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Foreword  
Louise Arbour, UN Special Representative for International Migration
Migration is an overwhelmingly positive story. The web of interactions between host 
communities, migrants and those locations from which they travel is one of great 
economic, social and cultural richness.  
 Yet the full potential and nature of this relationship is not sufficiently understood. 
As migration emerges as a global issue requiring global solutions, there is a risk 
that development policies are only considered as tools to address the root causes of 
migration, or that aid is used to deter migration from low-income countries. Instead, 
it is important to consider how migration can facilitate development and improve 
opportunities for all.
 I am therefore delighted to welcome this series of briefings which explore how 
migration can help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) from gender 
equality to urbanisation, climate change and poverty reduction. These briefings are 
essential reading for anyone tasked with implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, yet unsure about the how and whether migration can help achieve 
specific SDGs.
 The evidence presented here clearly shows that migration will impact the 
achievement of all Goals, and that development will have an impact on future 
migration. It is crucial that we understand this interrelationship if we are to achieve 
our common goals of promoting safe, orderly and regular migration, and holistic 
sustainable development.
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Introduction
Marta Foresti and Jessica Hagen-Zanker
1. The main focus of the project was on international labour migration, though the briefings also considered internal migration (notably the briefing on 
Urbanisation) and forced displacement (particularly the briefings on Climate change and Education).
1 Migration, development and the 2030 
Agenda
Migration is one of the defining features of the 21st 
century. It contributes significantly to all aspects of 
economic and social development everywhere, and as 
such will be key to achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Different opportunities and levels of 
development in origin countries can drive migration. At 
the same time, migration can increase development and 
investment in origin countries, fill labour gaps in host 
countries and contribute to development along the journey 
(or, in so-called ‘transit countries’). It is a strong poverty 
reduction tool – not just for migrants themselves, but 
also for their families and their wider communities. But 
migration can also negatively impact development, and 
though the relationship between the two is increasingly 
recognised, it remains under-explored. 
Migration can contribute to positive development 
outcomes and, ultimately, to realising the Goals of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the ‘2030 
Agenda’). To do this, it is essential to understand the 
impacts of migration on the achievement of all SDGs, 
and – equally – the impact this achievement will have on 
future migration patterns. As the details of the Global 
Compact for Migration (GCM) are being debated, it is 
more important than ever to understand these relationships 
and their implications for policy.
In a series of eight policy briefings, the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) analyses the interrelationship 
between migration1 and key development areas: gender, 
health, urbanisation, climate change, social protection, 
education, citizenship and poverty. Each briefing explores 
how the links between migration and these different 
development areas affect the achievement of the SDGs, 
and offers pragmatic recommendations to incorporate 
migration into the 2030 Agenda and beyond to ensure it 
contributes to positive development outcomes. 
1.1 Why the 2030 Agenda can be a useful policy 
framework for migration
The 2030 Agenda is well placed to reflect and exploit 
the links between migration and development for three 
reasons. For migration, the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs 
represent an incredibly important step in development 
policy-making. The global Targets are the first to formally 
recognise migration in international development 
frameworks and processes. This highlights the importance 
of migration as an issue, and cements it as a factor which 
can contribute to development and poverty reduction. 
The multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral nature of the 
2030 Agenda is a useful platform to assess the impact of 
migration and human mobility on a range of development 
areas (Lönnback, 2014). This is not just important in 
terms of problem analysis – for instance, in considering 
the effects of migration across different dimensions of 
development – but also offers opportunities for finding 
policy solutions. The SDGs’ multi-disciplinary nature 
increases the potential for multi-stakeholder collaboration 
in labour mobility (Mosler Vidal, 2017). 
Crucially, the 2030 Agenda is supported by the 
necessary political ‘traction’ in different member states 
and in the multilateral system. The impacts of migration 
can be felt at all stages of the journey – notably in both 
origin and host countries – and as such it interacts with 
different sectors, requiring coordination between multiple 
actors and enhanced coherence across policies. This kind 
of coordination is only possible with high-level buy-in, 
something the SDGs have already secured.
1.2 Migration in the 2030 Agenda
The 2030 Agenda does explicitly refer to migration, 
and recognises the economic value of migrants: migrant 
workers are expressly considered in SDG 8 on economic 
growth and decent work; issues of trafficking noted as 
part of SDG 16 on peaceful societies; SDG 10 calls for 
a reduction in the transaction costs of remittances; and 
migrant status is mentioned in SDG 17 as a factor for 
disaggregation during review and follow up (Table 1). 
Finally, Target 10.7 – the cornerstone of migration in the 
2030 Agenda – calls for the facilitation of ‘safe, regular and 
responsible migration’ and the implementation of ‘well-
managed migration policies’. 
But while migration and remittances are covered 
by several Targets (Table 1), the relationship between 
migration and development does not feature elsewhere in 
the Goals, nor has it been consistently explored. 
Migration is relevant to many of the other Goals. If 
countries are to achieve the SDGs, they need to consider 
the impact of migration at all levels and on all outcomes, 
beyond the migration-specific Targets. Our analysis, which 
has explored the links between migration and 13 of the 17 
SDGs (Table 2), shows that migration is not a development 
‘problem’ to be solved (as is the focus of SDG 10.7), but 
a mechanism that can contribute to the achievement of 
many of the Goals. To do this, governments must identify 
the linkages between migration and different Goals and 
Targets as shown in Table 2. Finally, countries must also 
recognise that migrants may be a particularly vulnerable 
group who should be considered under the general 
principle of ‘leaving no-one behind’.
2 Linking migration, development and the 
2030 Agenda 
Four main conclusions emerge from our analysis of the 
relationship between migration and different development 
areas: 
1. Migration is a powerful poverty reduction tool, 
which can contribute to the achievement of the SDGs
Labour migration can reduce poverty for migrants 
themselves, their families, and their origin and host 
countries. Migrants and their families benefit from 
increased income and knowledge, which allows them to 
spend more on basic needs, access education and health 
services, and make investments – directly impacting SDG 
1, SDG 3 and SDG 4. For female migrants, increased 
economic resources can improve their autonomy and 
socioeconomic status, impacting SDG 5. In origin 
countries, migration can lead to increased wages and 
greater economic growth through higher incomes, spending 
and investment of migrant households. In host countries, 
migrants can fill labour gaps and contribute to services and 
the fiscal balance, impacting on SDG 1, SDG 8 and SDG 9. 
However, migration does not always achieve its full 
potential. Our analysis on migration and urbanisation 
finds that poor, urban migrants often work in the informal 
sector where the rewards of migration are lower (Lucci et 
al., 2016). In relation to poverty, our research reveals that 
the high costs involved in different stages of the migration 
process reduce financial payoffs, and that restrictions on 
mobility prevent those who would benefit the most from 
migrating in a regular and orderly way (Hagen-Zanker 
et al., 2017b). Large and unexpected migration flows can 
also disrupt education systems, disadvantage migrant and 
refugee children, and create tensions in host communities 
(Nicolai et al., 2017).
2. The specific risks and vulnerabilities of migrants 
are often overlooked
The risks and vulnerabilities of migrants throughout the 
migration process are often overlooked in development 
processes, the 2030 Agenda included. Migrants experience 
both migration-specific vulnerabilities – that is, experienced 
by migrants only – and migration-intensified vulnerabilities 
– when migration exacerbates a disadvantage that can be 
experienced by all (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003). For 
instance, a migration-specific vulnerability is that female 
migrants, working in less regulated and less visible sectors, 
are at greater risk of exploitation and abuse, including 
trafficking (O’Neil et al., 2016). Or that migration due to 
climate change can lead to further risk accumulation in 
cities (Wilkinson et al., 2016). An example of a migration-
intensified vulnerability is that migrants are more likely 
to live in informal settlements, lacking access to health, 
education, water and social protection services (Hagen-
Zanker et al., 2017a; Nicolai et al., 2017; Tulloch et al., 
8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and 
those in precarious employment.
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed 
migration policies.
10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%.
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.
17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity building support to developing countries, including for Least Developed Countries (LCDs) and Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS), to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory 
status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.
Table 1: The Targets that mention migration
Note: That is, those Targets which mention the word ‘migration’, ‘migrant’ or ‘trafficking’.
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2016). Beyond SDG 16.2 (trafficking) and 8.8 (labour 
rights and secure work environments), these risks and 
vulnerabilities are not considered in the 2030 Agenda.
3. The implementation of existing programmes of 
support for migrants is often weak
In principle, three quarters of the world’s migrants are 
entitled to some form of social protection through a 
multilateral, bilateral or unilateral agreement. But in 
practice, enforcement of these agreements is poor (Hagen-
Zanker et al., 2017a). Access to basic services, such as 
health, education and social protection, is key for migrants’ 
livelihoods and development prospects. But while in some 
cases, migrants can access such services through existing or 
specifically designed programmes, the implementation of 
such programmes is often weak and levels of uptake low. 
A number of factors contribute to this, including limited 
capacity in implementing institutions, funding gaps, a 
lack of political support and reluctance among migrants 
to participate. For instance, while migrants in Thailand 
are covered by the country’s universal health care scheme, 
uptake is low due to language and cultural barriers, fear 
of discrimination, fear of losing work due to absence and 
poor employer compliance with the scheme (Tulloch et 
al., 2016). Likewise, while often eligible for education, 
immigrant students tend to face greater difficulties than 
their host country peers in accessing education and 
achieving good learning outcomes (Nicolai et al., 2017). 
4. There are major data gaps
Finally, data is often not disaggregated by migrant status 
or comparable across different groups and countries. As 
a result, we do not know the share of migrants actually 
able to participate in social protection programmes, 
access health services or attend school. The collection 
and monitoring of this disaggregated data, accompanied 
by migrant-specific indicators, is vital to understand 
the vulnerabilities and needs of migrants. Only then 
can governments and NGOs design migrant specific 
and sensitive support. Unfortunately, there are no 
internationally standardised approaches for collecting 
this data, and coordination of the data that different 
actors have already collected is limited. Within the 2030 
Agenda, there are two Targets that could facilitate the 
implementation of coherent policies and programmes 
to support better coordination and data. Target 17.18 
focuses on data and monitoring, crucially including a call 
for disaggregation of data by migrant status. Meanwhile, 
Target 16.6 calls for the development of effective, 
accountable and transparent institutions through which 
migrants could have recourse to hold governments, service 
providers and individuals to account.
3 Implications for migration and 
development policies 
Development policies and programmes can be part of 
a comprehensive strategy to better manage migration 
and make the most of its economic and social benefits. 
To do this, migration must be ‘mainstreamed’ in 
the implementation of the 2030 Agenda: the links, 
opportunities and challenges related to migration under 
specific Goals and Targets need to be identified and 
highlighted. Policy-makers need to consider, measure and 
take account of migration to harness its positive benefits 
and reduce potential challenges. 
The multiple facets of the relationship between 
migration and development offer concrete policy entry 
points to help achieve the SDGs – including in specific 
sectors, such as health and education. For instance, the 
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) decent work 
agenda is highly relevant to migration. Any programming 
as part of this agenda should consider the specific 
vulnerabilities of migrants in the workplace (see Lucci 
et al., 2016) and the specific barriers migrants face in 
accessing work-place social protection schemes (see Hagen-
Zanker et al., 2017a).
3.1 The Global Compact for Migration: a unique 
moment of opportunity
The links between migration and development also have 
implications for migration policy and practice, particularly 
the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), which will be 
agreed by the UN member states in 2018. The GCM – an 
effort by states to work towards a common approach to 
address global migration – represents a unique moment 
of opportunity to put the nexus between migration and 
development on the global policy agenda. After years 
of debate that saw limited contact and collaboration 
between migration and development policy and practice 
communities, we are now at an important crossroads. Two 
years after the agreement of the SDGs and one year from 
the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the 
GCM is a chance to contribute to real progress. The SDGs 
should be a part of this (Foresti, 2017). 
The SDGs provide a holistic and comprehensive 
framework to ground the migration-development nexus 
in the GCM. It will be important not to limit the focus 
to specific Targets on migration and remittances, but 
rather consider the role of human mobility to achieve 
all the Goals (ibid.). And, while the GCM framework 
and aspirations are global and grounded in international 
cooperation, actions need to be locally led and rooted in 
specific contexts, countries, regions and markets where 
particular development opportunities and challenges exist 
(ibid.). 
3.2 The need for a new narrative
But how to do development is as important as what to 
do. There is the risk that viewing migration through a 
development lens may reinforce or replicate unhelpful 
dichotomies of donor and recipient or origin and host 
country. For example, the fact that in some host countries 
(especially in Europe) development aid is being used as 
part of a broader strategy to deter migration raises many 
concerns; not only it is ineffectual (there is no evidence 
that aid can affect migration patterns) but it also risks 
misinforming the public about the positive relationship 
between migration and development. Instead, the SDGs 
are an opportunity to frame migration and development 
relationships between countries as reciprocal and mutual, 
under a global framework. 
The GCM consultation process also highlighted the 
need for a fresh narrative that goes beyond the negative 
connotations and perceptions that are present in both 
migration and development debates. A new vocabulary 
could help achieve this, and avoid replicating common 
misconceptions. We propose three new ways to talk about 
migration and development to move the debate along 
(Foresti, 2017): investment, innovation and inclusion.
 • Investment. Beyond aid or remittances alone, focus on 
investing in future societies for all, in line with the ‘leave 
no one behind’ imperative. This includes harnessing 
the potential of diaspora, civil society innovators and 
entrepreneurs as private sectors and civil society. 
 • Innovation. Build and expand on the initiatives that 
already exist especially at local and country levels: 
diaspora bonds, global skills partnership, extension 
of rights for citizens on the move, financial inclusion 
through digital technology/mobile money, training and 
skills matching/investment etc. 
 • Inclusion. It is key for development and migration 
policies to be inclusive and not targeted at specific 
groups alone. They also need to explicitly aimed at 
expanding rights and opportunities. In practice, there 
is a need to broadening access to services, ensure 
portability of benefits and expand access to inclusive 
finance.
Moreover, while the 2030 Agenda provides a useful, 
broad policy framework with political traction, on its 
own it will not be enough to achieve change. We need to 
build coalitions and partnerships – between countries, 
cities, with development organisations and actors, with 
private sector – and to identify and work on realistic and 
politically viable objectives. Strategies should be flexible 
and modalities of intervention should adapt to specific 
needs and opportunities. It will be important to avoid 
‘blueprint’ approaches and unrealistic promises if we are to 
make the most of bringing these two interlinked agendas 
together for concrete change. 
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Goal Target Link with migration Briefing
1.1 Migration is a powerful poverty reduction strategy, for migrants themselves and their families in origin 
countries. It has substantial positive impacts on income and other areas of human development.
Poverty
Increased immigration does not lead to higher poverty rates in host countries; in fact, migrants often 
add value to domestic economies.
Poverty
Rural to urban migration contributes to economic development and to overall poverty reduction. Urbanisation
Access to education for migrants can lead to rising incomes. Education
1.3 Labour migrants can be a particularly poor and vulnerable group, but often lack eligibility for legal 
social protection and/or are not effectively covered. Where migrants are covered, benefits are often 
non-portable, further reducing coverage amongst a group that is highly mobile.
Social Protection
1.4 Migration can help families in countries of origin to improve their wellbeing through increased income 
and consumption. Indirect effects include higher savings, investment and protection from shocks and 
stresses.
Poverty
1.5 The poor are the most vulnerable to climate change. They are likely to live in high-risk areas, have 
fewer means to prepare, and lack information to anticipate, and respond to, a disaster. Yet they are 
also the people who will find it hardest to migrate.
Climate change
1.a Labour migrants present an opportunity to increase the tax base, and a greater number of contributors 
to social insurance-type schemes leads to better risk pooling and financial sustainability.
Social Protection
Remittances and other forms of diaspora financing can be mobilised to improve infrastructure, 
services and development more generally. 
Poverty
2.2 Migrants are a particularly vulnerable group but may not be reached by assistance programmes aimed 
at improving nutrition. 
Health
3.1 Eligibility for health access is often tied to citizenship/permanent residency status, with only some 
countries opening up (emergency) health care to all, regardless of status. 
Citizenship
Migrants, particularly those without legal residence permits, sometimes experience higher maternal 
mortality and morbidity relative to the host populations.
Health
3.8 As internal migrants are often in the informal sector they risk exclusion from coverage of insurance 
schemes and in many cases are not considered in universal health coverage programmes.
Health
4.1,  
4.2, 
4.5,
Migration helps improve education access and educational outcomes for families in origin countries, 
yet migrant children in host countries often suffer disadvantages in accessing quality education.
Education
4.1 Eligibility for primary and secondary school education can be tied to citizenship/permanent residency 
status, which means that migrant children can be prevented from accessing education, particularly 
children who are undocumented. Often this also includes second generation migrants.
Citizenship
4.4 Internal migrants often lack the skills and training required to access decent jobs and as a result end 
up working in low-productivity jobs in the informal sector.
Urbanisation
4.7 Education plays an important role in social integration, economic mobility and learning outcomes for 
migrant children. 
Education
5.2 Migrant and refugee women and girls can experience violence at all stages of the migration process, 
especially during transit (e.g. at refugee camps) or at their destination (e.g. by an employer).
Gender
5.4 Many migrant domestic workers are female. Actions that increase the value of domestic work would 
reduce the burden of unpaid work and enhance the well-being, dignity and status of paid and unpaid 
care and domestic workers, including migrants.
Urbanisation
Table 2: The impact of migration on different SDGs and Targets
Goal Target Link with migration Briefing
6.1,  
6.2
Large-scale movements of people could increase stress on fragile water supply systems. Health
8.5 Migration, in particular remittances, can lead to economic growth in origin countries. It can also lead 
to a reduction in unemployment and increase wages in countries of origin, also affecting poverty 
indirectly.
Poverty
Female migrants and refugees may be prevented from working, or may experience de-skilling or being 
confined to ‘feminine’ jobs, often paid or valued less than other work.
Gender
8.8 Low-skilled rural to urban migrants seeking better job opportunities in the city often end up working in 
precarious occupations in the informal economy.
Urbanisation
Female migrants in stereotypically ‘feminine’ work (e.g. live-in care and domestic work) are frequently 
isolated and therefore more vulnerable to exploitation, violence and abuse.
Gender
9.5 Migration leads to greater diversity in host countries, and this can foster innovation. Poverty
In origin countries, migration can also foster innovation through social remittances, skills transfers and 
return migration.
Poverty
10.1 Migration can reduce global inequalities, among countries and people, as people migrate from low- to 
high-income countries, and send remittances back home.
Poverty
Whether migration reduces inequality within origin countries depends on where migrants sit on the 
income distribution. In some contexts, migration can lead to higher inequality as the poorest are often 
unable to migrate. When the costs of migration are reduced, the potential to reduce inequality is also 
greater.
Poverty
10.2 Education can improve the social, economic and political inclusion of migrant children, particularly if 
they are better educated regarding their host country and able to speak the majority language.
Education
10.3 Removing legal barriers to accessing education – particularly for the children of irregular migrants and 
refugee children – would boost enrolment rates, as would ensuring that all people have a legal identity 
and the necessary paperwork to allow them to enrol in school.
Education
10.4 Social protection policies often do not guarantee equal access to all workers, which means that labour 
migrants have lower eligibility for and take-up of social protection. If vulnerable groups are unable to 
participate in social protection, inequalities widen.
Social Protection
11.3 Actions that take into account the needs of poor internal migrants, and the urban poor more generally, 
enhance their well-being and are more likely to maximise benefits of migration for the host city 
economy.
Urbanisation
13.1,
13.3
People affected by climate change will seek to diversify their livelihoods and rely on remittances from 
relatives elsewhere to cope with seasonal variation, extreme events and longer term trends. Adaptation 
policies can ensure income diversification into less climate vulnerable sectors.
Climate change
13.2 Not taking into account rural-to-urban migration patterns in the future could result in incomplete 
adaptation plans, which fail to protect important economic sectors from climate change impacts.
Climate change
13.3, 
13.a
Better consideration of migration as a response to climate change – both extreme and slow-onset 
changes – and better financial planning are required to divert funds from adaptation to addressing a 
migration crisis.
Climate change
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Goal Target Link with migration Briefing
16.2 Attempts to eliminate child labour, exploitation and trafficking through financial support to families 
are all likely to boost education for migrant children by freeing them to receive an education that they 
would not otherwise be able to have.
Education
Irregular and young migrants are at greater risk of violence, trafficking and exploitation. Migrant girls 
are more likely to be trafficked or experience sexual exploitation than boys.
Gender
When migrants, including second-generation migrants, cannot obtain citizenship or residency status, 
they are more vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers.
Citizenship
16.7 Migration can contribute to making host countries more diverse and inclusive. Lack of citizenship or 
residency can prevent migrants from being full members of society, including access to services, and 
can lead to tensions and conflict.
Citizenship
17.8 Data on migration, particularly on internal migration, is very limited. Improving the evidence base is 
fundamental in order to better understand the scale and impact of internal migration, and design 
better policies.
Urbanisation
Data pertaining to migration background and education level should be collected together. This 
information should be used to support vulnerable groups, and not for reporting to security-related 
institutions.
Education
17.18 There are no international standardised approaches for monitoring variables relating to the health 
of migrants. Development of data collection, monitoring and surveillance mechanisms is needed to 
understand migrant health needs.
Health
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• International labour migration can reduce poverty for migrants themselves, their families, and their 
host and origin countries. It is therefore crucial to achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1.
•  Yet, migration does not always achieve its poverty reduction potential. This is due to the high costs 
involved, poor conditions in host countries, and barriers to mobility.
•  To reap the benefits, states should increase and diversify safe, regular and orderly migration 
pathways in line with demand for migrant labour, and make these easier to access.
•  Remittances are a powerful poverty reduction instrument. They should be encouraged by origin 
countries and the private sector. Transfer costs should be lowered. States should also lower the 
costs and bureaucratic requirements for those wishing to migrate.
• Evidence is needed on the mechanisms through which migration impacts on poverty. Better 
longitudinal data would help understand these pathways and target policies effectively.
Key 
messages
SDGs covered    1: No poverty 
8: Decent work and economic growth 
10: Reduced inequalities
Poverty, migration 
and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development
Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Hannah Postel and Elisa Mosler Vidal
1 Introduction 
This briefing considers the extent to which international 
labour migration can reduce poverty, and the implications 
this has for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2030 Agenda). Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
1 calls for ‘ending poverty in all its forms everywhere’. 
Labour migration can help achieve this goal, having 
been described as ‘the most effective contribution we can 
make to improving the lives of the world’s working poor’ 
(Rodrik, 2007). In this briefing, we show that international 
labour migration is a powerful tool to reduce poverty, 
for migrants themselves, their families, and their host and 
origin countries. 
In 2015, over 243 million people (3% of the global 
population) lived outside their country of origin. The 
growth of financial transfers made by these migrants 
(‘remittances’) has rapidly accelerated. Remittance flows 
to developing countries are now four times larger than 
official development assistance (ODA) (Global Knowledge 
Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), 
2017) and are estimated to touch the lives of over one 
billion people. In certain settings, migration has been 
shown to be more effective at reducing poverty than other 
development programmes (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014).
Tackling the different facets of poverty is one of the key 
aims of the 2030 Agenda. Poverty is multidimensional; 
encompassing both monetary measures and other 
dimensions such as living standards, health, and education 
access and quality (Alkire and Santos, 2010). Labour 
migration1 can reduce poverty for migrants themselves, 
their families, and their host and origin countries. 
Migrants and their families benefit from increased income 
and knowledge, which allows them to spend more on 
basic needs, access services, and make investments. In 
host countries, immigration can have positive economic 
effects through increased production and labour-market 
specialisation. In origin countries, migration can lead 
to higher economic growth through increased incomes 
and spending, investment by migrant households, and 
knowledge transfers. However, migration does not always 
achieve this potential, nor are the outcomes always 
beneficial, due to a number of barriers. These include 
the financial costs of migration itself, conditions in host 
countries, and barriers to mobility. 
1. This briefing focuses on international labour migrants (or ‘migrant workers’), defined as individuals who moved from one country to another for the 
purpose of employment (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011). Where the briefing refers to other types of migrants, for example 
internal migrants, this will be stated explicitly. Most of the evidence focuses on migration to the global North, although we do also include examples of 
South-South migration.
2. In this briefing we include studies considering the income and welfare gains from migration, which are an indicator of its potential to reduce poverty. 
However, it should be kept in mind that they may not always translate into a reduction of poverty at the national level.
3. The impacts of migration are difficult to measure as migrants are not randomly selected but self-select into migration. Therefore migrant-sending 
households can have underlying differences to non-migrant-sending households (e.g. they may be wealthier or more willing to take risks), which means 
comparing them may capture differences in these underlying differences instead of migration effects (Démurger, 2015). This section only cites studies that 
account for selection bias; where this is not the case this will be stated.
The beginning of this briefing presents evidence 
demonstrating the potential of migration to reduce poverty. 
Section 3 links this evidence to the 2030 Agenda, arguing 
that migration should be considered a means to meet the 
SDGs, especially Goals 1, 8 and 10, and their Targets, 
especially 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.a and 1.b. Section 4 considers 
why migration’s poverty reduction potential is not always 
met, and what to do about it. Section 5 concludes, and 
offers recommendations to boost this potential.
2 How can migration reduce poverty?
Migration can result in positive economic and social 
benefits, for migrants themselves, their families, and 
their host and origin countries. In particular, migration 
is a powerful poverty reduction tool, with the potential 
to substantially increase incomes for migrants and their 
families.2 
2.1 Impacts on migrants and their families
Migration can reduce poverty of both migrants themselves 
and their families in countries of origin. It can do this 
through remittances, as well as other mechanisms, 
including knowledge and norm transfers, in-kind transfers 
(e.g. assets) and changing household dynamics.3 While 
most studies focus on South-North migration, similar 
mechanisms hold for South-South movements; effects will 
of course vary based on context, but likely not enormously.
Labour migration can have a direct, immediate and 
substantial effect on the poverty of migrants themselves 
due to increases in income. A typical worker from an 
average developing country would earn 2.5-3 times their 
income if they moved to the United States (US) (Clemens et 
al., 2009). Migration resulted in a 263% income gain for 
Tongans in New Zealand (McKenzie et al., 2010; Box 4); 
and 1,400% for Haitians migrating temporarily to the US 
(Clemens and Postel, 2017; Box 1). Migration within the 
global South can also result in income gains of up to 60% 
(Ratha and Shaw, 2007). The families of the migrant can 
also experience gains in income, mainly through remittance 
receipts.
These income gains can lead to poverty reduction. 
For example, international migration reduced the level 
of poverty among migrant households in Ecuador by 
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between 17% and 21% (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014).4 
This is a substantial decrease, especially when compared 
to other development programmes – a rigorous review of 
cash transfers showed that impacts on poverty reduction 
range from four to nine percentage points (Bastagli et 
al., 2016). Remittances can also be seen as an informal 
insurance mechanism, helping households cope with 
economic shocks (Stark and Lucas, 1988; Yang, 2008) 
and preventing them from falling deeper into poverty. In 
addition, migrants and their families can become wealthier 
through the accumulation of assets and the ability to make 
more investments (Yang, 2008; de Brauw and Rozelle, 
2008; Mansuri, 2007). 
Migration can influence whether family members in 
origin countries work, and the type of work they do. The 
evidence is mixed and context-specific. In some cases, 
family members work less.5 This effect is often gendered; 
labour-force participation tends to fall more for women in 
households that receive remittances (as Amuedo-Dorantes 
4. See also Jimenez-Soto and Brown, 2012 for Tonga.
5. See Adams, 2011 for a review of evidence on this in various countries; Grigorian and Melkonyan, 2011 for Armenia; and Abdulloev et al., 2014 for 
Tajikistan.
6. See also Acosta, 2011 for El Salvador; Yang, 2008 for the Philippines; and Mansuri, 2006 for Pakistan.
7. For more information, see two other briefings in ODI’s Migration and the 2030 Agenda series: on health (Tulloch et al., 2016) and education (Nicolai et 
al., 2017).
8. However, there is also some evidence that the migration of parents or caregivers can have negative impacts on education and health of children and the 
elderly (e.g. Giannelli and Mangiavacchi, 2010 for Albania).
and Pozo, 2006 show for Mexico). Whether this results 
in an increase or decrease in poverty depends on how 
far remittances compensate for work-related income 
loss. Crucially, migration and remittances can reduce 
child labour, especially among poorer and low-skilled 
households (de Paoli and Mendola, 2017)6, which has 
important implications for long-term poverty reduction. 
Access to education and health are also aspects of 
multidimensional poverty; moreover, they are important 
determinants of long-term poverty. Migration leads 
to improved health, education access and outcomes,7 
particularly for children.8 Migration can also result in 
‘social remittances’ or norm transfers (Levitt, 1998) 
that can have positive effects on individual and family 
wellbeing. For instance, Mexican women whose partners 
migrated internationally had lower smoking rates and 
healthier pregnancies than average through norm transfers 
(Frank, 2005). Having household members working in 
urban areas and abroad was associated with improved 
Box 1: A pilot programme using labour mobility as a tool to reduce poverty
After an earthquake devastated Haiti in 2010, the Center for Global Development (CGD) proposed a novel way 
to help Haitians rebuild their livelihoods: help them migrate. This required opening new legal migration pathways 
between the US and Haiti, a process that culminated five years later when the US Department of State made 
Haitians eligible for temporary work visas. A pilot programme matching Haitian workers to US farms in need of 
agricultural labour soon followed: between 2015 and 2016, 68 workers arrived to work in the US.
The results of a small-sample survey assessing the programme’s impact showed the project differed from 
traditional development aid in three major ways: the size of the income gains; the direct benefit to poor families; 
and the mutual economic benefit to both countries. On average, one month of seasonal agricultural work by a 
male Haitian in the US raised his current wage by approximately 1,400% (Clemens and Postel, 2017). This led to 
a doubling of annual household income in Haiti, with 2-3 months of overseas work by one household member. 
Furthermore, all migrant households reported being able to invest in durable goods and livelihoods, including 
in farming tools and home construction. These gains are much larger than for other poverty-reduction policies, 
which at the high end have been measured at 20-30%.12 And in comparison to aid, where only a portion of total 
project funding reaches the poor, income earned by Haitian seasonal workers in the US went directly to Haitian 
households. 
The programme had effects beyond the household level: for every month of overseas work, approximately 
US$1,700 will eventually be spent in Haiti. These expenditures ripple through the Haitian economy, adding 
an estimated US$3,300 to Haiti’s GDP. Haitian agricultural work also adds value to the US economy by filling 
seasonal workforce needs. By supporting the productivity of US farms, one worker-month of Haitian agricultural 
labour adds approximately $4,000 to US GDP. 
These results suggest unexplored potential for temporary labour mobility as a tool for development and poverty 
reduction. The programme described here faced substantial informational and bureaucratic barriers, but was able 
to operate without any changes to existing legislation in either country. If successfully scaled, 10,000 Haitians 
working in the US for three months a year would add approximately US$100 million annually to the Haitian 
economy.   
knowledge of sexual health in rural Guatemalan women 
(Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco, 2005). Again, this has 
important implications for long-term poverty and the 2030 
Agenda more broadly, with migration enabling households 
to become healthier and better educated.9 
2.2 Impacts on origin countries
The previous section discussed how migration has the 
potential to reduce poverty for individuals and households. 
These effects ripple through national economies in origin 
countries: raising incomes, protecting against exogenous 
shocks, and enabling increased economic activity (see 
also Boxes 1 and 4 for effects on national-level gross 
domestic product (GDP)). In fact, most of the benefits to 
national economies accrue through the aggregate effect of 
migration on individual households. Increases in income 
through remittances can result in reductions of poverty 
at the macro-level if poorer households become relatively 
better off: in other words, by changing national inequality 
distributions. This is not a given, however. It depends on 
how income is originally distributed and where migrants 
fall on this spectrum (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007).
Most macro-level analyses investigating cross-country 
national-level poverty rates find that migration (often 
proxied by remittances) does cause a reduction in poverty. 
However, the size of this effect varies considerably by study 
and may be overstated in some cases due to methodological 
concerns. In one study of 10 Latin American countries, 
for every 10% increase in the ratio of remittances to GDP, 
poverty fell between 0.04% to 0.5% (Acosta et al., 2008).10
Other studies sum the benefits accrued by individual 
households to estimate the effects on national-level poverty. 
11 This approach reflects the logic explained above, that 
individual- and household-level poverty reduction from 
migration has national impacts in aggregate. For instance, 
a 10 percentage-point increase in international remittances 
in the Philippines caused a 2.8 percentage-point decline in 
the likelihood that a migrant household will be in poverty 
(Yang and Martinez, 2006). This benefit also spills over to 
non-migrant households in high-migration regions, where 
aggregate poverty rates fell by 0.7 percentage points. In 
Ecuador, one study found that migration reduced poverty 
incidence among migrant households by between 17.4% 
and 20.8% (Bertoli and Marchetta, 2014). Along similar 
lines, studies on internal migration in Vietnam and China 
have found a small yet significant effect on poverty rates 
9. For examples of positive effects of migration on investment in education and access for families in countries of origin, see Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2017 and Ambler et al., 2015.
10. See also Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2010; Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2007; and Gupta et al., 2007. The most cited study in this research space is Adams and 
Page (2005), but it does not correct for migrant selection bias.
11. Interestingly, the most cited statistics in this area (five percentage points of poverty reduction in Ghana, six percentage points in Bangladesh, and 11 
percentage points in Uganda) are untraceable to the original source or methodologically less rigorous (e.g. Lokshin et al, 2010; Adams and Cuecuecha, 
2013), implying that the magnitude of poverty reduction effects may be overstated).
12. 38% to 41% for grants to start-up businesses (Blattman and Niehaus, 2014); 20% to 25% for anti-sweatshop activism in Indonesia (Harrison and Scorse, 
2010); 10% to 30% for productive asset transfers for the ultra-poor (Banerjee et al., 2015).
(De Brauw and Harigaya, 2007 for Vietnam; Yang et al., 
2005 for China). 
Emigration can lead to increased wages for non-
emigrants in origin countries, particularly in the short-term, 
which can affect national poverty levels. However, this 
is mainly experienced by those with similar skills to 
emigrants; non-emigrants with complementary skills can 
experience a wage decline (Elsner, 2015).12
2.3 Impacts on host countries
Migration can also reduce poverty and increase growth in 
host countries; through increased productivity, new demand 
for and supply of goods and services, and more labour-
intensive production. As described in Box 1, a programme 
of temporary agricultural work for Haitians added value to 
the US economy of around US$4,000 per worker-month. 
Under New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employment 
programme, employers reported increased production 
through access to a more productive, stable workforce. 
Immigrants also add value to host countries through their 
skills and innovation, fostered by diversity; for example, 
the number of patents applied for by immigrants in the 
US is far greater than their share in the population (Hunt 
and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010). The literature agrees that 
immigration may encourage natives to take up more highly 
skilled jobs to take advantage of skills complementarity; 
native workers in Denmark originally displaced by new 
refugee arrivals eventually earned 3% more through 
increased specialisation in more complex tasks (Foged and 
Peri, 2015). 
3 Why migration matters for the 2030 
Agenda
As shown, international labour migration is a powerful 
poverty reduction tool, for migrants themselves, their 
families, and their host and origin countries. Therefore, 
migration can be a vital weapon in the arsenal to fight 
poverty, affecting the implementation of SDG 1, as well as 
several other Targets and Goals (see Table 1). These Targets 
cannot be met successfully unless their links to migration 
are considered. 
Targets 1.1 and 1.2 call for an end to poverty around 
the world. As we have seen, migration can be an effective 
instrument in reducing poverty. This is especially the case 
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regarding income, where the potential gains are very large 
for migrants and their families, leading to wider positive 
spillover effects. However, labour migrants themselves can 
be highly vulnerable and may need specific support.
Target 1.4 calls for greater access to economic resources, 
financial services and basic services. Labour migration 
can help families in origin countries invest in assets and 
access financial services. Migration can be a form of 
self-insurance; protecting migrant families experiencing 
shocks and stresses. This is relevant for Target 1.5 which 
calls for greater resilience and insurance for individuals 
and families. 
Target 1a calls for better and smarter mobilisation of 
resources for development. We have seen that remittances 
dwarf aid. Remittances, and other forms of diaspora 
financing and investment, can be mobilised to improve 
infrastructure, services and development more generally 
at a community level (see Gelb, forthcoming). Migration 
should be included as a poverty reduction strategy in non-
migration policy frameworks, as called for in Target 1b. 
Migration also affects multidimensional poverty (SDGs 
1, 3 and 4), economic growth and employment (SDG 8), 
and innovation (SDG 9), which can have indirect effects 
on poverty. Finally, it can lead to increases or decreases in 
inequality, relevant to SDG 10. 
13. There may also be psychosocial costs of migration, however these are not discussed here. For an overview of migrant happiness and wellbeing, see IOM 
(2013) and Hendriks (2015).
14. Passport costs vary widely, costing as much as US$300; in at least 14 countries a passport costs more than 10% of average annual per-capita income 
(Gibson and McKenzie, 2011a).
4 Why migration’s poverty reduction 
potential is not always met, and what to do 
about it
The financial costs13 associated with the migration process 
can reduce migration’s impact on poverty reduction. 
Further barriers include conditions in host countries, which 
can entrench poverty amongst migrants, and barriers to 
mobility, which often prevent those who would benefit the 
most from migrating from doing so. 
4.1 The financial cost of migration can be high
Migration can incur high costs, even prior to departure. 
This includes the costs of procuring passports14, a visa, 
work permit and/or the recruitment process more generally. 
Migrants may secure the services of a travel agent, migrant 
broker or smuggler, and the costs of the journey itself can 
be high, especially if protracted and/or irregular. These 
costs can be excessive – low-skilled migrants often pay 
more than a year’s worth of future income (International 
Labour Organization (ILO), 2017; KNOMAD, 2017), 
reducing their ability to send remittances. Migration 
costs tend to be higher for the low-skilled (ILO, 2017; 
KNOMAD, 2017) and are more likely to prevent the poor 
from migrating. Migration costs also tend to be higher 
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere
1.1: By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently 
measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day.
1.2: By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and 
children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national 
definitions.
Migration is a powerful poverty reduction strategy for migrants themselves and 
their families in origin countries. The benefits of migration are greater for those 
travelling through regular migration channels, with costs and risks higher for 
those migrants with irregular status (see Section 4). Furthermore, the poorest 
are often unable to benefit from migration, owing to the high costs involved.
Labour migrants in host countries may need specific support as they often face 
unique poverty challenges, for instance because of discrimination and poor 
working and living conditions (see Lucci et al., 2016). Migrants often send a 
high share of their disposable income as remittances which can make them 
impoverished. 
Increased immigration does not lead to higher poverty rates in host countries; in 
fact, migrants often add value to domestic economies.
1.4: By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the 
vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to 
basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, 
inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial 
services, including microfinance.
Migration can help families in origin countries improve their wellbeing through 
increased income and consumption. Indirect effects include higher savings, 
investment and protection from shocks and stresses. Migration can lead 
to family members accessing and using financial services for the first time 
(Anzoategui et al., 2014). It can also improve their ability to invest in assets, 
including land ownership, and increase access to basic services like education 
and healthcare.
Table 1: Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
1.5: By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations 
and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events 
and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters.
Migration strengthens households’ resilience. It helps families in times of crisis 
by strengthening their ability to cope with economic risks and shocks, through 
informal insurance strategies. Remittances have also been shown to increase 
at times of national shocks and stresses (for instance in the Philippines after 
natural disasters).
1.a: Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, 
including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide 
adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least 
developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in 
all its dimensions.
Remittances and other forms of diaspora financing can be mobilised to improve 
infrastructure, services and development more generally at community level (see 
Gelb, forthcoming). These have been shown to lead to poverty reduction on a 
national level as well. At the same time, remittances, as private funding, do not 
replace aid.
This is recognised in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (June 2015), which states 
the ‘positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable 
development in countries of origin’ (United Nations (UN), 2015). 
1.b: Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international 
levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to 
support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions.
Migration tends to be overlooked as a poverty reduction strategy in policy 
frameworks, with some policies in origin and host countries limiting mobility. 
Conditions in host countries can also reduce the poverty-reduction potential of 
migration. Sound policy frameworks should consider migration’s role in reducing 
poverty and strive for policy coherence across different sectors. 
Other Goals
Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages. Migration improves healthcare access and health outcomes for families in 
origin countries. However, migrants in host countries often lack access to health 
services (see Tulloch et al., 2016).
Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all.
Migration helps improve education access and educational outcomes for 
families in origin countries. However, migrant children in host countries often 
suffer disadvantages in accessing quality education (see Nicolai et al., 2017).
Goal 8: Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and 
decent work for all.
Migration, as proxied by remittances, can lead to economic growth in origin 
countries. It can also lead to a reduction in unemployment and higher wages in 
origin countries (Mishra, 2014). 
Labour migrants often face difficult working conditions (see Lucci et al., 2016), 
with stronger regulations and monitoring needed around working conditions and 
recruitment processes (see also Box 3) to achieve decent work for all migrants. 
Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and foster innovation.
Migration leads to greater diversity in host countries and this can foster 
innovation. 
In origin countries, migration can also foster innovation through social 
remittances, skills transfers and return migration (Debnath, 2016). This has 
implications for long-term poverty reduction in these countries. In some 
contexts, outflows of the highly skilled could have negative impacts for origin 
countries in certain sectors (for example, shortages of healthcare workers, 
Mills et al., 2008). However, evidence that a so-called ‘brain drain’ harms 
development in origin countries is mixed once the net effects are considered. 
High-skilled migration often generates positive externalities such as increased 
investment in education, a more educated domestic workforce, and returnees 
bringing back skills acquired abroad (Adzei and Sakyi, 2014; Docquier and 
Rapoport, 2011). 
Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries. With people migrating from low- to high-income countries and sending 
remittances back home, migration can reduce global inequalities among 
countries, and among people (Milanovic, 2016).
Whether migration reduces inequality within origin countries depends on where 
migrants sit on the income distribution. In some contexts, migration can lead to 
higher inequality as the poorest are often unable to migrate. When the costs of 
migration are reduced, the potential to reduce inequality is also greater.
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for migrants from more remote areas, who are also more 
likely to be poorer (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). This 
relationship holds at the national level as well: countries 
with low GDP per capita have lower emigration rates 
(OECD, 2016), to some extent due to aspiring migrants 
being unable to finance migration. 
Loans can facilitate the payment of pre-departure 
and recruitment costs. However, with imperfect credit 
markets in poorer areas, this can result in aspiring 
migrants borrowing high sums of money15 from informal 
lenders, often at exorbitant interest rates. This places poor 
households in a risky situation, and raises the stakes for 
the migrant: an ‘unsuccessful’ migration, which produces 
low returns (and hence low remittances), makes it difficult 
for the household to meet loan repayments and eventually 
free itself from debt. The most vulnerable can get caught in 
debt-bondage when they are trapped in exploitative work 
situations after taking a loan to pay for recruitment costs 
and/or an advance (e.g. Zeitlyn et al., 2014 on India).
Studies have shown that migration becomes more 
pro-poor when costs decrease, e.g. through strengthened 
migration networks (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007; 
Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). The policy discussions in 
this area have mostly focused on fair recruitment (see 
Box 3), but have also considered how to improve access 
to pre-departure migration loans. For instance, at the 
Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) 
in 2009, bank-non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
partnerships were discussed, where banks would provide 
loans at reasonable interest rates, as well as transparent 
information about the migration process (Martin, 2009). In 
Bangladesh, the NGO BRAC has funded close to 200,000 
migration loans, also providing additional pre-departure 
services such as contract reviews (BRAC, 2016). The policy 
recommendations of former UN Special Representative for 
Migration Peter Sutherland (the ‘Sutherland Report’) call 
for migrant welfare funds to issue such loans.
Finally, the cost of sending remittances back home can 
lower their potential for reducing poverty. Studies have 
shown that fees for migrants remitting to sub-Saharan 
Africa average 12% of the amount transmitted (Watkins 
and Quattri, 2014). These excess fees cost the African 
continent US$1.8 billion a year, which would cover the 
primary-school education of 14 million children in the 
region (ibid.). The need to reduce remittance fees is now 
firmly rooted in policy discussions, being an explicit target 
in the 2030 Agenda (see Target 10.C) as well as more 
specifically in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 
‘Sutherland Report’. Mobile remittances are seen as one 
way forward to reduce costs (Box 2).
15. For instance, one study shows that the average migration loan of migrants in Rolpa, Nepal, is 97% of average annual household expenditure (Hagen-
Zanker et al., 2014).
16. More information on these can be found in other briefings in this series, including on living conditions of urban migrants (Lucci et al., 2016) and those 
displaced by climate change (Wilkinson et al., 2016), access to health services (Tulloch et al., 2016), and access to social protection (Hagen-Zanker et al., 
2017).
4.2 Poor conditions in host countries can undercut 
expected benefits from migration
Migration doesn’t always offer the rewards anticipated. 
Conditions in host countries can entrench poverty of 
migrants, including poor living conditions and limited 
access to services,16 low wages, and poor working 
conditions. 
Sometimes, wages paid by employers are lower than 
promised, or not paid at all (see Donini et al., 2013; 
Hagen-Zanker et al., 2014; Maher, 2009). Wages can be 
irregular, particularly for those in the informal economy, 
making it difficult for migrants to sustain themselves in the 
host community and send remittances back home. Female 
migrant workers are especially over-represented in lower-
paid, irregular work (ILO, 2017; O’Neil et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, migrants may not be able to make full use 
of their education and skills as access to skills-recognition 
processes tend to be lacking, especially for low- and 
medium-skilled workers (ILO, 2017). This can lead to 
deskilling or ‘brain waste’ and migrant workers earning 
less than anticipated. Compared to natives, migrants face 
wage gaps that cannot be explained fully by differences 
Box 2: Mobile remittances to reduce costs
One innovative way to reduce the cost of 
remittances is to use mobile money-transfer options. 
A recent study on using mobile transfers found that 
it drastically reduces costs: using mobile transfers 
is on average more than 50% cheaper than using 
money-transfer operators (MTOs); in 45 country 
corridors surveyed, the average cost of sending 
US$200 using mobile money was 2.7%, compared 
to 6% with MTOs (GSMA, 2016). 
Mobile remittances have the potential to be more 
inclusive than other transfer methods, as they allow 
smaller remittance values to be sent more cheaply, 
which is important for poorer migrants. The same 
study showed the average value of mobile money 
transfers was US$82, while across other channels 
this was approximately US$500 (ibid.). Moreover, 
mobile money can foster greater financial inclusion, 
by tapping into migrants’ ownership and usage of 
mobile phones to include them in digital financial 
services. Finally, the increasing use of mobile money 
fosters competition in the market, leading to greater 
transparency and further driving down transfer 
costs. This includes traditional MTOs, which tend 
to lower their fees when forced to compete against 
mobile-money competitors. 
in education, work experience and language skills (ILO, 
2015). 
Second, migrants often experience poor working 
conditions, which can lead to lower earnings and adverse 
health outcomes. Migrant workers are more likely to hold 
jobs that are ‘dirty, dangerous and difficult’ (ILO, 2017). 
Migrant workers are much less likely to have ‘decent-
work benefits’ such as a contract, occupational health 
and safety, and fundamental labour rights (Aleksynska et 
al., 2017).17 Migrant workers are at greater risk of being 
victims of forced labour (ILO, 2017). They are also more 
likely to experience work-related accidents and diseases 
(Belin et al., 2011; ILO, 2017). This is especially relevant 
for those who are undocumented and/or working in the 
informal economy, who are also less likely to be protected 
through social-insurance schemes.18 As such, migrants may 
lose extended periods of time to illness, can end up with 
disabilities that limit future earning potential or, in extreme 
cases, lose their lives. Box 3 gives examples of emerging 
best practices on how to combat poor working conditions 
using fair recruitment. 
17. See also a review of working conditions for internal migrants in Lucci et al., 2016.
18. See Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017 for a review of social-protection coverage of migrants.
19. In total this represented approximately 630 million people who would like to migrate internationally, dwarfing the current estimated international-
migrant stock of 244 million (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2015).
4.3 Barriers to mobility 
So far, we have focused on the factors that limit the 
poverty reduction potential for those who are already on 
the move. What about those who would like to move, 
but are unable to do so? This ‘involuntary immobility’ (as 
coined by Carling, 2002) characterises many poor areas 
and origin countries. In a global survey, 14% of the world’s 
adults said they would like to move to another country.19 
Of those surveyed, 33% were in sub-Saharan Africa, 21% 
in the Middle East and North Africa, and 20% in Latin 
America (Esipova et al., 2011). However less than half of 
these respondents had already started making preparations 
(ibid.). The evidence suggests that those who would benefit 
the most from migration are often unable to do so. Part of 
this can be explained by the debilitating costs of migration 
discussed above. However, there are also policy barriers 
that prevent people from migrating legally, which diminish 
the potential of migration to reduce poverty.
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Box 3: Policy measures on fair recruitment
International labour standards apply to the recruitment of migrant workers. Effective implementation of fair 
recruitment measures involves extensive policy coordination amongst governments, labour recruiters and 
employers alike. The following are some emerging practices:
1.   Some host countries state costs are to be paid by the employer, while origin countries may cap recruiter fees 
(ILO, 2017). Nepalese practice combines this; the ‘free visa, free ticket’ policy ensures migrants pay no more 
than NPR20,000 (US$184) to private employment agencies, and the employer pays for tickets and visas (von 
Rohland and Crozet, 2017).
2.   To ensure workers are given clear, transparent contracts, standardised employment contracts can be attached to 
labour agreements between countries, as in the 2008 Sri Lanka-Qatar agreement (Wickramasekara, 2015), and 
registered with authorities in the host country, as in some Gulf countries (ILO, 2017).
3.   Some countries such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia have joint liability provisions to ensure recruiters and 
employers can be held liable for workers’ rights violations during recruitment (ILO, 2017).
4.   Private-sector initiatives play a growing role. The Consumer Goods Forum (CGF) recently introduced its 
Three Priority Industry Principles and guidance to tackle forced labour and abusive recruitment. More global 
companies are joining the Leadership Group, launched in 2016 under the Institute for Human Rights and 
Business (IHRB), to promote responsible recruitment and ethical supply chains (CGF, 2017; IHRB, 2016).
5.   More companies are following due-diligence procedures in supply chains, for example, US government agencies 
(United States Office of the Federal Register, 2012) and Colgate-Palmolive and Marks & Spencer’s (CGF, 2017).
6.   Once migrants are abroad, some cities have taken the initiative to protect their employment rights. Barcelona’s 
authorities help migrants with employment through its immigrant reception service, SAIER (Saier Servicio 
de Atención a Inmigrantes, Extranjeros y Refugiados), which supports migrants with job-seeking, training 
and education, and offers legal advice (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2017). In the US, ‘sanctuary cities’ can help 
protect irregular labour migrants (Ridgley, 2008). 
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Barriers set by origin countries
Some of these barriers are set, perhaps surprisingly, 
by origin countries. Some have extensive bureaucratic 
requirements, including procuring documents and 
participation in pre-migration trainings and health checks, 
that act as indirect barriers to exit.20 Poorer and less-
educated individuals can find it challenging to navigate the 
complex bureaucratic requirements. This in turn reduces 
their ability to migrate and increases their dependency on 
brokers, which drives up the cost of migration. 
Furthermore, some origin countries place legal 
restrictions on their citizens that prevent them from 
leaving. Some countries enact exit-visa schemes, others 
prohibit citizens from leaving if their intention is to 
migrate. Some countries place travel restrictions on women 
or on citizens of national-service age (see Figure 121), and 
others temporarily ban migrant workers from travelling to 
certain countries, allegedly for safety reasons or to protect 
their rights.22 
Preventing individuals from migrating can deny them 
the potential for poverty reduction and negatively affect 
their households. For example, a study in Indonesia 
showed that banning female domestic workers from 
emigrating to Saudi Arabia led to an increase in poverty 
of between 2% and 3% in households in migration origin 
communities, as well as a decline in female employment 
and labour-force participation (Makovec et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the bans that are intended to protect 
potential migrant workers from rights violations can 
backfire; in some cases, they have been associated with an 
increase in irregular labour migration and trafficking. 
Barriers set by host countries
Then there are barriers set by host countries limiting legal 
pathways for migration. Host countries employ different 
legislative and policy instruments to manage the overall 
number of immigrants and nature of migration. Many of 
these instruments prevent and restrict migration, which 
means that the demand far outstrips places available, 
particularly in the most desirable host countries. For 
instance, the US temporary visa for skilled migrants has 
a cap of 65,000 annually, which was reached within the 
first week in each of the past five years (Trautwein, 2017). 
Likewise, only about 0.5% of applicants for a diversity 
visa received it (State Department, 2017). In the UK, skilled 
Tier 2 visas are capped at 20,700 per year; in 2015 the 
monthly cap of 1,650 was reached within 11 days (West 
and Ali, 2015). 
20. For example, limited administrative capacity in the Congo means not enough passports are produced year on year to meet demand (Gibson and 
McKenzie, 2011).
21. This figure lists legal restrictions; other countries also restrict mobility for certain ethnic or political sub-groups due to political reasons.
22. Ethiopia bans unskilled workers travelling to the Middle East, and the Philippines restricts or bans labour migration to more than 10 Middle Eastern and 
sub-Saharan countries. Travel bans for migrant domestic workers are common; for example, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka 
have had temporary bans on domestic workers migrating to several Middle Eastern countries.
23. See also Medam (2017) for more examples.
Some evidence suggests that national migration policy 
regimes have become less restrictive over the past 50 years, 
at all skill levels (de Haas et al., 2016). Other analysis 
suggests that work-related entry channels in four European 
countries (France, Italy, Spain, the UK) have become more 
restrictive, especially with respect to low-skilled migration 
(Consterdine et al., 2017). While overall policy trends 
are disputed, country-level analysis shows that over the 
past two decades, more restrictive policies have started to 
dominate in traditional host countries, e.g. Australia and 
the US (de Haas et al., 2016). 
The nature of migration policies has changed too, 
becoming increasingly selective based on skills, with fewer 
opportunities for poor and less-skilled aspiring migrants 
(Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). Selective immigration 
policies facilitate the entry of skilled workers, but are also 
used to justify the discrimination and/or denial of rights 
to low-skilled workers (de Haas et al., 2016). This has 
direct implications for the potential of migration to reduce 
poverty as it prevents the low-skilled who are more likely 
to be poor from accessing regular migration pathways. It 
also potentially causes ‘brain waste’ amongst those who are 
slightly better off and can afford to finance migration and 
who can access regular migration pathways, but then often 
end up working in low-skilled jobs in host countries(ibid.). 
Restrictive policy regimes reduce the opportunities 
for regular migration in the first place, but they can also 
deflect migrants towards irregular migration channels. 
For instance, a study looking at Eritrean migrants in 
Ethiopia showed that as people lose hope in the formal 
processes and channels, the risks involved in irregular 
transit become tolerable (Mallett et al., 2017). Likewise, 
a study in 29 European countries showed that more 
restrictive temporary visa schemes push migrants towards 
irregularity: a 10% increase in short-stay visa rejections 
leads to a 5% increase in irregular migration (Czaika and 
Hobolth, 2014).23 As irregular migration is more costly and 
risky, it has a lower potential to reduce poverty, and makes 
the original point of barriers moot. 
Restrictive migration policies are likely to remain on the 
policy agenda of many desirable host countries, but there 
are policy entry points. Circular and seasonal migration 
schemes have been put forward as a ‘realistic’ policy 
solution (Foresti, 2017), opening up more opportunities 
for regular and safe migration, particularly for those with 
lower skills levels (see Boxes 1 and 4).
5 Conclusions and policy recommendations
The potential benefits of international labour migration 
have been described as the equivalent to ‘finding 
trillion-dollar bills on the side-walk’ (Clemens, 2011). 
The very essence of labour migration lies in the huge 
income-differentials that exist globally: a worker from 
a low-income country can earn significantly more in a 
high-income country, thus being able to improve standards 
of living for their families, with multiplier effects in both 
host and origin countries. In other words, migration is a 
hugely powerful poverty-reduction instrument and is key 
to meeting SDG 1 and other Goals. 
Keeping in mind the 2030 Agenda principle of ‘leaving 
no-one behind’, the evidence makes a powerful argument 
for creating opportunities for mobility for citizens of poor 
countries, particularly the poorest, who often cannot 
afford the high costs of migration. Schemes that foster 
labour mobility should be seen as complementary to other 
development programmes and considered an important 
item in the toolbox for reducing poverty.
Yet the role that mobility can play is mostly absent 
from the discussions on poverty reduction. This is because 
migration is a ‘difficult’ policy instrument. The effects of 
migration are not always immediate and public attitudes 
to migration are often negative (Dempster and Hargrave, 
2017), which makes it tough for policy-makers to propose 
new policy instruments within short-term political 
cycles. Migration often fails to achieve its full poverty 
reduction potential due to the high costs of migration, 
poor conditions in host countries, and barriers to mobility. 
Furthermore, when regular migration channels are not 
in place, aspiring migrants make use of irregular ones, 
with lower benefits for both host countries and migrants 
themselves. 
It is therefore in everyone’s interest for migration to 
happen safely and legally, in a regulated rather than a 
clandestine way (UN, 2017). To achieve this, the 2030 
Agenda can provide the policy framework, as well as the 
necessary political ‘traction’, in different member states and 
in the multilateral system.
Figure 1: Legal restrictions in origin countries on the international mobility of citizens 
Source: Country reports in US Department of State (2016)
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The recommendations below set out key actions 
for national governments in host and origin countries, 
international institutions and civil-society organisations 
to maximise the poverty reduction potential of migration. 
This is key for to achieving the SDG targets on poverty 
reduction and, leaving no-one behind.
Conclusion 1: Migration is one of the most successful 
ways to reduce poverty, and is therefore crucial to 
achieving SDG 1 and other Goals. 
Recommendation: Allow poor families and 
households to benefit from migration.
 • The benefits of migration are greater for migrants and 
host countries when it takes place through safe, regular 
and orderly pathways: expand and diversify them 
(see Conclusion 3). Origin countries should provide 
information about regular migration pathways, and 
run pre-departure training to facilitate migration and 
maximise its benefits. 
 • Safeguard the rights of migrant workers, including those 
working informally, particularly when they are not 
protected by national labour laws. Work proactively to 
eliminate abusive recruitment, and encourage greater 
scrutiny of global supply chains (see Box 3). These 
efforts should take a multi-stakeholder approach and 
involve governments of origin and host countries, as 
well as other actors including the private sector and 
local authorities.
 • Female migrant workers also contribute to sustainable 
development, but owing to gender-based barriers 
they are less likely than men to make the most of the 
economic and social opportunities of mobility. Policy 
measures should focus on regulating and improving 
working conditions for all female migrant workers 
(O’Neil et al., 2016).
 • Establish supportive institutions that can help families 
who stay behind adapt to the loss of an economically 
active member or caregiver through migration. 
Interventions should be tailored to the length and type 
of migration in question; options could include putting 
in place safety nets to improve health and education 
outcomes for children in the community, including those 
of migrant children, and introducing accessible banking, 
credit, investment and insurance systems (Démurger, 
2015).
 • Foster and encourage remittances and other forms of 
diaspora finance. Remittances can be a key resource 
for poverty reduction, while diaspora investment 
can contribute to broader economic growth in origin 
countries (see Gelb, forthcoming). Bilateral and 
multilateral organisations have a role to play too, 
for instance in matchmaking investors/lenders in the 
diaspora with borrowers in the home country (including 
the government, businesses or individual households) 
as well as leveraging and complementing diaspora 
investment.
 • Policy-makers in donor countries should view 
development aid and migration as complementary. It 
is possible to achieve aid objectives (such as poverty 
reduction) through mobility, while at the same time 
benefitting host countries (Clemens and Postel, 2017). 
At a more granular level, aid can be used to facilitate 
skills-training programmes specifically linked to 
mobility opportunities (see Clemens, 2014), provide 
information to aspiring migrants (e.g. on regular 
migration pathways), improve conditions for migrants 
in so-called transit countries, and more.
Box 4: New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer programme
The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) programme began in 2007, aiming to ease labour shortages in 
New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture industries by admitting up to 5,000 seasonal workers (in the first 
instance), giving preference to those from Pacific countries. Promoting development in the Pacific Islands is an 
explicit goal of RSE. It is considered a success; a rigorous multi-year evaluation showed it had a significant and 
multidimensional impact on poverty reduction for participating migrants and their households in Tonga and 
Vanuatu. 
In both countries, per-capita income of households with an RSE migrant rose by over 30% relative to non-
migrant households, and in Tonga, households doubled their savings (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014). Over 
two years, households in Vanuatu who reported having a bank account rose from 55% to 74% (ibid.), which 
is thought to reflect more formal savings practices. Subjective economic welfare increased significantly for 
households in both countries. Participating households in both countries purchased more durable assets, and in 
Tonga they were almost twice as likely as non-RSE households to make a home improvement. Moreover, school-
attendance rates increased by 20% for 16- to 18-year-olds in Tonga.
 • The relationship between migration and poverty 
reduction is complex: while the evidence shows that 
migration tends to reduce poverty, the mechanisms 
are often difficult to disentangle (Antman, 2012). 
Therefore, more rigorous research is needed to isolate 
these mechanisms, so that policies can be targeted more 
effectively. Better longitudinal data could also help to 
clarify the range of impacts migration has on migrants 
and their families, at different stages of the process.
Conclusion 2: The high cost of migration makes it 
harder for the poorest to migrate. 
Recommendation: Reduce the pre-departure, 
recruitment and travel cost of migration, improve 
access to loans, and lower the transaction costs of 
migrant remittances.
 • Origin countries should take action to reduce the pre-
departure costs of migration, as they burden the poorest 
the most. For instance, passports should be made 
available more easily and at a lower cost. Pre-departure 
loans, at reasonable interest rates from a regulated 
provider, can help, alongside information about the 
migration process. Such loans must be fully transparent 
and legal, and the migrant must have sufficient financial 
knowledge to assess adequately the implications of 
taking a loan. 
 • Governments should better regulate and monitor 
recruitment agencies, encouraging professionalisation 
and transparency in the industry, for example holding 
agencies accountable by publishing their performance 
and ratings. Additional efforts could include 
cooperation and agreements with large employers 
dependent on migrant labour, and bilateral coordination 
between origin and host countries on enacting the 
principles of ‘fair recruitment’.
 • Lowering the transaction costs of remittances has 
been on the policy agenda for years. The focus now 
has to move from rhetoric to action, ensuring more 
partnerships between MTOs, policy-makers, regulators 
and other stakeholders, and to set up enforceable 
agreements, such as the African Postal Financial Services 
Initiative (APFSI, 2016).
Relevant SDG Targets
1.1: By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people 
everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than 
$1.25 a day.
1.2: By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, 
women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its 
dimensions according to national definitions. 
1.4: By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular 
the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic 
resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and 
control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, 
natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial 
services, including microfinance. 
1.5: By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those 
in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and 
vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other 
economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters. 
8.1: Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance 
with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per 
cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least 
developed countries.
8.8: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure 
working environments for all workers, including migrant 
workers, in particular women migrants, and those in 
precarious employment.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.a: Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a 
variety of sources, including through enhanced development 
cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable 
means for developing countries, in particular least developed 
countries, to implement programmes and policies to end 
poverty in all its dimensions.
10.c: Reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances.
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Conclusion 3: There are insufficient safe, regular and 
orderly migration pathways diminishing the potential 
of migration to reduce poverty.
Recommendation: Increase and diversify safe, regular 
and orderly migration pathways to achieve greater 
poverty reduction benefits for migrants themselves, 
their families, and their host and origin countries.
 • Origin countries must remove barriers to migration. 
They should support their citizens who want to migrate 
by providing information on the migration process and 
consular support to those in host countries. They should 
also help those who return, for instance by providing 
attractive investment opportunities.
 • Temporary/seasonal migration has a high poverty 
reduction potential and can have more political traction 
in host countries than permanent schemes. These 
schemes should be expanded, learning lessons from 
existing pilots (for instance between Haiti and the US, 
and Tonga and New Zealand.
 • Many high-income countries have a strong demand for 
labour at different levels of skill. To ensure a reliable 
supply of appropriately trained individuals, host 
countries could set up training institutions in origin 
countries. Initiatives such as a Global Skills Partnership 
could combine skills and job training with embedded 
mobility schemes (Clemens, 2014). They would also 
help to maximise the benefits of migration for migrants 
and origin countries.
 • Citizens from the poorest countries have the most to 
gain from migration, yet are often less able to access 
regular migration pathways. Countries with a points-
based immigration system could give extra points for 
migrants from low-income countries, to increase their 
likelihood of obtaining a visa. Additional measures 
could focus on skills matching and skills recognition.
Many thanks to Pietro Mona (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)), Melissa Siegel (University of Maastricht), Emma Sammon, Helen 
Dempster, Marta Foresti and Stephen Gelb (all ODI) for comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to Sophy Kershaw for editing and Sean Willmott for design.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.b: Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional 
and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-
sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated 
investment in poverty eradication actions.
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration 
and mobility of people through the implementation of planned 
and well-managed migration policies.
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• Internal migration and population growth drive urbanisation in many countries. How urbanisation is 
managed, and the types of jobs and services that migrants can access, are crucial to achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
• Rural to urban migration can open up job opportunities, improve livelihoods and contribute to 
poverty reduction. Those who remain behind also benefit through remittances and non-financial 
transfers, such as improved knowledge and skills.
• Despite their potential, internal migrants are often neglected in government policies and lack 
access to adequate social protection or basic services.
•  Poor, urban migrants often work in the informal sector which is badly regulated in many cities.
•  More and better jobs, entrepreneurial opportunities, improved work standards and protection in 
cases of abuse would increase the opportunities available to migrants.
Key 
messages
SDGs covered    1: No poverty 
3: Good health and well-being 
4: Quality education 
5: Gender equality 
8: Decent work and economic growth 
10: Reduced inequalities 
11: Sustainable cities and communities 
17: Partnerships for the goals
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1 Introduction
Rapid urbanisation in developing countries is a defining 
feature of the 21st century, driven by internal migration 
and population growth. How urbanisation processes are 
managed and the types of jobs that internal migrants 
can access will have a great bearing on achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
This policy briefing focuses on the economic integration 
of internal migrants arriving to cities in rapidly urbanising 
countries. It highlights two important SDGs, from 
migrants’ perspectives: the promotion of full, productive 
employment and decent work for all (Goal 8), and making 
cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient 
and sustainable (Goal 11). This briefing synthesises the 
evidence on the impact of internal migration on migrants’ 
livelihoods, host cities’ development and overall poverty 
reduction. We assess how both migrants and ‘host’ cities 
can benefit from migration. We then put forward the policy 
instruments at city and national level that could help in 
achieving the SDGs.
Our main focus is on internal, rural to urban migration 
– one of the key pathways of urbanisation. People often 
move from poor rural areas to cities in the hope of 
escaping poverty. It is conventional economic wisdom 
that cities – because they concentrate economic activity 
and labour markets – are places of economic opportunity 
that hold the keys to further economic development 
and poverty reduction (Asfaw et al., 2010; Beegle et 
al., 2011; Tacoli et al., 2015). Indeed, in many Latin 
American and East Asian countries, urbanisation happened 
concurrently with industrialisation and access to higher 
productivity jobs. However, in some developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, urbanisation is happening without 
industrialisation and alongside an expansion of the 
informal economy. Despite this, people still prefer to move 
and stay in cities, which suggests that even in cases where 
poor rural migrants move from agricultural activities to 
precarious informal jobs in the city, they may still be better 
off. This briefing analyses the existing evidence to consider 
why this is.
After reviewing the main trends of internal rural 
to urban migration, Section 2 highlights the SDGs on 
which we focus. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
available evidence on the impact of internal rural to urban 
migration on migrants’ livelihoods, on the cities that they 
migrate to, and on overall poverty reduction. Section 4 
goes on to illustrate these impacts with two case studies 
across different regions (Dhaka in Bangladesh, and Accra 
and Kumasi in Ghana). Section 6 concludes with policy 
recommendations targeted at maximising the benefits of 
rural to urban migration and that go towards achieving the 
SDGs on decent jobs and inclusive, integrated urbanisation.
2 Internal migration trends
While international migration receives a lot of attention, 
internal migration is larger in terms of scale. In 2013 there 
were an estimated 763 million internal migrants worldwide 
(Bell and Charles-Edwards, 2013), three times the number 
of international migrants. Given that the costs of moving 
internally are much lower than those of crossing borders, 
internal migration and remittances are more likely to 
involve poorer people (Deshingkar, 2006; Migration DRC, 
2006). As such, internal migration also has the greater 
potential to reduce poverty. Even if internal remittances 
are likely to be smaller, these individual transfers can reach 
a much larger number of poor households. For example, 
Castaldo et al. (2012) found that internal remittances in 
Ghana and India appear to be greater in magnitude than 
international ones. 
Figure 1: Percentage of people living in urban areas
Source: UN DESA, 2014.
32 ODI Briefing
Urbanisation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development  33 
Urbanisation is defined as the increasing share of 
population living in urban areas, and it is primarily the 
result of internal migration (Tacoli et al., 2015).1 Currently, 
Asia and Africa have 48% and 40% of their population, 
respectively, living in urban areas. They remain among 
the least urbanised regions and are expected to experience 
the fastest urban growth in coming decades (UN DESA, 
2014; Figure 1). Asian countries, such as China, Thailand, 
Laos, Bangladesh and Indonesia, have experienced a large 
increase in the share of their population living in urban 
areas over the last 15 years, and are expected to continue 
doing so between now and 2030. In Africa, countries 
including Namibia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Rwanda, Mali 
and Ghana have also experienced a similar increase (UN 
DESA, 2014).
There are limitations to using the existing data on 
urban populations in sub-Saharan Africa, which often 
rely on out-of-date censuses. As a result, claims of recent 
rapid urbanisation in the region have been overestimated, 
with the reality being much more nuanced. Only some 
countries, such as Ghana, Cameroon and Burkina Faso fit 
this trend (Potts, 2013). Furthermore, census data can hide 
circular or temporary migration, people moving back from 
urban centres to rural areas as a result of seasonal work or 
extreme urban informality (ibid.).  
Urbanisation materialises as growth in various types of 
settlements. Mega-cities – in particular, cities of 10 million 
plus residents – have received a lot of attention, in part 
because they are a relatively new phenomenon. There are 
28 mega-cities today, up from just two in 1970, with 41 
projected by 2030 (UN DESA, 2014). Many of the fastest 
growing mega-cities are in China and India; some are also 
located in fragile states, such as in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Egypt. 
Despite the attention on mega-cities, the fastest-growing 
agglomerations are medium-sized cities and those with 
fewer than 1 million inhabitants located in Asia and Africa 
(UN DESA, 2014). Even though they receive significant 
numbers of migrants, these secondary cities often receive 
less political attention, have fewer resources and poorer 
quality basic services (Ghosh, 2012).  This dimension of 
urbanisation adds to the complexity in considering internal 
migration and how to better support it.
3 Internal economic migration and 
the SDGs
How urbanisation is managed by both city and national 
policy-makers, and the types of livelihoods that internal 
migrants can access in the city, will have a great impact on 
sustainable development. Goals 8 and 11 speak directly 
to the issues of jobs and inclusive cities. We consider them 
from a migrant perspective.
Goal 8 seeks to promote decent work and protect 
labour rights for all workers, including migrants. Target 
8.8 states, ‘Protect labour rights and promote safe and 
secure working environments for all workers, including 
migrant workers’. Poor, internal migrants tend to work 
in the informal economy, often in risky environments and 
with no access to social protection. Policies that support 
decent job creation and entrepreneurship in such settings 
are critical to strengthening the opportunities available to 
new arrivals, as are those interventions seeking to improve 
work standards and provide protection and assistance in 
cases of abuse.
Goal 11 aims to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient 
and sustainable for migrants and others. In particular, 
target 11.3 seeks to promote inclusive city planning 
and management, while target 11.a sets out ways of 
implementing this goal by supporting positive economic 
and social links between rural and urban areas through 
regional and national planning. The aim is for city and 
national policy-makers to include new arrivals in economic 
and spatial planning, and in the delivery of services. Goals 
8 and 11 are inherently interrelated.
Other SDGs also relevant to the economic integration of 
internal migrants are included in Table 1.
4 Evidence on the impact of internal 
migration on livelihoods and 
poverty reduction
4.1 How does internal migration impact 
migrants’ livelihoods?
The economic benefits for migrants
Broadly speaking, evidence suggests that rural to urban 
migrants (hereafter, urban migrants) benefit economically 
from moving to cities (Deshingkar, 2006). A study of 
internal migrants in Cambodia found that almost all were 
able to save money, and many also developed skills in areas 
such as tailoring or construction, allowing them to earn an 
income in both cities and rural areas (Godfrey et al., 2001). 
This study, like many others, suggests that, in general, 
urban migrants are ‘winning’ through migration. Wages 
and the ability to earn an income are also generally higher 
in urban areas than in rural ones (World Bank/IMF, 2013). 
Further still, using a wider measure of well-being, UNDP 
has found that internal migrants have a higher quality of 
life than non-migrants (UNDP, 2009). 
1.   Note that there is often confusion between urbanisation (increasing the share of the urban population) and urban population growth (the result of natural 
increase in populations).
Table 1: Urbanisation, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
8.3: Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, 
decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage 
the formalisation and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
including through access to financial services.
Policies that support job creation and entrepreneurship are fundamental to 
guarantee decent work and better work conditions for migrants, and the urban 
poor more generally. There are debates about the extent to which formalisation 
is feasible in the short to medium term in cities with a large informal economy. 
Therefore, there is a need to also consider policies that can support better 
conditions in the informal economy in the short term.
8.5: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and 
men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for 
work of equal value. Low-skilled rural to urban migrants seeking better job opportunities in the city 
in fast urbanising developing countries often end up working in precarious 
occupations in the informal economy.8.8: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments 
for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and 
those in precarious employment.
Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
11.3: By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity 
for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and 
management in all countries.
Actions that take into account the needs of poor internal migrants, and the 
urban poor more generally, enhance their well-being and are more likely to 
maximise benefits for the host city economy.
11.a: Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, 
peri-urban2 and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development 
planning.
Effective management of the challenges posed by urbanisation and internal 
migration require an understanding of the links between urban, peri-urban and 
rural economies. However, an understanding of these links is often missing in 
rapidly urbanising countries.
Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere
1.1: By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently 
measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day.
The evidence suggests that rural to urban migration contributes to economic 
development and to overall poverty reduction (Ravallion et al., 2007).
1.2: By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children 
of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions.
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures 
for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor 
and the vulnerable.
Due to their lack of formal registration in the city, many (poor) internal migrants 
cannot access social protection systems.
Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
3.8: Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, and 
access to quality essential health-care services
As internal migrants are often in the informal sector they risk exclusion from 
coverage of insurance-based schemes and in many cases are invisible to 
universal health coverage programmes (Tulloch et al., 2016)
Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
4.4: By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have 
relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent 
jobs and entrepreneurship
Internal migrants often lack the skills and training required to access decent jobs 
and as a result end up working in low-productivity jobs in the informal sector.
Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
5.4: Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the 
provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and 
the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as 
nationally appropriate.
Many migrant domestic workers are female. Actions that increase the value of 
domestic work, including changes in underlying gender norms, would reduce 
women’s burden of unpaid work and enhance the well-being, dignity and status 
of paid and unpaid care and domestic workers, including migrants (O’Neil et al., 
2016).
2.   Peri-urban areas are largely defined as the areas that surround our metropolitan areas and cities – neither urban nor rural in the conventional sense.
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3.   Entrepreneurship in the informal sector is highly gendered, with women often working as petty traders, food vendors, and hair dressers. Men often create 
work as artisans, construction workers, and motorbike drivers (Awumbila et al., 2014).
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of 
people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed 
migration policies
Some countries explicitly discourage internal migration for work. The policies put 
in place to manage migration have a direct impact on migrants’ well-being and 
on the host city and country economies.
10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant 
remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%.
Internal remittances to poor households are often sent through informal 
channels as poor internal migrants do not have access to bank accounts. Such 
services can be riskier and more expensive.
Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development
17.8 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, 
including for least developed countries and small island developing states. 
This will significantly increase the availability of high quality, timely and reliable 
data, disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, 
disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national 
contexts.
Data on migration, particularly on internal migration, is very limited. Improving 
the evidence base is fundamental in order to better understand the scale and 
impact of internal migration, and design better policies.
The informality of work
Migrants from poor rural areas may find prospects in the 
city more financially rewarding than in the rural areas 
they migrated from. However, most gain employment in 
precarious conditions within the informal sector, often 
as self-employed workers,3 home-based workers, street 
vendors (Deshingkar and Grimm, 2004), or domestic 
and construction workers (de Haas, 2006; Mitra, 2010; 
Pattanaik, 2009; Picherit, 2012). 
Incomes in the informal sector can be unstable. In 
Tianjin, China, only 7.3% of urban migrants have 
permanent jobs versus 31.8% of non-migrants, while 
over 50% of migrant workers have no work contract 
compared to 14.4% of urban workers (Lu and Song, 
2006). The common practice of sending remittances to 
family in rural areas can contribute to a loss of income that 
could otherwise be used to increase a migrant’s standard 
of living (Tacoli et al., 2015). Income instability can also 
be exacerbated by a number of issues, including illness or 
injury, discrimination in labour markets, debt bondage, 
bonded labour, and long-term indebtedness (for the latter, 
see examples on India in Breman, 1996 and Mosse et al., 
2005). 
Given the informal arrangements, migrant workers can 
be subject to exploitative or dangerous working conditions. 
For example, construction workers in Kathmandu, Nepal 
face harsh working conditions that put them at high risk 
of injury and sickness (Adhikari and Deshingkar, 2015); 
while female domestic workers in Asia have few rights in 
the workplace and are one of the least protected urban 
migrant groups (Siddiqui, 2012). Moreover, migrant 
workers are often not eligible for social or employment 
protection. Even when they are, they may not be able 
to obtain it because of complex and costly registration 
requirements, portability constraints (rather than being 
able to move with the worker, many social protection 
programmes require permanent residency) and lack 
of enforcement of existing laws (Hopkins et al., 2016; 
Adhikari and Deshingkar, 2015).  
Government policy on the informal sector, particularly 
at city level, can have significant consequences on the 
livelihoods of urban migrants. Few cities have coherent 
regulations and policies. Instead, police and other 
authorities ‘deal with’ informal workers in haphazard ways 
(Bhowmik, 2004; Mitullah, 2004). In Kampala, Uganda, a 
2011 law enforced by the Kampala City Council Authority 
prohibits the selling of goods in public spaces without 
a business license or permit. Yet many urban migrants 
cannot afford business licenses, and some migrants end 
up paying even more than urban residents due to their 
migrant status. Such laws restrict the livelihoods of locals 
and migrants, and increase insecurity. For example, women 
who now sell wares at night and are therefore more at risk 
of rape and theft (Easton-Calabria, 2016). 
The informality of residence
On top of vulnerabilities in the workplace, many urban 
migrants also live in fear of eviction, as the majority live 
in informal settlements. Many governments still perceive 
evictions as the main way to address inappropriate living 
conditions in slum areas, instead of seeing a result of the 
failure of planning and service provision. For example, in 
Zimbabwe, poor slum dwellers, many of them migrants, 
have been evicted from slums in Harare (UNDP, 2009). 
Similarly, in Ghana, migrants living in the slum area of Old 
Fadama in Accra are vulnerable to evictions, which are 
sometimes violent (Awumbila et al., 2014). 
Informal settlements in the poorest areas of cities often 
lack access to basic services, such as water and sanitation. 
This can affect both migrants’ livelihoods and incomes, 
as they often have worse health than non-migrants 
(Afsar, 2003) and must pay in order to obtain (typically, 
poor quality) basic services. For example, about 92% of 
urban migrants in a neighbourhood in Ghana lack access 
to water within their residences, meaning they have to 
pay to buy water and bathe (Awumbila et al., 2014). In 
Nairobi, Kenya, urban migrants often experience a lack 
of sanitation, high crime rates and malnutrition (Oucho et 
al., 2014). However, in Accra, Ghana, although migrants 
live in slums with little formal social protection, they still 
overwhelmingly believe their overall well-being in addition 
to their livelihoods, has been improved through migration 
(Awumbila et al., 2014). 
4.2 What is the impact of internal migration on the 
host city?
The economic benefits for the city
There is an increasing recognition of the benefits of urban 
migrants, including their ability to fill labour gaps as 
a cheap labour force, and their resulting contributions 
to economies (IOM, 2015). Many industries are reliant 
on migrant labour, such as garment manufacturing or 
construction – in India, almost 90% of construction 
work is estimated to be carried out with migrant labour 
(Deshingkar and Grimm, 2004).  The informal sector, 
where most migrants work, can also be a major area of 
entrepreneurship. Again, in the case of India, it accounts 
for over 99% of establishments in the manufacturing 
sector (Ghani and Kanbur, 2012). 
Despite this, it is important to note that the positive 
outcomes of urban migration are contextual – they depend 
on individual countries’ economic prospects, characteristics 
of employment sectors and migrants’ skill levels. While 
some research suggests that migrants may struggle more 
than non-migrants to find work in cities (Oucho et al., 
2014), research from Bangladesh found that three out 
of every five migrants in Dhaka found work within one 
week of arrival (Afsar, 1999). A study on Dhaka estimated 
that the unemployment rate for working-age members of 
migrants’ households was only 4% – half that of non-
migrants in the same age range (Hossain et al., 1999). This 
low unemployment rate stems from a variety of factors, 
including Dhaka’s economic and political climate and 
migrants’ high drive to find work, which sometimes leads 
them to accept lower-paid jobs than locals will. Urban 
migrants also have high employment rates in particular 
cities and suburbs of Vietnam, in part due to direct 
recruitment from rural areas. For example, in Binh Chieu, 
an industrial zone ringing Ho Chi Minh City, an estimated 
65% of workers are migrant labourers (Taylor, 2011).
To further increase the positive economic impact 
from the informal sector, some municipal and national 
governments have adopted policies targeting professional 
training to upskill micro-entrepreneurs and regulate 
apprenticeships, which include both the formal and 
informal sector. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the local 
government in China’s Yanbian district developed policies 
to harness the productive capacity of both international 
and internal migrants, including through pre-migration 
skills training, encouraging capital transfer, and supporting 
return migrant entrepreneurship (Luova, 2014). The high 
remittances and other capital transfers received in Yanbian 
is attributed in part to these programmes, and is impressive 
given the low-education level of most labour migrants 
from the region (ibid.).
Increasing pressures on services 
If local governments do not have the capacity to plan for 
services to meet increasing demands (or apply restrictive 
policies based on negative views of internal migration), 
this can lead to the rise of informal settlements with 
poor access to water, sanitation and basic amenities. 
Pressures on city finances compound the situation; the 
informal economy is rarely taxed, and there is often little 
redistribution from national government to the city level 
to deal with the backlog in the provision of amenities. In 
addition, poor service provision for urban migrants can 
affect not only new arrivals but local residents as well, and 
can exacerbate existing inequalities (Tacoli et al., 2015; 
Awumbila, et al., 2014).
For instance, in the case of Brazilian urbanisation, 
internal migrants and other low-income urban residents 
were left to live in informal settlements (favelas) with very 
limited access to services. Now that the country’s urban 
transition has been completed, the country has introduced 
policies, such as urban rights in its Statute of the City 
(Rolnik, 2013; Santos Carvalho and Rossbach, 2010), 
to reduce urban inequalities. However, these inequalities 
ultimately stem from how low-income migrants were 
treated during past urbanisation (Tacoli et al., 2015).
4.3 The wider picture: how does internal migration 
affect poverty reduction?
Urbanisation is, generally, a positive factor in overall 
poverty reduction (Ravallion et al., 2007). Rural to urban 
migration opens up new job opportunities to migrants (in 
urban areas and in rural areas), and through the role of 
remittances also increases the living standards of those who 
remain behind (Ravallion et al., 2007). Increasing evidence 
demonstrates the role of the informal sector in contributing 
to national GDP in many developing countries (Chen, 
2012; WIEGO, 2013). In the case of Mexico, the informal 
economy is understood to have contributed about 25% 
to its GDP for the years 2003-2012, demonstrating its 
relevance to national economic growth (WIEGO, 2013).
There is also some evidence of the positive effects 
of entrepreneurialism on the communities that urban 
migrants originate from. Entrepreneurship among 
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returning migrants has been found to be small, but the 
businesses they do create post-migration can have a large 
impact on their community through the creation of jobs, 
the buying and selling of local supplies, and increased trade 
networks  to rural regions (Murphy, 2002). Similarly, many 
Igbo entrepreneurs – an ethnic group widely cited as the 
most entrepreneurial in Nigeria – purposively invest in 
rural areas (Osuji, 1983). Rural poverty in Igboland has 
declined due to the high level of entrepreneurial activities, 
investment, and community development in rural areas 
(Chukwuezi, 2001). A further positive effect of male 
out-migration is that left-behind women also become 
entrepreneurs, creating their own independent incomes 
(Moldova, 1997; Georgia, 1997).
Internal remittances too, play an important role in 
poverty reduction. Despite internal remittances being 
smaller in comparison than international remittances (de 
Haan, 1999), internal remittances can potentially play a 
greater role in reducing poverty (Castaldo et al., 2012). 
Internal migration is more common than international 
migration among poor households as they often lack the 
resources to send a family member abroad (Deshingkar, 
2006). In India and Bangladesh, poverty rates in 
households with an internal migrant have fallen by about 
50% (UNDP, 2009). Even in cases where remittances 
do not directly reduce poverty, they are likely to help 
sustain rural livelihoods and prevent people from further 
impoverishment (Deshingkar, 2006). 
In addition to material benefits through remittances, 
there are further positive outcomes in other dimensions 
of well-being. For example, rural to urban migration can 
improve migrant-sending households’ living standards, 
and can positively impact health and sanitation in the 
areas of origin through migrants’ increased knowledge 
about hygiene practices (Adhikari and Deshingkar, 2015). 
Families of migrants are also more likely to send their 
children to school, using remittances to pay fees and 
other costs. In Guatemala, internal migration increases 
educational expenditures by 45%, particularly on higher 
levels of schooling. Mexican children in households with 
an internal migrant were 30–45% more likely to be in an 
appropriate school grade for their age (UNDP, 2009).
National and local policies that seek to curb rural 
to urban migration on the basis that it increases urban 
poverty are problematic, and are largely based on a crude 
measure of poverty that fails to capture the dynamics – 
many of them positive – behind the movement of poor 
people to urban areas, such as access to more remunerative 
opportunities and the beneficial impact that this has on 
their families. A more balanced and nuanced understanding 
of the inter-linkages between causes and impacts of rural 
to urban migration and its role in poverty reduction is 
required (Awumbila et al., 2014).
5 Case studies
How do the positive and negative dynamics of rural to 
urban migration play out on the ground? Case studies from 
Dhaka in Bangladesh, and Accra and Kumasi in Ghana 
provide an illustration of the impacts of internal migration 
on migrants’ livelihoods, the host city and wider poverty 
reduction discussed above. Bangladesh and Ghana are two 
of the fastest urbanising countries in Asia and Africa, and 
a number of studies have been carried out on these two 
countries, which provide readily available evidence on the 
impact of internal migration at micro and macro levels. 
5.1 Dhaka, Bangladesh: migration into an 
unsupported, unregulated hive of activity
Dhaka is the world’s fastest growing megacity and 
the 11th largest in the world. With an estimated 15 
million inhabitants, the city’s population has increased 
fourfold in the last 25 years. Approximately 300,000 
to 400,000 migrants arrive in Dhaka each year, most of 
whom are poor and from rural areas (Sanderson, 2012). 
As agricultural production has declined, landless rural 
inhabitants fleeing floods, climate and food disasters have 
also sought livelihoods in the urban areas. 
Upon arriving in Dhaka, most urban migrants become 
part of the urban poor. Overwhelmingly, they live in 
slums (bastees) and work in the informal sector (70% of 
employment in Dhaka is informal: IOM, 2010). Common 
jobs include street vending, rickshaw driving, petty trade, 
daily construction labour, hairdressing, and carpentry. 
Migrants who find work in the formal sector mostly work 
in the rapidly growing ready-made garment industry – 
most of Bangladesh’s garment industry is in Dhaka and 
the flow of economic migrants is considered a key factor 
in the sector’s success. Other migrants find work in the 
construction sector, or as private domestic help 
(BPB, 2015). 
Government policy towards rural to urban migration 
at both national and local levels is ambivalent. While 
there are no restrictions on movement to cities, national 
government policies and programmes do not specifically 
support migrants. For example, national targeted poverty 
reduction programmes, as well as those led by NGOs, 
tend to only register people living at their place of official 
residence. Once people become migrants, they are largely 
unable to access these forms of support due to both legal 
requirements and a need for good contact with the officials 
distributing entitlements. Urban migrants are thus often 
excluded from development and social programmes that 
could help lift them out of poverty (Afsar, 2005).
Furthermore, street-trading is illegal and urban 
authorities often harass and evict street traders, many of 
whom are migrants. Urban migrants are also vulnerable 
to eviction as most can only afford to live in informal 
settlements (BBS, 2014). 
Due to the rapid increase of migrants. Dhaka faces a 
shortage of housing, an increased cost of living, overall 
lack of access to social services, and environmental strains 
such as a decreasing amount of potable water (Islam, 
2015). The worsening socioeconomic conditions that have 
resulted from an increasing urban population are even 
perceived by some municipal officials as a means to deter 
potential urban migrants, due to the low quality of life in 
informal settlements (UNDP, 2011).
In sum, people migrating from declining opportunities 
in rural areas to Dhaka face a number of difficult 
challenges in establishing a life in the city, yet the overall 
impact on their livelihoods is positive. Despite negative 
attitudes towards the informal sector – threats of eviction 
and a lack of social protection – most migrants who 
arrive in Dhaka are able to survive in the informal urban 
economy. Moreover, internal remittances sent to family 
members (up to 60% of migrants’ income: Deshingkar, 
2006) have a significant impact on rural economic growth 
and play a role in reducing poverty both directly and 
indirectly. Institutionalising internal remittances, such as 
incorporating them into the country’s Deposit Pension 
Scheme, could further increase both rural development and 
the savings of the rural poor (Afsar, 2003). 
5.2 Accra and Kumasi, Ghana: economic policies 
driving labour migration to urban areas
Accra and Kumasi are the two largest cities in Ghana. 
Accra, the capital, has an estimated population of 2.27 
million (CIA, 2012) and is the country’s economic hub. 
Accra is the most popular destination for migrants in 
Ghana, who make up an estimated 55% of the city’s 
population (Pescina and Ubaldo, 2010). Kumasi, known as 
the ‘hinterland capital’, also attracts many migrants from 
northern Ghana (Litchfield and Waddington, 2003).
Ghana’s economic policies have played a role in 
incentivising the migration flow from rural to urban 
areas. National government liberalisation and structural 
adjustment programmes removed fertiliser and social 
service subsidies, which made engaging in agriculture 
less economically viable (Awumbila and Momsen, 1995; 
Awumbila, 1997). In addition to this, national policies 
favouring urban development through industrial protection 
meant that income levels and social conditions were 
better in urban than rural areas (Anarfi et al., 2003). 
Consequently, rural inhabitants facing declining incomes 
in agriculture have become a large labour supply for 
urban industries, mainly in and around Accra and Kumasi 
(Awumbila and Ardayfio-Schandorf, 2008). 
The majority (71.2%) of migrants arriving in Accra 
work in the informal sector (Awumbila et al., 2014). 
Common jobs include ice water and ice cream sellers, 
second-hand clothes hawkers and wholesalers, electronic 
waste pickers, hairdressers, maize retailers and wholesalers, 
construction workers, and domestic services (Overa, 2007; 
Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011). 
While migrants may be able to create a livelihood in 
their host city, they experience many vulnerabilities. It 
is common for migrants to face frequent harassment by 
city authorities due to the illegal status of their work 
and homes (Awumbila et al., 2014). The upgrading of 
markets, such as the Agbogbloshie and Nima, located in 
migrant-dense areas of Accra, would allow many more 
migrants to earn a living without risk of harassment on 
the street (Awumbila et al., 2014). Furthermore, at least 
half of the migrants in Ghana live in temporary shelters 
in informal settlements (Awumbila et al., 2014) and can 
face discrimination in accessing housing due to their 
migrant status (UNESCO, 2013). Female migrants and 
unaccompanied child migrants are especially vulnerable. 
Female migrants may resort to sex work as a means to 
support themselves or in exchange for housing (Osei-
Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011), while child migrants 
commonly end up living on the streets (Awumbila and 
Ardayfio-Schandorf, 2008; Molini et al., 2016; GSS, 2003).
Until recently, the Ghanaian national government did 
not have any policies explicitly targeting migration and 
there have often been contradictory policy responses 
at national and city levels. For example, while national 
level policies call for urban renewal and upgrading, city 
authorities in Accra continue to harass street vendors and 
pursue slum clearance (Awumbila et al., 2014). But in 
2014, a National Migration Policy was introduced which 
sought to address these challenges through promoting 
‘fair settlement planning’ in urban areas. This included the 
provision of adequate infrastructure, and managing the 
causes and consequences of migration flows (GoG, 2014). 
Similarly, the recent National Policy on Migration (2016) 
and implementation plan aim to increase the benefits of 
both internal and international migration, in part through 
policy coherence (GoG, 2016). 
The impact too of internal migration on migrants’ 
households appears to be positive. It appears that, on 
average, households receiving remittances have a 77% 
higher consumption level than non-migrant households 
(Molini et al., 2016). A recent survey of migrants in Ghana 
suggests they overwhelmingly believe their overall well-
being, in addition to their livelihoods, have been improved 
by migrating (Awumbila et al., 2014).
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations
The movement of people within and across borders in 
search of better living and working conditions has been 
an integral part of human history. During the Industrial 
Revolution, rural to urban migration helped turn cities into 
constantly growing and transforming industrial hubs, and 
created opportunities for future generations. 
As with international migration, internal migration 
occurs for a variety of reasons. In most developing 
countries, the search for employment and the drive to 
escape poverty remain the primary factors of voluntary 
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movement. Facilitating the movement of people within 
borders has the potential to improve the livelihood of 
individual migrants and their families through remittances 
and non-financial transfers, such as improved knowledge 
and skills. Yet despite their potential, internal migrants 
are often neglected in formal government policies at local 
and national levels. Urban migrants often end up working 
in the informal sector, lacking access to social protection 
and basic services. Host cities, in turn, experience a range 
of rural to urban migration effects, from potentially 
strengthened economies, as a result of an influx of workers, 
to the potential strains on infrastructure from increasing 
demand.
Many of the benefits of internal migration remain 
unrealised due to policy barriers affecting population 
movement, inadequate legislation enforcement to protect 
the rights of the poor, and social exclusion on the basis of 
ethnicity, caste, tribe and gender as well as an incomplete 
understanding of migration patterns (Deshingkar, 
2006). More inclusive policies are needed to advance 
the economic potential of urban migration, and address 
migrants’ insecurity of work and residence. 
The recommendations below set out key actions for 
local and national government agencies, civil society 
organisations, the private sector – particularly in fast 
growing urban centres of the South, and those agencies in 
charge of monitoring the SDGs. Ultimately, how cities and 
government policies respond to urbanisation is crucial to 
unlocking and maximising the positive impacts that urban 
migration can have on both migrants and ‘host’ cities, and 
to achieving the SDGs, particularly those linked to access 
to decent jobs and inclusive urbanisation. 
Box 1: Access to work for refugees
While the focus of this briefing is on internal migration for economic reasons, it is useful to establish parallels with 
access to work for refugees. It is particularly relevant given the current large numbers of refugees and the policies 
that governments and cities are actively pursuing to integrate refugees into their labour markets.
In Europe, cities have demonstrated greater flexibility and creativity than national governments in responding 
to the influx of refugees, introducing a number of job-matching and integration projects (Eurocities, 2016). Milan 
created reception hubs overseen by municipal employees, volunteers and NGOs to receive asylum seekers and 
provide them with shelter, support and information. Barcelona declared itself a ‘City of Refuge’ last September, 
with mayor Ada Colau, stating that ‘It may be that states grant asylum, but it is cities that provide shelter’ 
(Pescinski, 2016; Eurocities, 2016). In March 2016, Barcelona negotiated an innovative city-to-city agreement 
with three cities: Athens, Lesbos and Lampedusa. This pilot initiative aims to alleviate the pressures on these major 
receiving hubs by welcoming more asylum-seekers into Barcelona. London provides an example where socially-
responsible businesses can address the struggles of the forcibly displaced trying to find work. The social enterprise 
‘Transitions’ is providing refugees with job-matching services and information while the ethical underwear 
business ‘Who Made Your Pants’ is providing refugees with sewing and English classes, among other services 
(Forrest, 2015).  
Cities and towns in the Middle East, in countries such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, have to cope with 
far larger numbers of refugees than in Europe. In these countries, there are also examples of endeavours by 
governments in cooperation with other partners, to provide humanitarian assistance and to promote self-reliance 
and inclusion. Indeed, earlier this year, Jordan granted Syrian refugees the right to apply for work permits. This is 
part of a wider programme among the Jordanian government, donor countries and development actors to improve 
the investment climate (World Bank, 2016). Yet, after a three-month grace period ending in July 2016, fewer than 
13,000 Syrians had obtained work permits out of an expected 50-100,000 (Patchett, 2016). 
In other cases, there are examples of how refugees themselves can drive urban development and build parallel 
informal economies. For instance, Dadaab in Kenya hosts close to 300,000 refugees (Laing, 2016; UNHCR, 
2016) making it the world’s largest refugee camp. The difficulties of leaving the camp led to the development of 
an informal camp economy as Dadaab’s residents opened their own businesses and started to provide services to 
residents and those in the host community (McKenzie and Swails, 2015). Today, Dadaab is not only considered to 
be Kenya’s third largest ‘city’, but also a commercial hub with refugees running successful businesses from bakeries 
to boutiques providing services, products and a ready market for locals as well as a substantial tax return to the 
Kenyan government (Hujale, 2016). There are also a number of organisations providing livelihoods support. 
For instance, the Norwegian Refugee Council provides vocational training courses and recorded that 58% of its 
graduates are currently running successful businesses. 
Conclusion 1: Internal migration is more common 
than international migration and has a larger poverty 
reduction potential.
Recommendation: create policies at local and 
national levels to enable a more balanced and fact-
based understanding of the causes and impacts of 
rural to urban migration, and its role in poverty 
reduction. 
 • Improve the data on internal migration and remittances 
to challenge assumptions linking rural to urban 
migration with increasing urban poverty. A better 
understanding of complex migratory patterns, including 
circular migration, is needed to inform better policies. 
Work with existing global networks (e.g. the Global 
Partnership for Sustainable Development Data) to 
improve the capacity of national statistics offices and 
local governments to collect this data.
 • Advocate for policies that support well-managed, 
internal migration. Government, local bodies and civil 
society organisations should support advocacy efforts 
at all levels – for example, in the implementation of 
the SDGs and at the UN Conference on Housing and 
Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III). This 
will enable more balanced debates around internal 
migration. 
 • Governments should include analysis of urbanisation 
and its consequences at all levels of policy planning and 
implementation, and ensure coherence between them. 
This would allow for a better understanding of factors 
that drive migration in different areas, and how to 
better support them. 
Conclusion 2: The economic potential of internal 
migrants is underutilised.
Recommendation: improve livelihood support 
to internal migrants to maximise their economic 
potential.
 • Local governments should include the needs and 
vulnerabilities of informal workers in policy planning. 
For instance, cities’ urban planning often excludes 
the issue of supporting infrastructure and services 
for informal workers, which frequently results in 
the informal sector clashing with city authorities. 
Supporting measures by city authorities could include 
the upgrading of markets, which serve the job and 
income needs of migrants (Awumbila et al., 2014). 
 • The informal sector should be decriminalised in both 
municipal and national policies. This should also include 
implementing or increasing labour rights and protection 
for internal migrants. Examples include free legal advice 
and rights awareness training, particularly in sectors 
common for migrants such as construction work and 
domestic help. Where state protection is lacking, civil 
society organisations have a role to play.
 • Internal migrants/temporary residents and returning 
migrants should be supported through local and 
national government channels, with help ranging from 
job searches to pre-migration training. Increase access 
to education and training for both rural and urban 
workers in line with the needs of the economy, as this 
has a positive influence on the wider economy and the 
job opportunities they can access. 
 • Government should work with the private sector to 
create banking services for the poor. This includes 
formalising remittance services (i.e. sending remittances 
through banks) and reducing their cost, especially 
because remittances are likely to be sent by poor 
internal migrants currently using informal channels 
that are expensive and risky. Consider institutionalising 
internal remittances, such as by incorporating them into 
the country’s pension scheme (Afsar, 2003).
Relevant SDG Targets
1.1: By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people 
everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than 
$1.25 a day. 
1.2: By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, 
women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its 
dimensions according to national definitions.
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible 
migration and mobility of people through the implementation 
of planned and well-managed migration policies. 
11.a: Support positive economic, social and environmental 
links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by 
strengthening national and development planning.
17.8: By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to 
developing countries, including for least developed countries 
and small island developing states, to increase significantly 
the availability of high quality, timely and reliable data, 
disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
migratory status, disability, geographic location and other 
characteristics relevant in national contexts.
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Conclusion 3: Internal migrants are often neglected 
in local and national policies. They end up living 
in informal settlements without adequate social 
protection and basic service provision.
Recommendation: create and improve protective 
legislation and social security for migrants, including 
access to basic services.
 • Extend state protections to the informal sector, where 
most migrants from poor rural areas work (e.g. 
pensions, access to healthcare for informal workers, 
including female domestic workers). Help informal 
workers access programmes they are already eligible 
for (e.g. by simplifying bureaucratic requirements and 
removing requirements to have resident status). Internal 
migrants are, by definition, a highly mobile population 
so they need to be able to access social benefits that are 
portable.
 • Focus on enforcing existing legislation, improving 
knowledge on social protection among migrants and 
making registration requirements easier to meet (e.g. not 
needing formal rental contracts).
 • End informal settlement evictions. Many rural to urban 
migrants live in informal settlements and face intense 
disruptions to both their home life and livelihoods 
through the threat of eviction. Increase the capacity 
of local governments and programmes to upgrade 
informal settlements and orientate urban planning 
that supports access to basic services and affordable 
housing. Neglecting informal urban communities will 
not deter urban migrants from settling in these areas, as 
the existing conditions give them no other choice but to 
settle there. 
 • Redistribute tax revenues so that poorer localities 
housing more internal migrants have the capacity to 
provide adequate local public services. 
Relevant SDG Targets
8.3: Promote development-oriented policies that support 
productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, 
creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization 
and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
including through access to financial services.
8.5: Achieve full and productive employment and decent 
work for all women and men.
8.8: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure 
working environments for all workers, including migrant 
workers, in particular women migrants, and those in 
precarious employment. 
10.c: Reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of 
migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with 
costs higher than 5%. 
4.4: By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth 
and adults who have relevant skills, including technical 
and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and 
entrepreneurship.
11.a: Support positive economic, social and environmental 
links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by 
strengthening national and development planning.
11.3: Enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and 
capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human 
settlement planning and management in all countries. 
Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection 
systems and measures for all, and by 2030 achieve 
substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable. 
3.8: Achieve universal health coverage, including financial 
risk protection, and access to quality essential health-care 
services.
5.4: Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work 
through the provision of public services, infrastructure 
and social protection policies and the promotion of shared 
responsibility within the household and the family.
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible 
migration and mobility of people through the implementation 
of planned and well-managed migration policies.
11.3: By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable 
urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and 
sustainable human settlement planning and management in 
all countries. 
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• Women migrate as much as men. Migration data must be disaggregated by sex and age, and 
migration policies must take account of how gender shapes different migrants’ needs.
• Migration can increase women’s access to education and economic resources, and can improve 
their autonomy and status.
• Female migrants and refugees are at greater risk of exploitation and abuse, including trafficking. 
• Highly skilled women have high rates of migration but many are employed in low-skilled jobs.
• Unskilled female migrants work in less-regulated and less-visible sectors than male migrants. 
Most migrant domestic workers are women and adolescent girls.
• Migration creates empowerment trade-offs for individual women and girls, and between 
different groups of women and girls. These trade-offs matter for gender equality and for 
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.
Key 
messages
SDGs covered    5: Gender equality 
8: Decent work and economic growth 
10: Reduced inequalities 
16: Peace, justice and strong institutions 
17: Partnerships for the goals 
Gender equality, migration  
and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development
Tam O’Neil, Anjali Fleury and Marta Foresti
1 Introduction
This policy brief gives an overview of the opportunities, 
risks and vulnerabilities female migrants and refugees1 face 
and the implications for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. It describes the realities of migration for 
women and adolescent girls, focusing on the experiences 
of those working in a range of ‘care’ professions, from 
domestic workers to nurses and doctors. Mobility and 
employment create opportunities for female migrants, 
but gender norms – shared ideas about the different 
capabilities and ‘natural’ roles of women and men, girls 
and boys – also create vulnerabilities, as do institutional 
failures to address discrimination. Gender norms, prevalent 
in all countries, are a root cause of the gendered division 
of labour (whether paid or unpaid work), violence against 
women and girls, and women’s lack of decision-making 
power – all of which have particular consequences 
for female migrants. While gender stereotypes and 
expectations also shape the migration experience of men 
and boys, this brief focuses on female migrants because 
they are most likely to be ‘left behind’ in progress towards 
the 2030 Agenda. 
After briefly exploring current migration trends, 
Section 2 describes how gender norms and relations shape 
decisions about why and when women and girls migrate, 
and their experiences of migration. We highlight how 
the socioeconomic characteristics of individual female 
migrants and the countries they migrate from and to 
influence whether migration is likely to increase their 
capabilities and/or vulnerabilities, and how. In Sections 
3 and 4 we use the concept of the global care chain to 
expand this discussion. We examine the experiences of 
skilled and unskilled female migrants and explore how the 
feminisation of labour leads to empowerment trade-offs 
for individual migrants, as well as between groups of 
women and girls. 
In Section 5 we make recommendations about how 
the international community can ensure that female 
migrants and refugees are not excluded from the benefits 
of economic and social progress and the 2030 Agenda. We 
argue that migration can contribute to women and girls’ 
capabilities and freedoms, but can also expose them to 
new or increased risks. Migration policies must reflect the 
different needs and risks women and girls face, and actively 
manage these trade-offs. 
1.1 Migration trends 
People have always moved across borders. In 2015, 
the global number of international migrants reached 
224 million, up from 173 million in 2000. However, 
as a proportion of the world’s population, the number 
of migrants has remained relatively stable over the 
past 40 years at around 3%. Europe and Asia host the 
most international migrants (76 million and 75 million 
respectively), while southern Europe and Gulf States are 
the regions with the highest growth in labour migrants 
(UN DESA, 2016a). 
In general, women migrate as much as men: in 2015, 
almost half (48%) of all international migrants were 
female (see Figure 1). From 2000 to 2015, women and 
girls’ migration to developing countries (15.8%) increased 
more rapidly than to developed regions (6.4%) (UN DESA, 
2016b). The proportion of female migrants to Europe, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and 
Oceania increased, but the proportion going to Africa and 
Asia decreased (UN DESA, 2016a). 
Regarding forced displacement, in 2015 the number 
of refugees worldwide rose to 21.3 million – the highest 
level since the Second World War. Refugees comprise 
approximately 8% of the total number of international 
migrants, and 47% of refugees were girls and women in 
2015 (UNHCR, 2016).
1.    The term ‘migrant’ can refer to two different categories of people that should not be conflated: labour migrants who move for the purposes of 
employment, and refugees who – owing to fear of persecution, war or natural disaster – are outside their country of origin and are unable to avail 
themselves of protection from that country, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951). Given that this briefing focuses on women 
employed in care professions, we primarily use the term ‘migrant’ as we are mostly referring to women and girls moving for employment purposes (unless 
we are referring to refugees and asylum seekers, in which case we do so explicitly). Internal migrants are not included in this analysis.
Figure 1: Total number of international migrants by sex
 
Source: UN DESA (2016b)
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2 Migration and the SDGs 
The challenges addressed by the SDGs contain many 
important gender dimensions. Gender-specific actions and 
solutions are needed to reduce women and girls’ poverty 
and insecurity and to promote their access to economic 
and sustainable growth, as well as to health, education, 
and justice. Policy-makers and practitioners must 
understand how gender inequalities influence progress on 
each goal and target. They should support measures that 
target harmful gender-related practices, reduce gender 
discrimination, and increase women and girls’ choices and 
decision-making power. 
A handful of the SDGs have targets that relate directly 
to migration. These include:
 • Goal 5 on gender equality and women and girls’ 
empowerment;
 • Goal 8 on growth and decent work;
 • Goal 10 on reducing inequalities;
 • Goal 16 on peaceful, inclusive societies and access to 
justice for all; and 
 • Goal 17 on global partnership on sustainable 
development, which includes improving data.
Target 10.7, for example, is to ‘facilitate orderly, safe, 
regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, 
including through the implementation of planned and well-
managed migration policies’ (UN DESA, 2016c). However, 
this target is gender-blind; effective implementation 
requires a gender lens to capture the specific needs of 
female migrants. Other targets are not related directly to 
gender and/or migration but are nonetheless relevant. For 
instance, Target 8.10 seeks to improve access to financial 
institutions, which is important for women’s ability to 
receive and send remittances. 
As Table 1 shows, SDG 5 and SDG 8 are particularly 
important to the wellbeing of female migrants and 
refugees in ensuring they are not left behind in progress 
towards the 2030 Agenda.
3 Gender norms and women and  
girls’ migration 
Men and women migrate for similar reasons – to get an 
education, to find work, to get married, or to flee persecution 
or harm. However, migration is very much a gendered 
phenomenon; gender norms and expectations, power 
relations, and unequal rights shape the migration choices and 
experiences of women and girls as they do men and boys.
Gender norms affect when and why people migrate. 
Women usually have less control over the decision to 
migrate than men – a decision more likely to be taken by 
their family (Yeoh et al., 2002). Where women and girls 
lack autonomy, this challenges the distinction between 
forced and voluntary migration – and particularly so for 
adolescent girls. Gendered expectations may also guide 
family decisions. For instance, families may believe that 
girls or young women are more likely than male family 
members to send home remittances regularly, or the eldest 
Table 1: Gender equality, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
5.2: Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and 
private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.
Migrant and refugee women and girls may experience violence at all stages of 
the migration process, whether at home or in the community. Gender-based 
violence or conflict-related sexual violence may force women and girls to 
migrate, and they may be subject to violence during transit (e.g. at refugee 
camps) or at their destination (e.g. by an employer). Irregular migrants and 
young migrants are at greater risk of violence, trafficking and exploitation. 
Migrant girls are more likely to be trafficked or experience sexual exploitation 
than boys (Temin et al., 2013). 
5.3: Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage 
and female genital mutilation (FGM).
Girls facing harmful practices such as FGM or forced marriage may use 
migration as a means of escape (Temin et al., 2013). Migration can expose 
girls and young women to different social norms and practices (including 
FGM) in new locations (Goldberg et al., 2016). Migrant communities may use 
early marriage as a coping strategy in the face of girls’ insecurity or economic 
hardship.
5.4: Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the 
provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and 
the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as 
nationally appropriate.
11.5 million (17.2%) of the world’s 67.1 million domestic workers are 
international migrants; 8.4 million (73.4%) of migrant domestic workers are 
women or adolescent girls (ILO, 2015). Actions that increase the value of 
domestic work, including changes in underlying gender norms, would reduce 
women’s burden of unpaid work and enhance the wellbeing, dignity and status 
of paid and unpaid care and domestic workers, including migrants. 
daughter may be expected to migrate so that the family has 
money to send her siblings to school (Kanaiaupuni, 2000). 
Not all decisions for girls or women to migrate are 
taken by families. Indeed, some adolescent girls and 
women migrate in order to escape family control that can 
lead to harmful practices such as forced or early marriage 
or female genital mutilation (FGM) (Temin et al., 2013). At 
the same time, gender norms may limit women and girls’ 
migration; at the household level, families may prevent 
them from migrating for fear of ‘moral corruption’ or 
difficulties in marrying (Shaw, 2005). At the national level, 
rather than addressing the causes of gender discrimination 
or the risks female migrants face, some governments have 
banned female migration as a means to protect women 
and children – a measure that contravenes women’s human 
rights. 
Gender also shapes the migration experience, regardless 
of whether migration is voluntary or forced (see Box 1). 
Female migrants, particularly girls, have less information, 
less education, and fewer options for regular migration, 
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Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
8.5: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women 
and men.
Many host countries limit or bar refugees from employment opportunities. 
Similarly, migrant spouses may be prevented from working. Female migrants 
and refugees that do work may experience deskilling or be confined to 
‘feminine’ jobs, often paid or valued less than other work. Ensuring full and 
productive employment and decent work requires access to work that is aligned 
with refugees’ and migrants’ skills and qualifications. It also means improving 
social and economic value afforded to work typically performed by women and 
girls.
8.7: Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, 
end modern slavery and human trafficking, and secure the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labour.
Migrants (particularly irregular migrants and children) are at risk of forced 
labour, trafficking, and exploitation and abuse. To eradicate these forms of 
labour requires improving labour standards, increasing the opportunities for 
decent work, protecting migrants, and prosecuting the perpetrators of such 
violations.
8.8: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments 
for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular female migrants, and 
those in precarious employment.
Protection of labour rights is particularly important for migrants, particularly 
women and children, who are at greater risk of exploitation or abuse. Female 
migrants in stereotypically feminine roles (such as live-in care and domestic 
work) are frequently isolated and therefore more vulnerable to exploitation, 
violence and abuse.
Box 1: Refugees and forced displacement
Refugee women and girls are subject to gender inequalities and discrimination. Conflict can exacerbate gender-
based violence, and sexual violence is commonly used as a tactic of war. The state’s failure to protect women and 
girls from gender-based violence can spur migration.
When they are displaced from their homes, women and girls are more vulnerable to violence and abuse, 
particularly if not accompanied by male relatives. The risk of human trafficking may also increase. When 
displacement results in female-headed households, women may struggle with the additional burdens of fulfilling 
both traditional male and female roles within the family. Female migrants (especially in cases of forced migration 
or displacement) may be forced into prostitution or sex work to survive or provide for their families.
Displacement can disrupt social and gender norms and bring added pressures for men and women alike, as well 
as increasing the vulnerabilities faced by women and girls. Male refugees in temporary camps may no longer be 
able to provide for their family as the breadwinner. Domestic violence by a spouse or family member can increase 
as families experience psychosocial trauma and as male refugees struggle with feelings of inadequacy and loss of 
control within the family.
Women and girls in refugee camps typically continue to be responsible for fetching the family’s firewood and 
water, often going beyond the camp walls where they face increased risk of sexual and gender-based violence. 
Even within camps, women and girls are exposed to increased risks of violence from other refugees. As is the case 
among some Syrian and Rohingya refugees, for example, displaced families may choose early or forced marriage 
for their daughters as a strategy to cope with economic hardship or perceived risks of sexual violence. During 
times of crises, states may be less able to protect and provide adequate services, further disadvantaging vulnerable 
refugees, including women and girls.
Sources: Bukachi et al. (2010); UNHCR (2008); Women’s Refugee Commission (2016); De Berry and Petrini (2011); UNHCR and World Bank 
Group (2015).
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which puts them at greater risk of exploitation and 
abuse, including trafficking (UNFPA, 2015). Farah (2006) 
reported that 80% of trafficking victims were estimated to 
be female. Girls migrating alone are particularly vulnerable 
(Temin et al., 2013). Female migrants tend to be more 
averse to risk than men, however, and prefer to migrate 
through regular channels and when social networks are in 
place (Fleury, 2016). Migrants often establish networks for 
social support; this enables other women and girls from 
their community to follow (Temin et al., 2013) and reduces 
the stigma caused by breaking traditional gender norms 
(De Haas, 2009). 
Gender norms and social norms in migrants’ country 
of origin and destination also influence the outcomes of 
migration for women and girls. Such norms determine 
whether migration empowers women and girls and/or 
exposes them to harm, and in what ways. Women are 
more likely to migrate to countries with less discriminatory 
social institutions than their country of origin, which also 
tend to offer greater economic opportunities (Ferrant et al., 
2014; Ferrant and Tuccio, 2015). However, there are also 
instances of women migrating from countries with very 
high levels of discrimination to countries with similarly 
high levels of discrimination, possibly because the decision 
to migrate may not have been solely theirs (Ferrant et al., 
2014) or they were driven by economic hardship. 
The act of migration may change social and gender 
norms, for migrants as well as for their home communities. 
In addition to improving women’s autonomy, self-
esteem and social standing, migration can also provide 
women and girls with new skills and their families with 
remittances. These new resources can change power 
dynamics within families and households. Migrants may 
also influence their home communities to adopt more 
equitable norms around education, marriage, fertility 
rates, and gender roles in the household and community. 
However, while migrant women may return home with 
new norms and skills, they may also face resistance or 
stigma and struggle to reintegrate into their families and 
communities (Sijapati, 2015).
When a woman migrates with her spouse, even to a 
more liberal country, discriminatory gender norms from 
the home community (such as restrictions on women’s 
movement outside the home) may still govern household 
relations, leaving women more isolated and vulnerable. 
For example, Kabeer (2000) found that employment had 
greater empowerment effects for Bangladeshi women 
who migrated to cities to work in factories than for those 
that migrated to London and performed piecework in the 
isolation of their own homes.
Migration may also bring changes in gender roles 
for men. Women’s migration may mean that men who 
stay behind take on more unpaid care responsibilities, 
though other female family members often take on the 
additional burden. Remittances from migrant workers 
also make a vital contribution to source economies and 
to the household income and wellbeing of migrants’ 
families (Fleury, 2016). However, realising the benefits of 
remittances depends on who receives and controls them; 
women are more likely to invest in children’s education 
and health, while men tend to invest in assets such as cars 
(De and Ratha, 2005).
4 Gender norms, labour market 
segmentation and the global care chain 
Gender is a key factor in the employment opportunities 
that are open to migrants. Most societies valorise men 
as natural leaders, decision-makers and breadwinners, 
placing them at the centre of the public and productive 
spheres, while women are relegated to the role of natural 
homemakers and carers, confining them to the domestic 
and reproductive spheres. In many countries though, 
simple productive-reproductive or public-private gender 
dichotomies have come under stress as women have 
entered the labour force in greater numbers. While it is 
now more acceptable that women perform productive 
roles, norms about reproductive and domestic work are, 
in some cases, proving very resistant to change and men 
are not doing their equal share of unpaid domestic and 
care work (Evans, 2016; Samman et al., 2016; Wojczewski 
et al., 2015). Time-use surveys show that women in all 
countries spend more time on unpaid care than men, 
ranging from around 2 weeks more in the Nordic countries 
to more than 10 weeks more in Iraq, Mexico and Turkey 
(Samman et al., 2016).
Furthermore, the labour market – including migrant 
labour – remains highly segmented by gender, as well as 
by class and ethnicity. Men are perceived as stronger and 
more capable of manual labour and, as a result, are more 
likely to work in mining, industry, transport, trade and 
construction. Men are also overrepresented in management 
positions. By contrast, women are perceived as nurturing 
and are concentrated in ‘feminine’ sectors related to 
care (e.g. health, teaching, cleaning, cooking, service 
industries) or entertainment, or in factory positions that 
prefer workers to be ‘nimble’ or meticulous (ILO, 2015; 
de Villard and Dey de Pryck, 2010; Ghosh, 2009; UNFPA, 
2006; IOM, 2009, 2011). Gendered labour opportunities 
then influence where male and female migrants move to. 
Countries with higher demand for construction workers 
are more likely to recruit or attract male migrants, whereas 
countries seeking domestic workers and nurses will attract 
more female migrants (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2003).
The gender segregation of labour and the feminisation 
of domestic and care work also mean that, even when 
female migrants have legal rights, they are less likely to be 
enforced than the rights of male migrants. This is because 
unskilled female migrants tend to be more isolated and less 
aware of their rights than unskilled migrant men working 
in relatively better-regulated, visible and better-paid sectors, 
such as construction, mining and agriculture (Garcia et al., 
2002). 
In sum, the intersection of gender norms and market 
economics has three consequences for female migrants:
1. They are concentrated in unskilled, undervalued and 
low-paid sectors, often employed as domestic workers in 
hard-to-regulate private homes;
2. Skilled and unskilled migrants often face intersecting 
gender and racial discrimination and have a triple 
burden of managing paid employment alongside unpaid 
domestic and reproductive responsibilities;
3. Female migrants are less able to advance their own 
interests than male migrants; they have less decision-
making power within the home and – whether migrating 
alone or as a dependent – are less likely to have the time 
or capabilities to engage with political decision-making 
and policy processes (O’Neil and Domingo, 2016).
The expectation that women, not men, are responsible 
for unpaid domestic and care responsibilities therefore 
influences labour market segmentation and the economic 
opportunities open to women, including migrants. The 
feminisation of labour then intersects with inequality 
and discrimination based on class and ethnicity within 
and across countries, creating global care and healthcare 
chains. Both societal factors and the individual 
characteristics of women and girls therefore determine the 
empowerment effects of migration – particularly migrants’ 
socioeconomic status, and the sector they work in after 
migrating, as well as they type of work they do. Changing 
this situation requires a shift in gender stereotypes and 
expectations – one that changes harmful masculinities and 
limiting femininities – as well as addressing class and other 
forms of discrimination.
4.1 Unskilled female migrants and domestic and  
care work
Most migrant domestic workers are women and girls – 
approximately 75% of the 11.5 million estimated in 2013 
(ILO, 2015). Indeed, domestic work is the most common 
employment for girls under the age of 16 (UN OHCHR, 
2015). While nearly 80% of domestic workers are in low- 
and middle-income countries, 79.2% of migrant domestic 
workers are in high-income countries. South-East Asia and 
the Pacific is the region with the highest levels of female 
migrant domestic workers (24%), followed by northern 
Europe, southern Europe, and western Europe (22.1%), 
then Arab States (19%) (ILO, 2015). Levels of migration 
and destination vary by country of origin; for instance, 86% 
of female labour migrants from Sri Lanka are employed as 
domestic workers in the Middle East (IOM, 2015).
The feminisation of domestic and care labour creates 
a global care chain, a term coined by Arlie Hochschild to 
describe ‘a series of links between people across the world 
based on the paid and unpaid work of caring’ (Wojczewski 
et al., 2015: 131). As ageing populations and women’s 
increasing participation in the global labour force create 
more demand for paid domestic and care work, the women 
who fill those positions then rely on female relatives to 
care for their own families, creating a chain effect (UN 
OHCHR, 2015). Migrants’ families (particularly female 
relatives such as mothers or eldest daughters) who take 
over unpaid domestic and care work may find that doing so 
limits their own ability to take up economic or education 
opportunities (Azcona, 2009; Wojczewski et al., 2015). 
Rather than leading men, employers or governments to play 
a greater role in the provision of domestic and care needs, 
the effect of women entering the workforce in greater 
numbers is to pull in even more women as paid carers.  
Despite the high demand for and numbers of domestic 
workers in many countries, domestic and care work is 
less socially valued than other types of work – something 
that is reflected in lower pay and fewer labour regulations 
compared with other sectors (Petrozziello, 2013; Temin 
et al., 2013). For example, 40% of countries do not offer 
protection for domestic workers within national labour 
laws (UN Women, 2012). Some countries, like Mexico, 
include domestic work in labour laws but afford such 
workers fewer rights and protections than workers in other 
occupations (European Union et al., 2014). Other countries 
may include protections in national labour laws but invest 
little or no resources in enforcement. Enforcing the rights of 
domestic workers is particularly difficult given that many 
live in their employer’s home, hidden from public view.
Since paid domestic work mostly takes place in private 
homes, it increases the risk of abuse and mistreatment 
(Fleury, 2016; Oishi, 2002; Piper, 2005; Temin et al., 2013; 
UN OHCHR, 2015). Domestic workers often receive low 
pay, work long hours, may suffer from insufficient sleep 
and (depending on their employer) may have difficulty in 
receiving time off or pay (Temin et al., 2013; Piper, 2005; 
UN OHCHR, 2015). For example, in Ethiopia, migrant 
girls doing domestic work are more likely to experience 
sexual abuse and rape by employers than other girls, 
in part due to their social isolation and dependence on 
their employers (Temin et al., 2013). In Gulf countries, 
migrant women are often marginalised and experience 
difficulties claiming their wages and with their legal status 
(Wojczewski et al., 2015). Yet, despite these risks, women 
and girls are still driven to migrate, usually pulled by the 
potential for better economic opportunities and increased 
income (see Box 2). 
4.2 Skilled female migrants and healthcare work 
Skilled female migrants also face gender segregation and 
tend to work in ‘feminine’ professions, such as education, 
health, social work, and nursing (Piper, 2005). In high-
income and upper-middle-income countries, various 
factors have combined to create a global healthcare 
chain – demographic changes (ageing populations and 
declining fertility rates), shifts in gender norms (more 
women entering the workforce) and gaps in health and 
social care systems (availability of trained nurses, adequacy 
50 ODI Briefing
Gender equality, migration and the 2030 Aggenda for Sustainable Development 51 
of welfare provision). Some countries have active, even 
‘aggressive’ recruitment policies (UNFPA and IMP, 2004) 
and bilateral agreements to plug gaps in their healthcare 
system (Wojczewski et al., 2015). For instance, in the UK 
in 2012, 22% of nurses and 35% of medical practitioners 
were born abroad (Jayaweera, 2015). In addition to push 
factors in their countries of origin, the prospect of better 
wages and/or working conditions draws trained nurses, 
doctors and other healthcare professionals to wealthier 
countries in the global North (e.g. Canada, Ireland, Japan, 
New Zealand, the UK and the USA) and the global South 
(e.g. Saudi Arabia and South Africa). 
Conversely, this migration of skilled workers can weaken 
healthcare systems in developing countries, sometimes 
referred to as ‘brain drain’. Since women from developing 
countries have less access to tertiary education and high-
skilled positions, when they migrate there are higher relative 
losses of human capital than when skilled males migrate 
(Docquier et al., 2009), though the picture is mixed depending 
on the countries involved. The chain of displacement and 
replacement is not just in one direction, from developing to 
developed countries. For example, the demand for migrant 
workers in the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) is 
fuelled by a shortage of UK-trained nurses but also by their 
Box 2: The global care chain and the experiences of unskilled female migrants
Many unskilled women and girls migrate for domestic work to improve their and their families’ economic 
wellbeing, but they also often face new or increased risks. These trade offs from migration vary in types and scale, 
however, and are informed both by individual and country characteristics. 
Recently, there have been growing numbers of Ethiopian adolescent girls migrating to Middle Eastern countries 
like Saudi Arabia to do domestic work. The main driver is increased income, particularly given the pressures on 
sustainable livelihoods in Ethiopia – one of the world’s poorest countries – due to worsening agricultural cycles, 
shortage of land, limited job opportunities and increasing unemployment. However, poverty is not the only driver. 
For adolescent girls, migration offers an escape from early marriage, oppressive social norms, and the lack of 
control over their lives. Now, the established culture of migration, a growing reliance on remittances and peer 
pressure also motivate young Ethiopians to migrate.
Though migration brings many benefits, the costs can be high. Young migrant domestic workers risk serious 
violations of their human rights, including exploitation, physical and sexual violence, trafficking, abuse, isolation, 
incomplete wages or even non-payment, long work hours, racial and religious discrimination, and psychological 
and mental trauma. For Ethiopian girls in Saudi Arabia, these experiences are far too common, both in transit and 
when they reach their employer’s home. One returnee girl said: ‘I was beaten by the daughters in the house and the 
daughter next door. They would use their hands or whatever object they asked me to fetch – spoons, cans, whatever. 
The beating was daily – even if one daughter wasn’t beating me, the other was’. Young Ethiopian girls encounter the 
difficult trade-offs between economic gains and empowerment, and exploitation and abuse. With few options for a 
fulfilled life at home, many adolescent girls leave feeling optimistic that their experience will be a positive one. 
Ecuadorian women migrating to Spain as domestic workers also face a trade-off – in their case, between 
increased economic opportunity and family income, and separation from their family and discrimination in 
the destination country. Domestic work in Spain provides a far superior income for Ecuadorian women than 
most job opportunities available to them at home, where they face age and gender discrimination when seeking 
employment. Women also have better, more stable opportunities in Spain than Ecuadorian men, so families often 
decide that it is best for women to migrate. Ecuadorian women are highly marketable in Spain given that they 
are native Spanish speakers and their general categorisation as nurturing carers and housekeepers. Migration also 
enhances Ecuadorian women’s autonomy, agency, and worth. By contributing financially to their families, women 
often gain greater decision-making power in the household. For single Ecuadorian women, migration also provides 
an alternative to marriage. 
Many Ecuadorian women who migrate to Spain are themselves mothers who are forced to leave their own 
children behind as they care for other children abroad. This separation is one major cost of migration. In many 
cases, Ecuadorian women prefer other female relatives (a grandmother or aunt) to care for their children, rather 
than their spouse. Ecuadorian migrants also face discrimination as foreigners in Spain; like many migrant women, 
they experience deskilling and occupy lower-level positions, primarily employed as domestic workers regardless of 
their education or experience. 
While Ethiopia and Ecuador both provide examples of female migration for domestic work, they illustrate how 
individual factors as well as the broader political and institutional context of the destination country influence 
women’s experiences of migration. Ethiopian adolescents in Saudi Arabia, for example, are especially vulnerable 
not just because of their age and lack of voice but also because of the lack of legal protection for women in the 
Middle East and the lack of recourse to justice when their human rights are violated.
Sources: Jones et al. (2014); Dudley (2013).
migration to the USA and other Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Today, rather than accompanying or joining spouses, 
women are more likely to be the ‘lead migrant’. In fact, 
highly skilled migrant women not only have higher rates of 
migration than low-skilled women, they are also more likely 
to migrate than highly skilled men. The demand for skilled 
migrants can also incentivise people in developing countries 
to gain further education and professional qualifications, 
a phenomenon known as ‘brain gain’. However, as 
Arends-Kuenning et al. (2015) found in the Philippines, 
these societal gains have costs for individual families. Often 
it is a family decision to invest in private education and the 
pay-off on the investment is only realised if the individual 
family member is able to complete their training, migrate, 
and secure a high-skilled and well-paid job.
Migration to a wealthier country can provide improved 
career opportunities and skills acquisition for women, 
as well as a better quality of life and increased security 
(employment or otherwise) for themselves and their 
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Box 3: The global healthcare chain and the experiences of skilled female migrants 
Despite skilled female migrants being the fastest-growing category of migrants, little attention has been paid to 
their experiences. There are few qualitative studies documenting the growing number of foreign-trained female 
doctors and the experiences of migrants working in the health sector, particularly those working outside Anglo-
Saxon countries. 
To fill this gap, Wojczewski and colleagues (2015) interviewed 34 migrants in Austria, Belgium, South Africa 
and the UK who trained as nurses or doctors in sub-Saharan Africa. Temporary ‘deskilling’ was a common 
experience, with validation of qualifications, retraining, and certification meaning that migrants were unable to 
practice as nurses or doctors for between two and 10 years. Doctors in particular reported having to do other 
jobs such as care work while they repeated lengthy training. Some reported permanent inability to work in their 
profession and ‘re-domestication’ when financial, reproductive, or care responsibilities meant retraining was not an 
option.
Formal regulations and bureaucratic capacity in destination countries have a significant impact on migrants’ 
experiences. For instance, interviewees complained that in South Africa, the validation of foreign certificates and 
registration with the nursing council could take two years. The recognition of qualifications was reported to take 
two to three times longer in Austria and Belgium than in the UK. Social attitudes and employment rights (and 
their enforcement) are also important. Many of the black (but not white) African doctors and nurses in the study 
reported experiencing racial discrimination from co-workers and patients. 
In Greece, Lazaridis (2006) also found informal barriers (cultural, attitudinal, organisational and practical) as 
well as formal barriers to women’s occupational mobility in her study of ‘quasi-nurses’ – people (often migrants 
and usually women) employed to care for families’ elderly or sick relatives either in their own home or in hospital. 
Before the economic crisis, the demand for quasi-nurses was driven by three main factors: Greek women entering 
the labour market out of economic necessity; inadequate social welfare provision by the state; and social norms 
that frown upon families who do not care for their elderly relatives at home. Families were also driven to hire 
quasi-nurses to care for their sick relatives during their hospital stays because of the shortage of nurses (doctors 
outnumbered nurses in Greek hospitals), and the overlap between the informal and formal care sectors in Greece, 
similar to other southern European countries.
A ‘hierarchy of labour’ in Greece based on intersecting forms of discrimination means that women from 
marginalised ethnic groups and without legal status experience the worst employment conditions. Many women 
(including skilled women) who migrate to Greece, particularly those without documents, have little choice but to 
work in the informal sector. Only one out of the 18 interviewed migrants working as quasi-nurses had nursing 
qualifications. All had higher education or professional experience but were unable to pursue their chosen career 
(e.g. accountancy, engineering, teaching). 
The women reported experiencing discrimination and insecurity. According to a Bulgarian migrant, ‘I came to 
Greece because I heard that whoever comes here makes money… It wasn’t an easy decision to take as I left behind 
my husband and children… The job was to look after a family with three children; the money was very little, only 
40,000 drachmas in the late 1990s, when other women were paid for similar job 120,000 drachmas, but I took 
it… When we fell out, they refused to let me have my passport back. I got it back only after I complained to the 
agency about it. The job was hard. I was not allowed to have a day off or to go out, because they were afraid that 
I would not return’. 
The lack of solidarity among quasi-nurses and hostility between Greek and migrant workers undermined 
collective action to improve conditions. However, in some cases, interviewees reported that working in a private 
home sometimes led to a bond with the employer, based on the elderly person’s dependence on the migrant 
employee, which enabled her to negotiate better wages and conditions.
Sources: Wojczewski et al. (2015); Lazaridis (2006).
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families. If they do return home, migration can also 
transfer skills to less-developed countries (UNFPA and 
IMP, 2004; Lorenzo et al., 2005). At the same time, 
many highly skilled migrant women are employed in 
low-skilled jobs, indicating a gap between expectations 
and opportunities in destination countries. Migrant nurses 
and, in particular, doctors can face an extended process to 
get visas, have their qualifications validated and register 
with the relevant bodies, during which time they may need 
to take up less-skilled work (see Box 3). Employers may 
not recognise migrants’ qualifications or experience and 
re-training may be necessary, or migrants may need to 
improve their language skills.
Deskilling and perceived devaluing of female migrants is 
common (Piper, 2005). Differences in national regulations 
may mean that migrant nurses are unable to continue 
to undertake routine duties in the destination country. 
Racial discrimination on the part of recruiters and co-
workers may mean that they are forced to accept positions 
they are overqualified for, or do not have the same 
opportunities for career progression as co-workers (Ghosh, 
2009; Wojczewski et al., 2015). Nursing and healthcare 
positions typically do not offer the same benefits (e.g. 
housing, relocation expenses) as male-dominated, white-
collar positions (Piper, 2005). Female migrant workers 
therefore face a double penalty in terms of labour market 
segregation and discrimination; they are more likely to 
work in less well-paid and rewarded sectors because of 
their sex, and are more likely to work in lower-skilled 
positions in that sector because of their ethnicity and 
migrant status (European Commission and OECD, 2005).
Point-based immigration systems influence these 
dynamics. For example, when Canada awarded no or 
negative points to health qualifications in the 1990s, 
many trained Filipinos entered the country through 
domestic labour programmes instead (Kofman, 2004). 
When women migrate as dependents, the labour market 
or social norms may mean they are unable to continue 
to do a job they have been trained for (Ghosh, 2009). 
Governments also control the labour market through the 
issuing of professional licences and certificates: ‘In Canada, 
certification requirements are often described as a form of 
systemic discrimination, in that criteria are created which 
are applied to the Canadian-born and foreign-born alike, 
but which disproportionately restrict the access of the 
foreign-born to trades or professions’ (Piper, 2005: 9). 
5 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Migration implies trade-offs for women and girls, in 
that it can offer new opportunities but can also expose 
female migrants and refugees to new or increased risks. 
For women and girls to benefit from mobility, policies 
must support the empowerment and economic benefits of 
migration and also increase protection of female migrants. 
This is especially important for the most vulnerable 
migrants and refugees, such as adolescent girls and low-
skilled female workers in highly unregulated markets. 
Female migrants are also not a homogenous group; they 
have different socioeconomic characteristics. Policy will 
only amplify the empowerment effects of migration and 
mitigate increased vulnerabilities if the specific needs 
of different women and girls, as well as men and boys, 
in different countries are understood, and policy and 
programmes are tailored accordingly. 
Migration is most likely to empower women and girls 
when it occurs through regular channels, when they can 
make informed choices, and when they have access to legal 
protection, services and social networks in countries of 
origin and destination. Achieving this requires actions at 
different levels – from the community to the international 
– and cooperation within and across sectors (international 
organisations, government agencies, the private sector and 
civil society). The recommendations below set out key 
actions for the SDG monitoring agencies, specialist United 
Nations (UN) agencies (e.g. the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), relevant national 
government agencies (home offices, labour departments, 
national statistics agencies), and civil society organisations, 
but they are not exhaustive. In addition, countries vary 
greatly in their political context and leadership on gender 
and migration issues. Further work is therefore needed 
to analyse the political and social barriers to progress in 
different countries of origin and destination and to tailor 
strategies accordingly. 
Conclusion 1: Women migrate as much as men, so 
migration policies must be gender-sensitive and data 
must be disaggregated. 
Recommendation: get the basics right – data, policies 
and advocacy. 
 • Ensure that all key national, regional and global 
processes and mechanisms on migration (e.g. the 
Colombo Process and the Global Forum on Migration 
and Development) as well as advocacy organisations 
and agencies (e.g. IOM and UNHCR and key non-
government organisations (NGOs) such as the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC)) focus on female 
migrants and recognise how gender affects migration 
experiences and outcomes. SDGs 5, 8, and 10 are 
important advocacy tools. 
 • Include specific objectives, targets and milestones on 
female migrants and refugees in key migration and 
asylum policies, programmes and monitoring systems, 
and specifically SDG 10 on inequality, and target 10.7 
promoting orderly and safe migration. 
 • Work with international networks such as the Global 
Partnership for Sustainable Data Development and 
invest in the capacity of national agencies to collect and 
use sex- and age-disaggregated data on international 
migrants in countries with high levels of female migrants 
or where they are most exposed to risks. 
 • Target specific initiatives such as the recently established 
High-Level Panel on Women’s Economic Empowerment 
to address female migration issues as part of decent 
work agendas and efforts to promote women’s 
economic empowerment. 
 • Provide financial support and political backing 
to national campaigns and initiatives focusing on 
community education, awareness raising, networking 
and training to combat xenophobia and increase 
awareness of migrant and refugee contributions to 
society (paid and unpaid).
Conclusion 2: Female migrants and refugees are 
less visible than male migrants but they are more 
vulnerable and exposed to greater risk.
Recommendation: prioritise and enhance protection 
policies and mechanisms. 
 • Ensure that opportunities to promote safe and regular 
migration consider gender factors and do not reinforce 
gender discrimination and disadvantage through a focus 
on traditionally male employment sectors. 
 • Introduce mandatory gender training for agencies that 
have most contact with female migrants, including 
immigration authorities, the police and health service 
providers. 
 • Support national and sub-national resource centres for 
migrants that provide advice, information and support 
services (e.g. legal advice, information on sexual and 
reproductive health services) for women and girls, 
regardless of their legal status.
 • Increase access to basic services such as health, 
education, social protection and psychosocial support 
for all female migrants and refugees, including dedicated 
resources for returnees.
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Relevant SDG Targets
5.2: Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and 
girls in the public and private spheres
5.6: Universal access to sexual and reproductive health and 
rights
8.7: Eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe and responsible migration, 
implement planned and well-managed migration policies
16.1: Reduce all forms of violence and death everywhere
16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all violence and 
torture against children
16.3: Promote the law to ensure equal access to justice  
for all
Relevant SDG Targets
10.7: Orderly, safe and responsible migration 
17.8: Increase significantly the availability of high-quality and 
reliable data
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Conclusion 3: Female migrant workers are less likely 
than men to make the most of the economic and 
social opportunities of mobility.
Recommendation: regulate and improve working 
conditions for all female migrant workers. 
 • Improve monitoring and enforcement of labour 
standards, policies and legal frameworks for female 
migrant workers to support decent work, eliminate 
abusive and illegal employment, and reduce 
discriminatory practices in the workplace. The OECD 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are 
well-positioned to lead these improvements in high-
income countries where most migrant domestic workers 
are found. 
 • Strengthen domestic and regional regulations to speed 
up access to and integration in the labour market for 
migrant women in destination countries, including 
regional collaboration for better recognition of 
qualifications. 
 • Support a global initiative and campaign to increase 
awareness and recognise the social and economic value 
of care and domestic work and to promote the equal 
sharing of unpaid work by men and women. 
 • Increase temporary and permanent work permits for 
migrants and refugees and their families (e.g. spouses of 
migrants, or refugees awaiting resettlement in camps or 
urban settings).
 • Improve migrants’ access to financial institutions for 
general financial inclusion and for sending/receiving 
remittances. 
The authors thank Nicola Jones, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Pietro Mona and colleagues for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Relevant SDG Targets
5.4: Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work
8.5: Achieve full and productive employment for all
8.8: Protect labour rights and promote safe working 
environments
8.10: Improve access to financial institutions, including 
remittance flows
10.c: Reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances
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• 31 million school-aged children are international migrants, and this number is set to grow. Their 
education is therefore a long-term strategic priority and investment. 
• Educating migrant children is essential to meet SDG 4, and more broadly to achieve economic and 
social benefits such as improved livelihoods, better health outcomes, reductions in gender inequities 
and enhanced political participation.
•  Large and unexpected migration flows can disrupt education systems, disadvantage migrant and 
refugee children and create tensions in host communities. To combat this, a combination of forward-
planning and contingency funding is needed. 
•  Education plays an important role in social integration, economic mobility and learning outcomes. 
Migrant children should not be placed in segregated classes or schools, nor solely taught in their 
native language.
•  There is limited data on the education of migrant and refugee children. Government and international 
institutions need to collaborate to collect such data, and use it to support vulnerable groups.
Key 
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1 Introduction 
This briefing explores the challenges and opportunities 
related to primary-school education for migrants – 
especially in host countries – and the implications for the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It focuses 
mainly on international migrants, but also includes a brief 
discussion of education for refugees.  
In 2015, around 244 million people were international 
migrants1 (International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), 2016), including 31 million children below the 
age of 18 (UNICEF, 2016). This means that roughly 
one in 70 children worldwide live in a country different 
to that of their birth. Asia and Africa host the largest 
numbers of migrant children. Migrant populations in 
Africa are notably younger – one in three migrants is 
under the age of 18, a figure twice the global average. 
While migrant populations tend to be younger in low-
income countries and older in high-income countries, it is 
striking that Europe, North America and Oceania host a 
disproportionate number of migrant children compared to 
their share of all children globally (see Figure 1) (UNICEF, 
2016). These patterns demonstrate that the challenge of 
meeting migrant education needs is a matter of importance 
for both high- and low-income countries.
The right to education for migrant children is 
protected by several legal instruments, including the 1990 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants 
1. International migrants are defined as people living in a country than the one in which they were born. In countries where this precise data was lacking, it 
was proxied for by the number of people with foreign citizenship. However, different sources of data in the brief might use slightly different definitions of 
international migrants, for example excluding short-term migrants from the statistics concerning migrants. We have tried to clarify where this is the case. 
and Members of Their Families, and the 1989 Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. However, the extent to which 
these commitments are implemented in practice varies 
considerably. Moreover, they are particularly valid for 
primary education, with the right to secondary and tertiary 
education less protected by legal instruments.  
Overcoming barriers to migrant education is key to 
achieving not only the Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) 4 on education, but also a range of other Goals. 
There is a strong evidence base showing that education 
contributes to improved livelihoods, more rapid economic 
growth, better health outcomes, reductions in gender 
inequities, strengthened support for democracy, higher 
levels of tolerance, enhanced political participation 
and greater concern for the environment. Providing 
education to migrant children is therefore of utmost 
importance – increasingly so given the likelihood of future 
growth in migrant flows (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2016; United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), 2014).
This briefing first highlights why education matters 
for migrants and their host countries. It then goes on to 
discuss trends in primary education for migrant groups, 
as education at this level has important repercussions for 
educational achievement at upper levels and for joining the 
workforce. It examines how migrant education contributes 
to SDG achievement, particularly SDG 4 on education 
Figure 1: Distribution of international migrant children and all children by region, 2015 (%)
Source: UNICEF (2016).
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and sub-goals on children in vulnerable situations. It 
explores some of the major challenges, particularly in 
terms of integration into education systems and the kind 
of education provided. The analysis examines how migrant 
education issues may differ between low-, middle- and 
high-income countries, and concludes by drawing out 
detailed recommendations. 
1.1 Why does education matter? 
Education brings a range of benefits for both individuals 
and societies. It provides children with skills that enable 
them to be more productive later in life, which leads to 
higher incomes and the possibility of breaking out of cycles 
of chronic poverty. It also shapes the way that citizens 
understand their society and engage with each other. These 
benefits are particularly important for migrants. Education 
creates opportunities to understand and better integrate 
into their host country, particularly when considering areas 
such as language, laws and customs. Being able to speak 
the language of the host country is especially important; 
across a range of surveys, respondents in host countries see 
it as a primary concern for effective integration (Dempster 
and Hargrave, 2017). More educated populations also 
tend to be more supportive of democracy, more likely to 
participate in politics, and more tolerant of differences 
(UNESCO, 2016) – all of which will help the host country 
to better manage the opportunities and challenges that 
migration creates.  
Research finds that investment in this sector also 
produces strong returns for countries (Pritchett, 2006 
quoted in UNESCO, 2016; Schäferhoff et al., 2016). 
Estimates suggest that every US$1 invested in an additional 
year of schooling for children in low- and middle-income 
countries generates benefits in earning and health gains of 
US$10 in low-income countries, US$4 in lower-middle-
income countries and US$2 in upper-middle-income 
countries (International Commission on Financing Global 
Education Opportunity (Education Commission), 2016).  
Education is also likely to generate remittances, which tend 
to strengthen education in countries of origin. 
1.2 Trends in migrant education provision
Globally, there have been significant gains in education 
– particularly primary – since the early 2000s. However, 
these have largely been in terms of access, which has 
become compulsory in most countries, with more 
limited progress made on quality and equity (Education 
Commission, 2016). A major challenge in mapping 
education trends for migrant children is the absence of 
internationally comparable data, particularly in low- and 
middle-income countries, partly due to the diversity of 
migration flows (see Box 1). Where data is available, it 
suggests that immigrant students face greater difficulties 
than their host-country peers in accessing education and 
achieving good learning outcomes (OECD, 2015). 
Large immigration flows can also have an impact on 
education systems, particularly if the host country does 
not have the infrastructure and resources to include a 
significant number of new students quickly. Demographic 
changes and rising demand for education caused by 
migration flows may lead to overcrowding in schools 
and falling education quality, larger class sizes and the 
emergence of a more complex mix of student language, 
existing skills and social norms. For example, the rapid 
increase in the number of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon 
led to the introduction of second shifts in the afternoon for 
Syrian students, with negative effects on both students and 
teachers (Dryden-Peterson and Adelman, 2016; Human 
Rights Watch (HRW), 2016; see Box 4). 
However, if managed well, migrant influxes can have a 
positive impact, for example by revitalising depopulated 
schools or, as in London, being linked to improvements 
in school and student performance (Burgess, 2014). 
Important strategies to facilitate the rapid integration of 
new students include prompt availability of funding for 
language classes (Hickmann et al., 2008), as well as the 
availability of extra funds for local authorities to match a 
rise in local migrant numbers (IPPR, 2014).
1.3 Trends in migrant education outcomes
Evidence from selected low- and middle-income countries 
also highlights challenges for migrant education (see Box 
2). Immigrants and children in immigrant households in 
Côte d’Ivoire and the Dominican Republic are less likely 
to attend school than their host-country peers; this is also 
Box 1: Data challenges in migrant education
In countries where official data collection is limited, 
only key variables such as age and gender are 
captured, and migration status is rarely recorded. 
Even if migration status is added to existing surveys, 
the ‘rareness’ of migrants may restrict a Ministries’ 
ability to collect meaningful data (Bilsborrow, 
2016).  While international organisations might 
collect information concerning the education of 
refugees residing in camps, little is known about 
those residing in urban areas due to the challenges 
in reaching them.  
Politics can also play a role in preventing 
the collection of migration data, for example if 
governments wish to downplay the figures of 
immigrants and asylum-seekers. Moreover, even 
countries with well-functioning data-collection 
systems may be unable to produce precise estimates 
of children of irregular migrants. Schools themselves 
might face difficulties in collecting information on 
their students, even if they can persuade parents in 
legally vulnerable situations that such data is aimed 
at supporting their children, rather than reporting 
them to security authorities (Bartlett et al., 2015).  
the case for children in Costa Rica who were born abroad. 
However, migrants are not always at a disadvantage: in 
Burkina Faso no significant differences in attendance were 
found (OECD, 2017).
Evidence from six OECD countries2 found that 
immigrant students3 tend to perform worse in standard 
assessments of reading, science and mathematics than 
their host-country counterparts and, in some countries, are 
more likely to repeat a grade, attend vocational schools 
or drop out of secondary education (see Box 3). They are 
more likely to attend schools in major urban centres with 
student populations who are from less advantaged socio-
economic backgrounds and, in some countries, are less 
2. Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
3. The definition of immigrant children varies based on different countries’ definitions. These could be both foreign-born children or children who are born 
in the host country, but who are considered foreign nationals per host-country law.
likely to have attended early-childhood education (OECD, 
2010; OECD, 2015).  
This performance gap is largely explained by parents’ 
occupations and educational background, and the language 
spoken at home. Other factors include better educational 
resources at home, early reading at home, early-childhood 
education activities, a more advantaged socio-economic 
composition of schools and communities, more hours for 
learning language at school, and school accountability 
measures (i.e. informing parents of student performance 
and the use of performance data) (ibid.).  
Migrant children are also likely to face linguistic 
barriers that impact on their achievement. Many 
first- and second-generation migrants do not speak the 
testing language at home (see Figure 2) and  Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) data suggests that 
this has a strong influence on their reading-comprehension 
scores – in part explaining the performance deficit with 
host-country students (OECD, 2015a). 
The characteristics of education systems and schools 
also play an important role in migrant children’s school 
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Box 2: Education and migration to low- and middle-
income countries
The examples of South Africa and Thailand, middle-
income countries with significant immigration, show 
that migrant inclusion in the primary-education 
system is an urgent issue and one that generates a 
variety of challenges and coping strategies. 
In South Africa, research shows that children 
of Zimbabwean migrants face discrimination 
when trying to access school, which results in 
migrant children having lower enrolment rates 
than South African children. This is partly a 
function of schools being requested to undertake 
policing functions and report undocumented 
migrants to the Department of Home Affairs, 
which makes them an unwelcoming environment 
for migrant children (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014). 
Moreover, the country experiences a high number 
of unaccompanied children who migrate for work, 
for whom no education is provided outside of their 
working hours (Save the Children UK, 2007). 
In Thailand, despite the legal right of all children 
to access education irrespective of their status, 
access to school for migrant children – particularly 
Burmese migrants – is very difficult due to fear of 
the authorities, the cost of books and uniforms, 
a lack of accreditation, and language barriers. In 
some areas, these challenges are overcome through 
co-operation between schools and civil society. For 
example, the Foundation for Rural Youth operates 
in a southern Bangkok district with a high number 
of migrant families and has successfully collected 
data on the whereabouts and profiles of many 
out-of-school children. This data allowed them to 
engage in awareness-raising activities with families 
about the right to education in Thailand (Save the 
Children, 2015).
Box 3: Education and migration to high-income 
countries
With access to primary school less of an issue in 
high-income countries, the main debates about 
inclusion of migrant children relate to the balance 
between their native language and culture and that 
of the host country. The OECD describes countries 
as using three different models: the ethnic-identity 
model, which values mother language and culture; 
the language-assimilation model, which focuses on 
the acquisition of the host country’s language; and 
the language-integration model, which values both 
languages equally (Taguma et al., 2010). 
Choices about integration stem from 
the countries’ histories of immigration. 
Different integration models, such as fostering 
multiculturalism or assimilation, also influence the 
way in which the education system has responded 
to the challenge of migrant students. For example, 
Sweden belongs to the language-integration model, 
having policies that promote supporting migrant 
children in their learning through their native 
language. On the contrary, in France it is illegal to 
collect information about the migration background 
of students, which shows the importance that the 
country gives to the assimilation of children in the 
French culture through French language (Escafré-
Dublet, 2014).
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results. Migrant students from the same countries of 
origin and similar socio-economic backgrounds have 
been found to perform very differently depending on the 
schools that they attend. For example, the performance of 
Arabic-speaking migrants in the Netherlands is higher than 
the achievement of students from the same countries who 
emigrated to Qatar, after accounting for socio-economic 
status (OECD, 2015).
2 Education, migration and the SDGs
Overall, improving education provision for migrants will 
impact the achievement of a range of SDGs. SDG 4 calls 
for inclusive and equitable education and lifelong learning 
for all. It specifically references an aspiration to meet the 
needs of children in ‘vulnerable situations’ – a group that 
includes migrant children, refugees and other displaced 
populations. Migrant children are often excluded from 
education due to language or socio-economic barriers 
(SDGs 4.1 and 4.5). Moreover, SDG 4.2 calls for their 
inclusion in quality early-childhood education, essential 
to prepare migrant children for primary school. Content 
focusing on socio-emotional learning, human rights and 
citizenship education in school curricula (SDG 4.7) can 
foster the inclusion of migrant children and enhance 
intercultural understanding among host-country children. 
Other SDGs address migrant children’s inclusion in the 
education system; foster gender equality (SDG 5.1); and 
target the wider integration of migrant children and their 
families within host communities (SDG 10.2). Inclusive 
and high-quality education can protect children from 
harmful practices such as early marriage, child labour 
and human trafficking (SDGs 5.3, 8.7 and 16.2) and 
has a positive effect on the health of migrants (SDG 3). 
These Targets are not specific to migrants, but as migrant 
populations are subject to socio-economic and legal 
vulnerabilities, they are at risk of harmful practices and 
lack of access to healthcare. Finally, greater education is 
linked to a lower incidence of poverty and boosts income 
growth (SDG 1.1 and 10.1). These dynamics and other 
links are outlined below in Table 1. 
3 Integration of migrant children in 
education systems
This section explores a range of efforts to support the full 
integration of migrant children into education systems, 
and the barriers to achieving integration, specifically legal, 
socio-economic and technical aspects. 
3.1 Educational integration of migrants
The integration of children in schools plays an important 
role in the social integration of their families within the 
host community, which in turn has a positive bearing 
on educational experiences (Moskal, 2010; Sacramento, 
2015). This is challenging in practice, however, particularly 
for irregular migrants who may be wary of interacting with 
Figure 2: Percentage of immigrant students who do not speak the language of assessment at home
Source: OECD (2015a). Note data sourced from high-income countries; comparable data is not available for low- or middle-income countries.
Table 1: Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all.
4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality 
primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning 
outcomes.
4.2: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early 
childhood development, care and preprimary education so that they are ready 
for primary education.
4.5: By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal 
access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, 
including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in 
vulnerable situations.
4.7: By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills 
needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through 
education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, 
gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global 
citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to 
sustainable development.
Reducing the barriers to migrant children accessing education is vital to 
meeting this Goal, as is improving the quality of the education they receive. 
This holds true for SDG 4 sub-goals of ensuring free access to education, 
improving education equity, raising levels of access to quality early-education 
programmes, and increasing the proportion that achieve certain benchmarks in 
literacy and numeracy – all areas of challenge for migrant children. 
It is important to develop more inclusive, intercultural school curricula, with a 
focus on socio-emotional learning, and to train teachers in these skills. It is also 
important to enhance the social and intercultural skills of host-country children. 
Achieving quality education for all (including in source countries) may lead 
to increases in migration, as there is a positive link between education levels 
and propensity to migrate. However, this varies across contexts, depending 
on opportunities available. In contexts where overall education levels are low, 
the link between migration and education levels is weaker, possibly due to a 
preponderance of low-skilled migration (OECD, 2017).
1.1: By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently 
measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day.
8.1: Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national 
circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product 
growth per annum in the least developed countries.
10.1: By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 
40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average.
Improving the education of migrant populations both in the developed and 
developing world is pertinent to these economic-related targets, as education 
can lead to rising incomes and reduced poverty for migrants, and boost growth 
rates and government revenues in their host countries. 
Migrant education may also indirectly contribute to these goals if their rising 
incomes translate into higher levels of remittances, and if remittances are 
partially invested in better education for family members at home. This impact 
is likely to be increased if SDG 10.C – on reducing the costs of sending 
remittances – is achieved.   
3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. Education has a strong impact on the future health outcomes of the student and 
their families, particularly in the case of female education. There may also be 
indirect impacts if migrant children can access and navigate the health services 
of their host country better because of improved knowledge of the country and 
its majority language. 
10.2: By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political 
inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion 
or economic or other status.
The integration of migrant children into education systems is closely linked 
to their broader integration into their host country and community, as well 
as that of their parents and immediate family. Education can improve their 
social, economic and political inclusion, particularly if they are better educated 
regarding their host country and able to speak the majority language.  
5.3: Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage 
and female genital mutilation.
8.7: Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, 
end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of 
child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms.
16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and 
torture of children. 
The enrolment of migrant children in education systems provides them with 
more protection and access to resources to resist these practices, and allows 
host-country governments to monitor and intervene more easily where needed.
Attempts to eliminate child labour, exploitation and trafficking through financial 
support to families are all likely to boost education for migrant children by 
freeing them to receive an education that they would not otherwise be able to 
have.  
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Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
11.1: By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing 
and basic services and upgrade slums.
11.2: By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable 
transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public 
transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, 
women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons. 
Achieving these housing and infrastructure targets would improve the basic 
ability of migrant children and refugees to access education services and to 
ensure that their home life was more conducive to achieving strong learning 
outcomes successfully. 
10.3: Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including 
by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting 
appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard. 
16.9: By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration. 
Removing legal barriers to accessing education – particularly for the children of 
irregular migrants and refugee children – would boost enrolment rates, as would 
ensuring that all people have a legal identity and the necessary paperwork to 
allow them to enrol in school. 
staff at their child’s school due to concerns about revealing 
their legal status (Bartlett et al., 2015). 
Educational integration of migrants can also have 
powerful generational effects. For example, a comparative 
study of Turkish migrants in several European countries 
showed social systems that support migrants are associated 
with greater economic mobility for second-generation 
migrants (Schnell, 2014). PISA data on the performance 
of second-generation migrant students finds that their 
scores correlate strongly to their parents’ educational 
background. This suggests that integrating first-generation 
migrants into the education system successfully can lead 
to a virtuous circle of integration in the host society across 
generations (Dustmann et al., 2011).
3.2 Barriers to access 
Legal barriers
While many countries grant access to basic education for 
children of irregular migrants (UNESCO, 2017), the type 
of migration strongly influences the legal barriers migrant 
students might face; irregular migrants, unaccompanied 
children, stateless children, children without identity 
documents, and seasonal migrants face more barriers (see 
Box 2).  Countries take different approaches to this. In 
some countries, such as Malaysia, irregular migrants are 
legally barred from government schools, while in other 
contexts the children of undocumented migrants may 
find themselves unable to enrol, despite having a legal 
entitlement (Lumayag, 2016; Insan Association, 2015).
Within Europe, irregular migrant children attend school 
in 23 out of 28 countries. In 10 of these4, the legislative 
framework has a specific reference to the entitlement of 
children with irregular status to attend schools (Spencer 
and Hughes, 2015). When law prevents access, civil society 
can step in to provide non-formal education to excluded 
children, as in the case of Malaysia (Lumayag, 2016). 
However, accreditation of non-formal education remains a 
problem and can prevent children from proceeding to the 
next education level. 
4. Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Slovenia for primary education.
Meeting enrolment requirements can also be an issue 
for unaccompanied and stateless children. In the US, 
unaccompanied children face challenges with proof of 
residency or guardianship, as they live with other families 
who are not their legal guardians (American Immigration 
Council, 2016). In addition, changes in citizenship laws 
in the Dominican Republic denationalised many citizens 
of Haitian descent, which prevented their children from 
enrolling in primary education (Georgetown Law Human 
Rights Institute Fact-finding Project, 2014). 
Strict rules on age limits for enrolment can also prove a 
challenge for migrant children who lack formal education 
and the knowledge necessary to enter the level of schooling 
appropriate for their age, but are too old to enrol in the 
level of schooling appropriate for their existing knowledge 
(American Immigration Council, 2016).
Socio-economic barriers
Socio-economic barriers can impact upon migrant 
inclusion in education systems in two main ways. The first 
is that the children in question may be engaged in labour 
of some type – either to meet their own needs or those of 
their family, or due to trafficking or forced labour. Under 
these circumstances, migrant children are unlikely to attend 
school (Child Protection Working Group (CPWG), 2015). 
Children engaged in seasonal migration for work or in 
nomadic and pastoralist movements may be migrating 
to work during the school term. Seasonally sensitive 
education policies have been introduced in countries such 
as Brazil, Colombia and the Gambia to reduce the impact 
of this phenomenon (Hadley, 2010).
The second way is the de facto segregation of migrant 
and host-country children that may occur because of 
socio-economic differences. First-generation immigrants 
tend to be poorer and are likely to be concentrated in 
urban areas. Thus, they are more likely to attend schools in 
cities with student populations who are, on average, from 
less-advantaged socio-economic backgrounds and more 
likely to be first- or second-generation migrants. This can 
reinforce disadvantage for both groups.
Evidence from some high-income countries shows that 
the enrolment of a significant number of migrant children 
in schools can cause host-country children to move to 
other – often private – schools (Bloem and Diaz, 2007; 
Fairlie and Resch, 2002). To reduce this tendency towards 
segregation, the Danish municipality of Aarhus created a 
quota approach that sets a cap of 20% of students eligible 
for linguistic support for each school. If the number of 
students in need for linguistic support is higher, some of 
these students are moved to another school (Jørgensen, 
2014).
Linguistic and technical barriers 
The language of instruction can act as a major barrier to 
migrant students’ integration, even if they are enrolled 
and attending school. In the US, there are concerns at the 
number of English-language learners amongst second-
generation migrant students with at least one parent born 
in the US. It suggests that their parents, despite having 
5. Per UNHCR, a refugee is ‘someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence’ while asylum seekers are those 
who ‘apply for asylum – the right to be recognized as a refugee and receive legal protection and material assistance’ (UNHCR, 2017)
6. This is in contrast to gross enrolment rates of native populations in host countries at above 97% in Egypt and Yemen and above 92% in Pakistan.
been born and educated in the US, have not learnt English 
fully nor passed on the language – a potentially significant 
barrier to the broader integration of both parents and 
children (Fix and McHugh, 2009). 
Early-childhood education plays a particularly 
important role in primary school readiness for children 
who do not speak the majority language at home, 
as their interaction with majority-language staff and 
students allows them to reach primary school with better 
language skills. Training pre-school staff to interact better 
with families of different backgrounds can help foster 
bilingualism amongst students by encouraging the family 
to use the majority language with the children alongside 
their native language (UNICEF, 2009).
However, migrant families tend to have less physical 
access to high-quality early-childhood education (Leseman, 
2007). Programmes such as the Migrant and Seasonal 
Head Start Program (MSHS) in the US can help by 
providing transportation to early-childhood education 
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Box 4: Education for refugees
In 2015, there were 11 million children under 18 who were refugees or asylum seekers6, representing just over 
half the total global refugee population (The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 2015). Estimates suggest that 1.75 
million primary-school aged refugee children – or half of that population – are out of school. The proportion of 
those out of school varies from 80% in Egypt and Yemen to 40% at refugee sites in Pakistan6 (UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics (UIS), 2016). This has a compounding effect on secondary education, contributing to the 80% of 
refugee adolescents (1.95 million) not enrolled in secondary education (UNESCO, 2016b; UNESCO, 2016). These 
percentages contrast with a secondary-school enrolment rate of around 75% worldwide and 40% in low-income 
countries (UIS, 2016). 
Countries have adopted a range of strategies to integrate refugee children into their education system, shaped 
by the local context and type of emergency. The main differences are whether they integrate refugees into the 
national school system, and what curriculum they use. 
Some countries integrate refugees in schools with native children, others set up separate schools in refugee 
camps. While integrating refugees avoids segregation, refugee children might face bullying and teaching might not 
be tailored to their language or psycho-social needs (Shuayb et al., 2014). If there are no schools within refugee 
camps, or refugees are in remote locations, transportation to school can be a major barrier to enrolment. When 
schools are set up in refugee camps, they often suffer from a scarcity of qualified teachers and the resources to pay 
for teachers’ salaries. Many teachers therefore work on a voluntary basis, which could have negative consequences 
for the quality of the education provided (UNHCR, 2016).  
The choice of whether to use the host-country curriculum or that of the refugees’ country of origin is an issue 
in refugee settings. While the curriculum of the country of origin helps to maintain ties with the home culture and 
facilitates later repatriation, it isolates refugees from the host community and makes it difficult for them to access 
higher levels of education or employment due to a lack of accreditation. Examples include Congolese refugees in 
Tanzania and students at two refugee camps in Djibouti, who have faced problems with accreditation of school 
certificates in the host countries and so been unable to continue their education (UNHCR, 2016). Conversely, 
the host country’s curriculum facilitates integration, but can present knowledge barriers and the challenge of 
translating the curriculum into another language. Overall, UNHCR favours use of the host country’s curriculum in 
the context of protracted emergencies and displacement (UNHCR, 2015a).
Innovative and flexible financing mechanisms are being developed to respond better to the needs of refugee 
children. These are often based on cooperation between multiple donors, as in the case of the EU Regional Trust 
Fund in response to the Syrian crisis and the Jordan Compact, a partnership between the Jordanian government 
and the international community (European Commission (EC), 2016; Reliefweb, 2016). 
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centres, mitigating the difficulties faced by migrant workers 
due to their working hours and limited access to transport. 
Another aspect of education systems that affects their 
level of inclusivity is how selective they are and how early 
the selection is made. Evidence from some high-income 
countries shows that migrant children are often streamed 
into educational paths that lead to vocational training 
instead of higher education. This has been observed 
in Germany which has a highly selective education 
system where only 23% of foreign-born students attend 
a grammar school (gymnasium) compared to 46% of 
German-origin students, and 1.8% German-origin students 
leave school before graduation compared to 14.2% of 
foreign-born students (Bendel, 2014).  
4 Quality education and life skills 
This section looks at the challenges of ensuring quality 
education and securing life skills for migrant students. It 
will examine some of the major barriers affecting provision 
and the strategies that have been adopted to overcome 
them. 
Despite the challenges that migrant children face 
compared to host-country students, migrant students and 
their families often show higher educational aspirations 
than their counterparts (UNICEF, 2009; UNESCO, 
2017). They therefore have the potential to thrive if 
education systems offer the necessary support. To improve 
educational opportunities, systems should focus on the 
presence of institutional and teacher discrimination, choice 
of languages of instruction, content of the curriculum, 
and teacher training, including attention to social and 
emotional learning, and teaching of the majority language. 
Discrimination
Feeling discriminated against affects the psychological 
wellbeing of children, as well as their social relations and 
academic outcomes (Spears Brown, 2015). Discrimination 
of migrant students has been observed across very diverse 
school contexts. For example, it has been reported by 
Haitian students in the Dominican Republic and by 
Colombian students in Ecuador, in both cases with 
detrimental effects for the students (Bartlett et al., 
2015). The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (EUMC) also found that lower expectations 
from teachers towards migrant students have a negative 
impact on students’ education. Moreover, discrimination 
based on cultural practices, such as the prohibition of 
wearing a headscarf in France, might also lead to exclusion 
or segregation in schools allowing such practices (EUMC, 
2004). 
Learning support in native language
It is estimated that around 40% of the global population 
does not have access to education in a language that 
they speak or understand, an issue that mainly concerns 
countries with a high diversity of languages, which often 
also deal with many migrant children. Some of these 
countries are taking steps to recognise the importance 
of instruction in children’s native language, and their 
best practices could be used as examples for the primary 
education of migrant children as well (UNESCO, 2016a). 
For example, in 1977 Sweden introduced programmes 
of teaching in the native language of migrant children, 
encouraged by diversity policies already in place towards 
the Sami and Finnish minority groups (Jacobs, 2013). 
The choice of language in education affects the ability 
of children to acquire better learning skills. Indeed, 
some examples show that the use of migrant students’ 
native languages in support of their learning can boost 
Box 5: Education and the role of remittances
Remittances that migrants send home to their 
families are widely acknowledged to have a positive 
impact on education (Gindling and Poggio, 2012). 
Remittances lead to improved financial security 
– this means migrant families can spend more on 
education, and free children from income-earning 
opportunities (Amakom and Iheoma, 2014). This 
impact may be particularly important for girls 
(Elbadawi and Roushdy, 2010). Potential earning 
power abroad may also lead families to prioritise 
improving the human capital of their children 
(Gyimah-Brempong, 2014). 
There is considerable evidence that the 
remittances migrants send back to their families 
are used to increase investments in education. 
Studies show that children whose families receive 
remittances are more likely to attend school, to 
reach higher levels of education and to attend 
private schools, when these are perceived to be 
of better quality (OECD, 2017; Elbadawi and 
Roushdy, 2010). A randomised experiment in 
El Salvador found that for every US$1 received 
by beneficiaries, education expenditures rose to 
US$3.72 (Ambler et al., 2015). 
Still, the positive influence of remittances on 
education cannot be assumed. Firstly, the gender 
of the household head can have a bearing on how 
remittances are allocated; a study in Ghana found 
that remittances to female-headed households 
increase education investments more than those 
to male-headed households (Gyimah-Brempong, 
2014). Secondly, remittances might have no effect, 
or even a negative effect, on education. For example, 
when there are low-skilled jobs that can help sustain 
migrants’ families at home without additional 
investments in education, remittances may 
discourage reaching higher levels of education. For 
example, the availability of low-skilled jobs in the 
US may act as a disincentive to further education 
for Mexican citizens who plan to migrate (LatapÍ 
and Martin, 2008). 
their self-esteem and increase their school achievements 
(Taguma et al., 2010). Countries differ in the way they 
approach heritage-language teaching, with some of them 
centralising it through national directives and others 
leaving it to private initiatives (EC, 2009).
Curriculum and teacher training
Including elements related to the child’s native culture in 
the school curriculum is helpful for development, as it 
allows migrant children to feel valued (Heckmann, 2008). 
Diaspora schools, and collaborations between countries of 
origin and destination of migrants, can play an important 
role in fostering teaching of native languages and culture. 
For example, many European countries have bilateral 
agreements with migrants’ countries of origin that sponsor 
teaching on specific subjects through embassies, consulates 
and cultural associations (Jacobs, 2013). A downside of 
this approach is the risk that they highlight differences 
that can hinder integration of the students within the host 
community. 
Stressing diversity and social and emotional learning 
within the curriculum can also help, especially when the 
migration process has been traumatic (International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), 2014). Similarly, including peacebuilding 
activities in the curriculum, and ensuring teachers have the 
skills to carry out such activities, not only fosters learning 
related to peace and sustainable development in situations 
of conflict, but also promotes social cohesion in non-
conflict contexts (UNICEF, 2014). 
Teachers therefore play a central role. The ability of 
school staff to manage diversity touches different levels.
 • At the individual student level, teachers should be 
trained and able to adapt their style to individual 
learning needs; 
 • At the classroom level, teachers should be able to 
deal with the interaction between different cultural 
backgrounds, showing students the strengths that derive 
from multicultural contexts; and
 • At the ‘school life’ level, teachers should include parents 
and communities, which requires sensitivity to different 
cultural practices and intercultural communication 
skills. This also enhances the role of schools in effective 
integration (OECD, 2010a).  
Inclusion in mainstream classes
Research broadly agrees that migrant children are better 
facilitated by support-oriented education systems than by 
those focused on selectivity. However, there is a strong 
debate as to whether migrant children should be included 
in mainstream classes immediately, or separated initially 
in special classes. In 2015, the OECD concluded that 
migrant students who are immediately immersed in normal 
classes tend to score higher in PISA data at 15 years old 
(OECD, 2015). However, other evidence points to benefits 
arising from migrant students attending accelerated 
language-learning classes before being streamed into 
normal classes. One caveat with this approach is the need 
to distinguish between language-support classes and classes 
for students with learning disabilities. Migrant children 
are often included in the latter by default, even when they 
do not present any learning difficulty, thus fostering their 
exclusion from the mainstream education system (UNICEF, 
2009; Waslin, 2016). 
5 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Globally, there are tens of millions of school-age 
children that migrate each year. Their experience varies 
tremendously, depending partly on where they are coming 
from and where they move to, but also on other socio-
economic factors such as the employment and educational 
background of their parents. Regardless, education is a 
crucial determinant shaping their and their families’ lives. 
There is limited data on the extent to which migrant 
children can access education, the teaching-learning 
experiences available to them, and their learning outcomes. 
It is clear, though, that certain challenges cut across 
contexts and complicate education opportunities. This 
includes legal, socio-economic and linguistic barriers to 
access, alongside poor learning outcomes and limited 
focus on life skills as part of the curriculum. These issues 
are present in low-, middle- and high-income countries. 
Moreover, the challenges for refugee children are often 
acute, whether education provision is through host 
communities or in separate camp schools.
Conclusion 1: Educating migrant children is essential 
to meet SDG 4 and plays an important role in 
achieving other Goals.
Recommendations:
 • Children should be able to access school irrespective 
of their migration status. Eliminate legal barriers that 
prevent the children of irregular migrants from enrolling 
in schools. Adopt a flexible approach to documentation 
requirements for unaccompanied minors to maximise 
enrolment levels (Lumayag, 2016). Flexible education 
programmes should be in place for working children, 
and for children belonging to pastoralists and nomadic 
groups (Save the Children UK, 2007).
 • Introduce a combination of forward-planning and 
contingency funding to account for surges in migration 
rates, both at national level and through multi-donor 
funds. These are essential to minimise disruption to the 
education system, maximise the extent of access and 
achievement amongst migrant students, and prevent 
the emergence of tensions between host and migrant 
communities (Hickmann et al., 2008). This should 
involve early investment in developing suitable curricula 
and teacher-training modules for engaging with new 
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arrivals, and the flexibility to channel resources to 
schools that see a rapid rise in the number of migrant 
students. 
 • Do not view migrant education in isolation, but pursue 
a range of coordinated strategies to maximise its overall 
impact (Schäferhoff et al., 2016) and impact across 
other areas of the in the 2030 Agenda. These should 
include a focus on employment, health, family and 
social-protection policies and programmes so that gains 
in education are translated into the labour market; 
close links between schools and other social services 
to ensure protection; and lowering the costs associated 
with transferring remittances back to migrants’ home 
countries to allow investment into the education of 
children staying behind.    
Conclusion 2: Education is strengthened by policies 
that prioritise integration.
Recommendations:
 • School segregation hinders both social cohesion and 
migrants’ rapid improvement in the majority language. 
Put in place measures to avoid segregation, for example 
by attracting native students to schools with migrants 
through the offer of special programmes. Include local 
communities as beneficiaries when additional resources 
are spent in schools with a high number of migrants to 
avoid making native residents feel neglected.
 • Improve access to quality early-childhood care and 
education for migrant groups and foster bilingualism 
amongst children that do not speak the majority 
language of the host country at home. This will enable 
children from migrant families to integrate more easily 
(UNICEF, 2009). 
 • Develop and invest in remedial education programmes 
for migrant students, focusing as quickly as possible 
on majority-language skills, as well as gaps between 
their skills and knowledge and those anticipated in 
the national curriculum for their age group. This 
should be paired with ongoing learning support in 
their native language (Taguma et al., 2010). Children 
should not stay in special classes with accelerated 
learning programmes for longer than needed, to avoid 
segregation.
 • Teachers should be trained and supported in managing 
diversity, both before they start to teach and through 
in-service training. Develop resources and networks 
giving teachers and schools access to learning materials 
and modules that will allow them to integrate references 
to migrants’ national home culture into lessons 
(Heckmann, 2008). 
 • Both the curriculum and school staff should provide 
psychosocial support to foster children’s wellbeing 
(IRC, 2014). This may involve a specific curriculum 
on intercultural issues or peace education. School staff 
should emphasise children’s potential, for example by 
not lowering expectations towards migrant children.
Relevant SDG Targets
4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, 
equitable and quality primary and secondary education 
leading to relevant and Goal-4 effective learning outcomes.
4.2: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to 
quality early childhood development, care and preprimary 
education so that they are ready for primary education.
4.5: By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and 
ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational 
training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, 
indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations.
4.7: By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge 
and skills needed to promote sustainable development, 
including, among others, through education for sustainable 
development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender 
equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, 
global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of 
culture’s contribution to sustainable development.
4.a: Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, 
disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, nonviolent, 
inclusive and effective learning environments for all. 
10.2: By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic 
and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, 
race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status. 
4.a: Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, 
disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, nonviolent, 
inclusive and effective learning environments for all. 
10.2: By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic 
and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, 
disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other 
status. 
Conclusion 3: There is limited data available on the 
education of refugee and migrant children, making it 
more difficult to design policies and programmes to 
support this group.
Recommendations:
 • Data pertaining to migration background and education 
level should be collected together, as further analysis 
on the link between education and migration status 
is necessary to improve service provision. To do this, 
more coordination is needed among the institutions 
collecting the data, including Ministries of Education, 
central statistics offices and international organisations 
collecting data in refugee camps and elsewhere.
 • The international community should provide more 
data-collection resources, especially where national 
governments are having to deal with other urgent 
priorities. 
 • Data collection on the migration backgrounds of 
students should be used to support vulnerable groups, 
and not for reporting to security-related institutions. A 
lack of trust in how personal information will be used 
can jeopardise not only the collection of valuable data, 
but also families’ trust in schools, which can negatively 
impact their children’s enrolment and learning (Bartlett 
et al., 2015).
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Relevant SDG Targets
4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, 
equitable and quality primary and secondary education 
leading to relevant and Goal-4 effective learning outcomes.
4.2: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to 
quality early childhood development, care and preprimary 
education so that they are ready for primary education. 
4.5: By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and 
ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational 
training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, 
indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations.
4.7: By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge 
and skills needed to promote sustainable development, 
including, among others, through education for sustainable 
development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender 
equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, 
global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of 
culture’s contribution to sustainable development.
4.a: Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, 
disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, nonviolent, 
inclusive and effective learning environments for all. 
4.c: By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified 
teachers, including through international cooperation for 
teacher training in developing countries, especially least 
developed countries and small island developing states.
10.2: By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic 
and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, 
disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other 
status.
Relevant SDG Targets
17.18: By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to 
developing countries, including for least developed countries 
and small island developing States, to increase significantly 
the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data 
disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
migratory status, disability, geographic location and other 
characteristics relevant in national contexts.
17.19: By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop 
measurements of progress on sustainable development that 
complement gross domestic product, and support statistical 
capacity-building in developing countries. 
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• There are fundamental policy gaps in addressing the health needs of migrants. Global, regional 
and national institutional arrangements could be improved to facilitate dialogue and collaborative 
problem solving. 
• Migration is a determinant of health: it does not have a systemic association with public health 
security threats to host communities but migrants do face distinctive vulnerabilities to poor 
health. These are exacerbated by ‘migrant-unfriendly or migrant-indifferent’ legal frameworks 
and health systems. Resolving these will require intersectoral approaches. 
• There are no international standardised approaches for monitoring variables relating to the 
health of migrants. Development of data collection, monitoring and surveillance mechanisms is 
needed to understand migrant health needs. 
• Migration can have a positive effect on the development of health systems if the International 
Code of Practice is adhered to and if there is strong coordination between home and diaspora 
systems and professionals.
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1 Introduction 
This briefing presents an overview of health-related 
challenges faced by international migrants. Implicitly, the 
SDGs recognise the importance and interrelation between 
health and migration. SDG 3 aims to ‘Ensure healthy lives 
and promote well-being for all at all ages’, including that 
of migrants, while a number of other SDGs incorporate 
elements relating to health outcomes and migration. In this 
brief, we primarily focus on three distinct aspects of the 
interrelation. Firstly, migrants can be more vulnerable than 
other populations to exclusion from health services. Secondly, 
countries with high numbers of migrants with complex or 
hidden health needs may be hindering individual countries’ 
own efforts in reaching their SDG targets. These first two 
risks demand a critical reassessment of the capacities of both 
transit and destination health systems to manage the needs 
of migrants, as well as the policy frameworks that should be 
promoting the health of migrants. The third element is the 
impact of migration on health outcomes in sending countries, 
through remittances, technology transfer and behaviour 
change. The conclusion offers recommendations for better 
migration and health global governance, at both national and 
regional policy levels.
Migrants make a considerable net economic 
contribution in many countries. The good health of 
migrants has obvious intrinsic benefits, but is also essential 
if migrants are to fulfil the considerable potential economic 
and social benefits and contributions to their home and 
destination countries. Migrants should be able to live 
and work in safe and healthy conditions, enjoy access 
to health services and expect health outcomes similar 
to that of the rest of the population of their destination 
country. Yet when migration levels rise or health systems 
are stretched, decisions about who is responsible for the 
welfare of migrants becomes contentious in national and 
global policy debates. Migrants, by virtue of their mobility 
and status, are therefore at great risk of being invisible, 
deprioritised or even excluded from national health 
strategies. They are subjected to neglect, discrimination, 
ostracism and exploitation, the effects of which can curtail 
migrants’ life expectancies, increase mortality and directly 
affect social, physical and mental well-being. These effects 
are further compounded by legal and socio-economic 
barriers that impede migrant access to health care.  
Two types of migrants are considered in this briefing: 
international economic migrants who move for the 
purposes of employment, and refugees who move because 
of fear of persecution, war or natural disaster. Internal 
migrants are not included in the analysis.
1.1 Migration trends 
In 2015, the global number of international migrants 
reached 224 million, up from 173 million in 2000. 
However, as a proportion of the world’s population, the 
number of migrants has remained relatively stable over 
the past four decades at around 3% (UNDESA, 2016). 
Europe and Asia host the most international migrants (76 
million and 75 million respectively), while southern Europe 
and Gulf states are the regions with the highest growth in 
labour migrants. Since 1995, the top sender countries have 
been consistent: India (15 million), Mexico (12 million) 
and Russia (11 million); with the most significant increase 
in Syria (0.6 to 5 million and continuing to rise).  
Regarding forced migration, in 2014 the number of 
refugees worldwide rose to 19.5 million – the highest level 
since World War II. Refugees comprise approximately 8% 
of the total number of international migrants (UNDESA, 
2016). Using 2014 data, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) found 30.4 million 
persons of concern, including both refugees and migrants. 
(See UNDESA, 2015; UNFPA, 2016; and UNHCR, 2016 
for these statistics.)
2 Health and migration in the 2030 Agenda
Health is central to the social, economic and environmental 
dimensions of sustainable development, both as a 
beneficiary and a contributor. In addition, health is 
considered an indicator of ‘people-centered, rights-based, 
inclusive, and equitable development’ (UN, 2015); a key 
aspiration of the 2030 Agenda is to ‘leave no one behind’, 
reflected in the Goals, nearly all of which state, ‘for all’. 
Achieving these Goals will require an inclusive approach 
that should include migrants by default. Although migrants 
are given special attention in some of the SDG targets, 
none relate specifically to their health status. Yet migration 
functions as a social determinant of health and will, 
crucially, affect the achievement of numerous targets across 
several Goals.  
76 ODI Briefing
Figure 1: Origins of largest migrant populations worldwide 
between 1995-2015
Source: UNDESA (2015)
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2.1 SDG 3: health and well-being
The health-related SDG 3 is underpinned by 13 targets 
that cover a wide spectrum of health and well-being for 
all populations. Migration flows intersect with this Goal 
through a number of different channels. 
1. Individual migrants. One of the strongest features of 
the 2030 Agenda is universality. Leaving no one behind 
means including migrants in efforts to tackle poor 
access and inequity in health care. Migrants can be at 
higher risk of poor health from infectious diseases, non-
communicable diseases and mental health problems due 
to a range of factors at different points before, during 
and after migration.  
2. National outcomes. Migrants are less likely than other 
populations to access or fully benefit from their host 
country’s health care system, which can result in poorer 
health outcomes when measured at the national level.  
For countries with large migrant populations and 
limited capacity in the health system, this will impede 
their ability to reach the targets in SDG 3.
3. Health systems. Migrant remittances are a critical 
source of household incomes and foreign exchange in 
several countries, and this income feeds into household 
and government level health spending. Returning 
migrants and those in diaspora communities can 
influence policy and practice in domestic health systems, 
help with crisis response during epidemics and influence 
health seeking behaviour at the individual level, often 
with a positive effect on health outcomes. 
The vulnerabilities faced by migrants, and how they 
intersect with selected SDG 3 targets relating to health and 
well-being are summarised in Table 1.
One of the channels through which migration can affect 
health and the achievement of SDG 3 is through the impact 
on the health systems of the source country. As with the 
impact on individuals, there are many ways that this can 
play out in practice. However, three factors are key: the 
impact on resource flows, the impact on human capital and 
response to disasters. 
1. Resources. Where migrant remittances are a large 
percentage of GDP, they boost government revenues 
through higher taxes, and will increase the resources 
available for public spending (e.g. remittances are more 
than 15% of GDP in Haiti and Honduras, nearly 30% 
of GDP in Nepal, and over 20% of GDP in Liberia and 
the Gambia (World Bank, 2014). Increased household 
income from remittances increases the funds available 
for out of pocket spending on health services, and 
several studies have found that receiving households 
spend more on health services than non-receiving 
households (e.g. UNESCAP, n.d.). 
2. Human capital. A great deal of attention has been 
paid to the question of the ‘brain drain’ and the extent 
to which migration can undermine health systems. 
Migration related shortages of human resources for 
health can hamper progress in health care delivery 
and improving population health (Mills et al., 2008). 
But, while every effort should be made to retain skilled 
people, the evidence that the ‘brain drain’ harms 
developmental outcomes is contested (Clemens, 2014). 
In addition, there are benefits to returning migrants 
who can bring skills acquired abroad to strengthen 
the domestic health system. A study in Ghana, for 
example, found that returning doctors, nurses and 
midwives brought with them skills in a range of medical 
techniques and systems management that were used 
either in the public health system or through setting up 
new private facilities, often with new investments from 
diaspora communities or other new sources (Adzei and 
Sakyi, 2014).
3. Disaster relief. Migrants and diaspora communities 
often respond strongly when a disaster strikes their 
home country. During the Ebola crisis in West Africa, 
for example, diaspora communities raised money for 
affected communities and donated equipment. However, 
the overall impact of these efforts was reduced by weak 
links to the public health system and to the donor-led 
relief effort (Chikezie, 2015). 
Table 1 illustrates the multiple vulnerabilities migrants 
face and the SDG 3 targets which seek to alleviate them. 
It is important to recognise that the type and level of 
vulnerabilities change over time. Those who have settled 
long-term tend to have similar health needs to the wider 
population in host countries. Contrary to popular opinion 
in the west, there is a healthy migrant bias where first 
generation (non-refugee) migrants can have a lower 
crude mortality rate than the host population because the 
healthiest tend to migrate (Thomas and Thomas, 2004). 
However, refugees have a specific set of health needs which 
also evolve depending on the time elapsed since they took 
flight. These are described in Box 1.
2.2 Links to health across the SDGs
Health is implicit in almost all of the other 16 Goals, not 
just in SDG 3. Progress on many of the Goals will affect 
health and the achievement of the Goal can be used to 
incentivise progress on migrant health, in some of the ways 
detailed below. Improving the health of migrants and all 
vulnerable people will be dependent on equity, as countries 
work towards achieving all SDGs, particularly those 
relating to poverty, inequality, hunger and food insecurity, 
employment and peace (see Table 2).
The range of SDG targets should incentivise the 
development of intersectoral approaches that may help 
improve migrant health, alongside the health of other 
vulnerable groups. Different groups of migrants have 
specific vulnerabilities and needs according to the sector 
in which they work or live. The SDG targets can be 
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
3.1: Reduce the global maternal 
mortality ratio to <70 per 100,000 
live births 
Migrants, particularly those without legal residence permits, tend to experience higher maternal mortality and morbidity 
relative to the host populations. They tend to be more vulnerable to high blood pressure, poor nutrition, pre-eclampsia, 
premature or complicated delivery, fatigue and maternal suicide.
Substandard or lack of services, patient delays, poor health worker-migrant communication, lack of knowledge about the 
transit or destination country health system can put expecting migrant mothers at risk. 
(See Esscher, et al., 2014; van den Akker and van Roosmalen, 2015; Fellmeth et al., 2016.)  
3.2: End preventable deaths of 
new-borns and children under 5 
years of age.
Migrants have greater difficulty accessing obstetric, antenatal and maternal health-care services.
Poor health outcomes and higher mortality for migrant new-borns and children under 5 are related to overcrowding in 
low-quality housing, poor sanitation (both in communities and refugee camps), substandard health care, inadequate diets, 
the mother’s educational attainment, and the migration process. 
Additional risk factors for poor migrant child health outcomes or life expectancy are poor mental health of migrant mothers, 
and residence in refugee camps 
(Racape et al., 2010, Rechel et al., 2013).
3.3: End the epidemics of AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and neglected 
tropical diseases (NTDs) and 
combat hepatitis, waterborne 
diseases and other communicable 
diseases
Migrants constitute nearly 40% of people living with HIV in the European Economic Area. The UNAIDS programme recognises 
migrants as one of the most vulnerable groups to HIV infection. They are also at increased risk of TB-related morbidity and 
mortality (IOM, 2012; Tomás, 2013). 
Although the global burden of malaria has substantially decreased, the cases among migrant populations within and 
between countries represent a high percentage of the total number of cases. E.g. In the Lao PDR, a surge in new cases 
between 2011-2015 was associated with economic migrant mobility.
Limited access to health care services and preventative measures means migrants are less likely to receive treatment 
making fatalities from NTDs more likely. 
Although low in non-endemic countries, cases of NTDs are also common among migrants and often overlooked. Non-
specific symptoms and inadequate knowledge among health care workers in non-endemic countries complicates diagnosis. 
(See ECDC, 2010; IOM, 2013; UNAIDS, 2014; Cairns, 2015; SASPEN, 2015; WHO, 2015b.)
3.4: Reduce by one third premature 
mortality from non-communicable 
diseases
Social and environmental factors interact with migration to form a complex pattern of determinants of non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs). 
Migrants in transit are at particular risk of not receiving continuous care for pre-existing chronic diseases. 
(See WHO, 2016).
3.5: Strengthen the prevention 
and treatment of substance abuse, 
including narcotic drug abuse and 
harmful use of alcohol
Stressful conditions can heighten tobacco use, alcohol and substance abuse as a form of coping mechanism. This can be 
further exacerbated by long-term separation from families and stress over lack of legal status, causing many migrants to 
develop mental health problems, depression and anxiety disorders. 
Seeking treatment for these disorders comes with individual-level barriers, including limited local language proficiency, work 
demands, and internalised stigma around substance abuse. 
Migrants often do not have access to psychosocial services, resulting in increased mental health disorders 
(See Negi, 2011; UNGA, 2013; Pagano, 2014).
3.8: Achieve universal health 
coverage, including financial risk 
protection, and access to quality 
essential health-care services
Universal health coverage (UHC) is an important means of achieving cross-cutting health SDGs. Although countries adopt 
different mechanisms for UHC progress, a common trend emerges: migrants are often neglected and/or excluded. 
Migrants risk exclusion from coverage of insurance-based schemes and those in the informal sector are often invisible to 
UHC programmes. 
Where UHC policies favour service provision free of charge in public health facilities, undocumented migrants often fail to 
access these free services because of registration barriers.
Where government spending on health fails to match the increased demand for health services, migrants can struggle to 
raise the household out-of-pocket payments to access health care. 
Table 1: Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
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used to advocate for change in a number of these areas. 
Two targets in particular, relating to inequality (10.4) 
and employment (8.8), are relevant to tackling known 
problems for migrants. Migrant groups are more likely to 
experience work-related accidents (e.g. the construction 
sector) or violence (e.g. domestic workers); or to be 
abused at the hands of unscrupulous employers, or 
immigration services (NNIRR, 2008; Long and Crisp, 
2011). A focus on inequality can also be used to address 
the legal, discriminatory, cultural and linguistic barriers 
that many migrants face when accessing services. If a 
serious commitment is made to ‘leave no one behind’, then 
progress on many of the other Goals and targets will have 
a positive impact on migrant health, as well as the overall 
achievement of SDG 3.
3 Responding to migrants’ health needs 
and meeting the SDGs
It is clear from the discussion above that there are several 
channels through which migration will impact on health 
and the achievement of the SDGs. This section describes 
three major strategies essential to aid countries’ efforts 
to achieving the SDGs that have particular resonance for 
migrants.
3.1 Universal health coverage
Target 3.7 is ‘Achieve universal health coverage, including 
financial risk protection, access to essential health care 
services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable 
essential medicines and vaccines for all’. Not only is this 
a target in itself, but it will be a contributory factor in 
the achievement of all the other targets in SDG 3. UHC 
is intrinsically inclusive of the entirety of a population, 
including migrants. It is expected to cover all the 
promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative 
health services people need, with affordable services 
Box 1: Refugees and forced displacement
Newly arrived refugees and displaced persons from communities affected by crisis have complex needs and a 
heightened risk of health problems related to their flight journeys. They are susceptible to a number of problems 
due to the likely exposure to physical and environmental threats, violence and trauma. As a result, they may 
face any and many of the following: loss of social networks and assets, poor language skills, knowledge and 
information in the new environment, decreased food security, and inadequate shelter, sanitation and access 
to safe water (FMO, 2016). Those who arrive in detention centres may also face abuse and ostracism (IFHR, 
2008). As with other migrants, the varied experiences before, during and after displacement cause difficulties in 
creating mechanisms for gathering reliable health data, and particular difficulties in continuity of health care and 
record keeping. Many refugees lack access to any health records or continuity of service or provision for chronic 
conditions.
There is no evidence of systemic association with migration and public health security threats to host 
communities (WHO, 2016; European Parliament, 2016). However, the risks of infectious disease faced by refugees 
are exacerbated by poverty, poor sanitation and living conditions after arrival and there is potential for these 
risks to affect host populations in lower income countries if the public health and welfare systems are weak. The 
public health risks for refugees are difficult to address particularly when there are high inflows of people in a short 
space of time. Displaced people do tend to have a higher crude mortality rate (Thomas and Thomas, 2004). Child 
health is a major problem, as children tend to make up a large proportion of refugee numbers. Refugees’ babies 
have lower birth weights and their children face increased risks of malnutrition, diarrheal conditions, infectious 
disease, anaemia, intestinal parasites, gastroenteritis, skin infections, wasting, stunting, delayed development and 
undiagnosed congenital anomalies (Tangcharoensathien, 2015).  
A case study of refugees in Turkey, an upper middle-income country, provides a clear illustration of the difficulties 
in managing health care for refugees. Turkey is now guardian of the largest single refugee population in the world. 
Most of these refugees live outside camps, are unaccounted for and live in extremely challenging circumstances. 
Increasingly, they are considered ‘permanent refugees’. Registered refugees have the right to free primary health care, 
but the protracted refugee situation means that many refugees are in a new state of flux as their long term status is 
unclear – they are far from receiving the benefits covered by a universal health care system. 
Following the influx of migrants, the Turkish health system became overwhelmed by the increase in caseloads, 
resulting in overworked staff and a shortage of supplies. Consequently, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
took over functions of health coordination, management and core services, with 200 partners contributing to a 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) that includes health care services. Coordination and financial support 
remain persistent problems, with a significant proportion of pledged funds not arriving when planned.
The vast majority of migrants in Turkey are at risk of being invisible to the public health system. Among those 
outside of camps, female refugees are the most vulnerable, 40% of whom are estimated to lack access to services 
(UNFPA, 2015). 
being understood as not exposing the user to financial 
hardship. Providing UHC is a major financial undertaking, 
it can be politically contentious and technically complex, 
particularly in developing countries that may already 
struggle to provide basic health services for the wider host 
population. However, it is essential to tackling the question 
of migration and health outcomes, at both individual and 
national level. 
3.2 Health systems, health workforce and migration
There is a global shortage and poor distribution of the 
health workforce. Lower-income countries, many of 
whom host significant numbers of migrants have a wide 
gap between the need for health workers and supply. 
As these countries attempt to fulfil the SDG target for 
UHC, this gap is likely to widen. Upper middle-income 
countries are likely to face a similar widening as demands 
for health care from aging populations increase. This 
demand stimulates international migration from low- to 
high-income countries (WHO, 2015a). This is exacerbated 
by ‘push factors’ in source countries, such as low pay, lack 
of career paths and poor working conditions. The WHO 
Global Code of Practice on International Recruitment of 
Health Personnel ‘promotes a fair balance of the interests 
of the health workforce, so sending and receiving countries 
can help to address the challenges in the widening gaps in 
the health workforce’. But implementation of the code is 
suboptimal. Where the numbers are large enough, health 
worker migration can have an impact on the economy 
of the whole country, for example, in the Philippines, the 
remittances from migrants, of which health professionals 
make up a significant part, contribute more than 8% 
to the gross national income (Guinto, 2015). Win-win 
situations may be possible if countries attracting migrant 
health workers adhere to the code, and the countries from 
where migrants come from organise their health profession 
education systems and labour markets so that local 
populations’ access to health care does not suffer. 
3.3 Barriers to effective implementation:  
coordination and data
One of the first difficulties in being responsive to migrants’ 
health needs as countries implement the SDGs is the lack 
of data available. Health characteristics differ according 
to a multitude of variables including type of migrant, 
sex, age, host and destination country, epidemiological 
conditions, employment status and poverty. Migrants are 
heterogeneous, their experiences and the reasons they leave 
or flee their home countries are multifaceted and there 
are inadequate data that give a digestible and accurate 
picture of their health needs (Thomas and Thomas, 2004; 
FMO, 2016).  There is a great deal of anecdotal and case 
study evidence suggesting migrants have specific health 
needs that could limit achievement of the SDGs if they are 
not tackled. However, there is currently no international 
standardised approach for monitoring data variables 
Table 2: Examples of major SDG Targets that have an impact on health outcomes for migrants
Target Goal and Target (summary)
1.3 Poverty: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all.
Key factor for migration: portability of social protection coverage across borders, or inclusion into national systems. 
2.2 Hunger: End all forms of malnutrition, and address nutritional needs of key populations.
Key factor for migration: ensuring migrants are reached by assistance programmes aimed at improving nutrition. 
5.2, 5.3 & 5.6 Gender: Eliminate all forms of violence and harmful practices against women and girls, including trafficking and sexual exploitation, and 
ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights. 
Key factor for migration: addressing the specific vulnerabilities of female migrants (see ODI briefing on Gender and Migration).
6.1, 6.2 Water: Achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking-water, sanitation and hygiene.
Key factor for migration: ensure that large-scale movements of people do not increase stress on fragile water supply systems, and address 
water and sanitation provision in migrant communities and refugee camps. 
8.8 Employment: Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all, including migrants.
10.4 & 10.7 Inequality: Adopt fiscal, wage and social protection policies; facilitate safe, and responsible migration including through migration policies.
16.1 & 16.9 Peace: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates. Provide legal identity for all. 
Key factor for migration: conflict is a major driver of migration. Legal identity for migrants is an important factor in the effective planning of 
response and establishment of effective support systems. 
17.18 Implementation: Increase availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.
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and indicators related to the health of migrants, and 
many countries do not include migrant status variables 
in their health statistics, which makes tracking outcomes 
very difficult. This is not a problem confined to poorer 
countries. In the UK, a report from the Migration 
Observatory at the University of Oxford remarked, ‘it 
is currently difficult to gain a comprehensive account of 
the health of migrants because much existing evidence on 
health includes ethnic group but not migration variables’ 
(Jayaweera, 2014). Without targeted evidence, the policies, 
strategies and institutional arrangements to support 
migrant health are likely to remain inadequate at the 
national, regional and global levels. 
A second challenge for implementation is the need 
for inter-agency and intersectoral coordination and 
cooperation, both within and between countries and 
regions. The action required to include a health lens in the 
number of areas influencing migrant health is complex. For 
example, in South Africa, achieving the SDG target relating 
to communicable diseases will be a major challenge. South 
Africa attracts the largest migrant population in Africa, 
mostly from countries in southern and eastern Africa 
where the burden of communicable diseases is already high 
and HIV incidence is the highest in the world. Migration 
has been a key feature of the economy of the country and 
the region as a whole, with migrants making up about 
6% of the population of South Africa. TB incidence 
and the HIV burden are particularly high in sectors in 
which migrants work (mining and agricultural labour), 
among migrants and non-migrants alike. Migration also 
had an impact on malaria incidence: the International 
Organization for Migration (2013) reports that in South 
Africa, almost half (48%) of all confirmed Malaria cases 
recorded between 2001-2009 in one border province 
were found in migrants from Mozambique. Tackling the 
communicable disease burden in South Africa will require 
a multifaceted approach that takes into account migrants. 
It can only be addressed through sustained, multi-sectoral 
collaboration across the region between ministries of 
labour, mining and health, and private industry (Mberu et 
al., 2016).
There are two SDG targets which may facilitate 
implementation of coherent policies and programmes 
to support better coordination and data. Target 17.18 
focuses on data and monitoring, crucially including a call 
for disaggregation of data by migratory status. Reaching 
this target is essential in order to collect meaningful data 
to monitor outcomes informing health financing, human 
resources for health and health care coverage of migrants, 
and monitoring of the means of implementation. While 
target 16.6 works towards the development of effective, 
accountable and transparent institutions through which 
migrants could have recourse to hold governments, service 
providers and individuals to account on matters relating to 
their health and well-being.  
Box 2: Migrants and universal health coverage
Thailand is a UHC pioneer for middle-income 
countries. There is a tradition of progressive health 
policies in Thailand and it was the first country 
in the world to integrate the needs of all migrants 
(including irregular and undocumented migrants) 
into its health system through a compulsory migrant 
health insurance scheme. UHC policy for Thais was 
introduced in 2002, and not long after, migrants too 
became entitled to the same health care rights. There 
is an immigrant population of nearly 4 million 
(constituting 6% of population) and migrants from 
three neighboring countries make up 5% of the 
Thai labor force. The government recognised the 
migrant contribution to the economy, considering 
health care a human right and concerned that 
without health services, migrants would exacerbate 
control efforts against communicable diseases. 
This system should mean that Thailand is in a 
good position to achieve the SDG 3 targets for the 
whole population, including migrants. Yet uptake 
of the scheme remains quite low. The reasons 
appear to be language and cultural barriers, fear 
of discrimination, fear of losing employment due 
to absence and poor employer compliance with 
the scheme. Though the original UHC policy 
may provide a useful model, there is a need for 
greater understanding on how to improve its 
implementation with regard to migrants.  
Countries considering UHC packages that 
integrate migrants would need to take action 
beyond simply extending the existing service 
coverage to migrants. This should involve 
consideration of advocacy with migrants and health 
promotion, feasibility of an annual fee, monitoring 
of implementation, transferability of health 
insurance between health facilities and quality of 
services for migrants (including non-discrimination). 
This also requires a good understanding of the 
social and cultural influences, language barriers on 
health outcomes and health seeking behaviour for 
the specific migrant groups.
4 Conclusions and policy recommendations
As people migrate, the socio-economic and political 
drivers of migration intersect. This intersect is increasingly 
complex, blurring the separation between voluntary 
and forced forms of migration. This briefing highlights 
that within this complex landscape, there is a clear and 
urgent need to reassess the capacities of both transit 
and destination health systems to manage the needs of 
migrants. Migrants frequently experience inadequate access 
to health care, and though there are pockets of progress, 
such as Thailand’s Compulsory Migrant Health Insurance 
Scheme, many other countries are yet to consider migrants 
or refugees in their health care systems. In doing so, these 
countries are hindering their own efforts to achieve their 
SDGs, as well as preventing migrants from fulfilling their 
considerable potential in contributing to the net economy 
and the health systems of host and home countries. The 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies 
migrants, refugees and internally displaced people as 
vulnerable populations that ‘must be empowered’ (UNGA, 
2015). For health, as for other sectors, migrants face 
specific challenges that must be addressed if the world is to 
meet the aspiration to ‘leave no one behind’. 
The evidence reviewed suggests a number of issues 
which need to be tackled to ensure that migration 
contributes to, and does not undermine, the achievement of 
the SDGs. We make the following policy recommendations 
to achieve these aims. 
Conclusion 1: There are fundamental policy gaps 
in addressing the health needs of migrants. Global, 
regional and national institutional arrangements 
could be improved to facilitate dialogue and collabo-
rative problem solving.
Recommendation: establish a formal, well-defined 
role within UN-based multilateral institutional 
arrangements that specifically monitors the 
implementation of migration and health policies. 
 • Formal multilateralism must be pursued in areas where 
migration specifically intersects with identified health 
issues, including maternal and neonatal mortality, HIV/
AIDS, UHC, vaccination and other targets under SDG 3. 
 • This will involve reaffirming the stewardship role of 
WHO on health and IOM on migration, but will also 
require new ways of collaborating to ensure that the 
two institutions, and others such as the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) and UNHCR, can 
effectively lead a joint global response to the health 
needs of migrants.
Recommendation: support networks and 
organisations working on migration globally and 
regionally.
 • Support and promote non-binding and flexible 
regional consultative processes within and between 
regions. Policy-makers, representatives from planning 
ministries, health ministries and other relevant sectors 
need a forum to discuss common challenges relating 
to migrants, and share important context-relevant best 
practice and inevitable trade-offs. 
 • Recognising that many countries still ignore migrant 
health, encourage training, peer exchange programmes 
and sensitisation of government and non-governmental 
organisations involved in the delivery of health care and 
migration-friendly policies. 
 • Establish networks that can respond quickly in the event 
of sudden population movements such as a new influx 
of migrants caused by conflict or environmental disaster.
 • Other institutions involved in advocacy and delivery of 
health intervention (such as the Global Fund or Gavi, 
the Vaccine Alliance) should be encouraged to ensure 
that migrants’ needs are recognised in their global and 
regional planning processes. 
Relevant SDG Targets
3.1: Reduce maternal mortality. 
3.2: End preventable deaths of newborns and children under 
5 years of age. 
3.3: End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-
borne diseases and other communicable diseases. 
3.4: Reduce premature mortality from non-communicable 
diseases and promote mental health and well-being.
3.7: Universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care 
services. 
3.8: Universal health coverage, access to safe, effective, 
quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for 
all. 
10.7: Orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and 
mobility.
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Conclusion 2: Migration is a determinant of health: 
it does not have a systemic association with public 
health security threats to host communities but 
migrants do face distinctive vulnerabilities to poor 
health. These are exacerbated by ‘migrant-unfriendly 
or migrant-indifferent’ legal frameworks and health 
systems. Resolving these will require intersectoral 
approaches.
Recommendation: domesticate international 
migration law standard and practices into national 
health strategies and other development and poverty 
reduction plans.
 • Integrate migration relevant aspects when designing 
national health strategies and plans. 
 • Promote ‘Health in All’ policies, an approach to cross-
sector public policies that takes into account the health 
implications of policy decisions, forges synergies and 
avoids harmful health impacts to improve population 
health and health equity, and addresses the wider social 
determinants of health. 
 • Ensure that health policies are consistent with country 
obligations under international laws relating to 
migration. 
Recommendation: harmonise social protection 
legislation for better inclusion of migrants in state-
provided health services.
Through regional (economic) communities (e.g. East 
African Community or ASEAN) or coordination by 
bilateral and multilateral agencies (e.g. WHO, IOM, ILO, 
or World Bank), countries should agree to harmonise 
legislation and policies related to social protection or UHC. 
This may result in better inclusion of migrants into state-
provided health services. To achieve this, we recommend a 
three-tiered process:
 • Conduct a mapping exercise to identify national 
legislation on access to state-provided health services 
and social protection
 • Review practical challenges for implementation, and 
barriers to access by migrants in different contexts
 • Make recommendations for harmonisation between 
countries, and improvements for local implementation 
to increase inclusion of migrants into national systems.
Recommendation: Ensure that countries with 
large migrant populations following conflict or 
environmental disaster get adequate support from the 
international community to address the health needs 
of migrants without compromising services to the 
local population.
Conclusion 3: There are no international  
standardised approaches for monitoring variables 
relating to the health of migrants. Development of 
data collection, monitoring and surveillance mecha-
nisms is needed to understand migrant health needs.
Recommendation: collect, track and review 
disaggregated data of all migrants to evaluate and 
support their health needs. 
 • National health information management systems, 
and monitoring and surveillance systems must collect 
disaggregated data by age, gender and location of 
all migrants. Only then can we begin understanding 
migrant health needs in detail to inform migrant-
friendly policies and action. 
 • Such disaggregated data needs to be protected by 
adequate data protection, privacy and confidentiality 
measures. 
Recommendation: integrate and dedicate resources 
for infectious diseases surveillance and monitoring 
migrants within national and regional programmes. 
 • Transit and destination countries to support the 
integration of infectious diseases surveillance and 
monitoring (e.g. for HIV/TB, malaria).
 • With committed resources, transit and destination 
countries to support access to diagnostics, treatment 
and care for migrants within national disease control 
programmes.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.5:  Build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable 
situations.
3.1: Reduce maternal mortality. 
3.2: End preventable deaths of newborns and children under 
5 years of age.
3.3: End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-
borne diseases and other communicable diseases. 
3.4: Reduce premature mortality from non-communicable 
diseases and promote mental health and well-being.
3.7: Universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care 
services. 
3.8: Universal health coverage, access to safe, effective, 
quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines  
for all. 
10.7: Orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and 
mobility.
 • Migrants must have access to TB and HIV treatment, as 
well as support and care regardless of legal migration 
status. This will involve improvements in the portability 
of health information to facilitate the continuation of 
treatment, and clinical testing efficiency.
Recommendation: support local accountability 
mechanisms and build grassroots capacity to track and 
monitor the protection of migrant health rights and 
safety.
 • Local faith-based, charity and volunteer groups, NGOs, 
and other local-level entities in sending countries should 
take the responsibility of educating and equipping 
migrants with relevant health information. 
 • In transit and destination countries, similar groups 
including the diaspora community must also document 
abuses and campaign with and on behalf of migrants for 
their health rights. 
 • Local groups can equip leading government ministries, 
employers and health service providers with knowledge, 
and support the means for increased intervention.
Conclusion 4: Migration can have a positive effect on 
the development of health systems if coordination is 
improved between home and diaspora systems and 
professionals
Recommendation: support and enforce policies that 
help to retain, incentivise and remunerate the health 
workforce.
 • Addressing poor wages and improving career 
opportunities can help to alleviate the ‘push factors’ of 
migration in the health workforce. 
 • Implementation of the WHO Global Code of Practice 
on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel 
can help to address the challenges of the widening gap 
in the health workforce. 
Recommendation: support engagement between 
health professionals in diaspora communities and 
local health systems
 • During epidemics, encourage systematic collaborations 
between diaspora communities and government, NGOs 
and donors to ensure that resources and expertise 
can be mobilised and used effectively in a way that is 
aligned with national strategies. 
 • Encourage twinning and other arrangements to increase 
collaboration and knowledge sharing between diaspora 
and home medical professionals.
Relevant SDG Targets
3.1: Reduce maternal mortality. 
3.2: End preventable deaths of newborns and children under 
5 years of age. 
3.3: End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-
borne diseases and other communicable diseases. 
3.4: Reduce premature mortality from non-communicable 
diseases and promote mental health and well-being.
3.7: Universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care 
services. 
3.8: Universal health coverage, access to safe, effective, 
quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for 
all. 
10.7: Orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and 
mobility.
17.l8: Increase significantly the availability of high-quality, 
timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, 
age, race ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic 
location and other characteristics. 
Relevant SDG Targets
3.1: Reduce maternal mortality. 
3.2: End preventable deaths of newborns and children under 
5 years of age. 
3.3: End the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-
borne diseases and other communicable diseases. 
3.4: Reduce premature mortality from non-communicable 
diseases and promote mental health and well-being.
3.7: Universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care 
services. 
3.8: Universal health coverage, access to safe, effective, 
quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for 
all.
3.c: Substantially increase health financing and the 
recruitment, development, training and retention of the 
health workforce in developing countries. 
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• Expanding social protection coverage of migrants is integral to achieving the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, specifically Goals 1 and 10.
•  Yet coverage for labour migrants remains low. 22% of migrants are not covered, including less 
than 1% migrants moving between low-income countries.
•  Globally, 55% of migrants are entitled to access social protection benefits, but cannot take these 
benefits home, or to another country (the ‘portability’ of benefits).
•  States should therefore ensure labour migrants are eligible for, and participate in, social protection, 
and that they can transfer benefits they have contributed towards.
• To be able to create, implement and enforce effective social protection for migrants, national 
bodies need better data and more support.
Key 
messages
Social protection, migration 
and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development
Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Elisa Mosler Vidal and Georgina Sturge
SDGs covered    1: No poverty 
5: Gender equality 
10: Reduced inequalities 
16: Peace, justice and strong institutions 
17: Partnerships for the goals
1 Introduction
This briefing considers the extent to which international 
labour migrants1 are covered by social protection, and the 
implications this has for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (2030 Agenda). More specifically, this brief 
shows that social protection coverage of international 
labour migrants varies considerably, and outlines how 
this has a bearing on the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) related to social protection.
Social protection is the set of policies and programmes 
that aim to reduce poverty and vulnerability and to 
enhance the capacity of people to manage economic and 
social risks, such as unemployment, sickness, disability 
and old age. It includes social assistance programmes, 
which are not conditional on having previously made 
contributions (e.g. cash transfers to poor households) – and 
social insurance programmes2, which are conditional on 
past contributions (e.g. contributory old-age pensions). 
There is a large evidence base showing the positive impact 
social protection programmes can have on reducing 
poverty and child labour, and on improving health and 
education outcomes and investment in productive assets 
(e.g. agricultural tools) (Babajanian et al., 2014; Bastagli 
et al., 2016; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2011). As such, social 
protection is seen as a priority area for achieving the 2030 
Agenda, specifically in its contribution to Goal 1 (No 
Poverty) and Goal 10 (Reduced Inequalities), and their 
Targets3.
Several international agreements governing social 
protection systems already make reference to the eligibility 
of migrants. The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) has long championed universal eligibility to social 
protection. Their 1952 Convention No. 102, which 
required equality of social protection treatment, has been 
ratified by 55 countries (ILO, 2017). More recently, they 
passed Recommendation No. 202, known as the Social 
Protection Floor. This sets out four basic social protection 
guarantees to all residents and children. Furthermore, 
several blocks of countries have agreed to guarantee social 
protection access to migrants moving within them, the 
best-known example being Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 for 
European Union (EU) migrant workers. Globally, there 
1. This briefing will focus on international labour migrants (or ‘migrant workers’), defined as individuals who moved from one country to another for 
the purpose of employment (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011). Where the briefing refers to other types of migrants, for example 
internal migrants, this will be stated explicitly.
2. These types of programmes are also sometimes called ‘social security’.
3. SDG 3.8 on universal health coverage is also often considered a priority target for social protection, but this goal is dealt with in a separate briefing paper 
on health, migration and the 2030 Agenda (Tulloch at al., 2016). This briefing also does not cover the decent work aspects of social protection (SDG 5.4, 
SDG 8.5 and SDG 8.B).
4. There is a distinction between de jure, or legal, coverage of migrants, meaning official social protection coverage of migrants under relevant agreements 
and mechanisms, and de facto, or effective, coverage, which may differ to this due to issues in ratification or implementation of these agreements, or 
practical access and take-up issues. As there is limited data on effective coverage, this briefing will mainly focus on legal coverage.
are also hundreds of bilateral and multilateral agreements 
between specific countries. The Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda of 2015, for example, commits UN member 
countries to improving ‘access to and portability of earned 
benefits [social insurance]’ (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), 2015).
In spite of these agreements, both the legal and effective 
social protection coverage of international labour migrants 
remains low4. Section 2 of this briefing discusses existing 
agreements and their legal coverage. Section 3 explores 
the factors that lead to low legal coverage for migrants 
and exclusion from effective coverage. Section 4 links the 
analysis to the 2030 Agenda, showing why these issues 
need to be considered for governments to meet the SDGs, 
in particular Targets 1.3, 1.a and 10.4. Finally, Section 5 
concludes and offers recommendations to improve legal 
and effective social protection coverage of migrants.
2 Legal coverage varies considerably, but 
tends to be low
Social protection programmes differ in two main respects: 
the extent to which migrants can access them in their host 
country, and whether their benefits can be withdrawn in 
another country, in other words whether they are portable 
(see Figure 1). Social assistance programmes are often 
funded through general national taxation (for example, 
maternity allowances) or through external funding such as 
official development assistance (ODA). These programmes 
are usually not portable (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2011).
Labour migrants should have legal access to a host 
country’s social protection system if there is:
1. A bilateral or multilateral agreement enabling eligibility 
for, and portability of, social protection between 
countries.
2. Unilateral programmes, provisions of equality of 
treatment or access to voluntary insurance in their host 
country.
3. More rarely, labour migrants may be covered by 
unilateral programmes from their origin country, such 
as a fund for overseas workers. 
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2.1 Frameworks for labour migrants’ access to social 
protection
This section describes the nature of migrants’ legal access 
to social protection, firstly considering entitlement while 
residing in a country and, secondly, considering portability 
of accumulated entitlements upon moving country.
A bilateral portability agreement between two countries 
sets out social protection entitlements to a citizen of 
one country who is resident in the other. Most bilateral 
agreements are between high-income countries (such 
as those concluded between the United States and 27 
high- and upper-middle-income countries5). Bilateral 
agreements covering South-North migrants are sometimes 
designed around temporary labour migration, such as 
Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) 
(Holzmann and Pouget, 2010). Certain EU countries have 
5. https://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html
agreements with Turkey and Morocco allowing labour 
migrants’ contributions into national social insurance 
schemes to accumulate across countries (Holzmann, 
2010). Bilateral agreements also exist between low-income 
countries, although these are more rare and less extensive 
in legal coverage. One example is that between Malawi 
and Zambia, which provides healthcare for temporary 
mine workers from Malawi through the Zambian Workers 
Compensation Fund (Avato et al., 2009).
Multilateral agreements provide a framework for 
coordinating portability at the regional level. For instance, 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) allows social 
security contributions to accumulate across member states, 
helping labour migrants to meet state-pension contribution 
thresholds (Taha et al., 2015, van Ginneken et al., 2013). 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has a regional legal 
Figure 1: The portability of social protection benefits
Some benefits are ‘not portable’ meaning that 
migrants are not allowed to withdraw the benefit 
while residing in another country.
If a migrant can withdraw their social protection 
benefits while residing in another country, the 
benefits are considered ‘portable’. 
framework for pension portability and other entitlements 
for all migrants from member states (van Ginneken, 2013). 
The Ibero-American multilateral agreement between Spain, 
Portugal and 20 Latin American countries provides a 
pension floor for labour migrants (Taha et al., 2015). The 
East African Community (EAC) gives its nationals and all 
migrants from member states equal rights to national social 
security systems; however, its member states have mostly 
under-developed systems to begin with and migrants lose 
their accumulated contributions upon returning to their 
country of origin (ibid).
Social protection can be made accessible to migrants 
through unilateral measures of destination countries. For 
example, third-country nationals legally resident in the EU 
for five years become entitled to equal treatment with EU 
nationals6. Canada, Australia and New Zealand also have 
generous entitlements for permanent resident migrants 
(and temporary migrants in New Zealand). Such measures 
are much more rare in low-income countries. For example, 
labour migrants arriving in member states of the GCC or 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
are not granted any right to access social protection. 
One exception is Barbados, where labour migrants can 
participate in the national social security system even if 
they lack a work permit (Taha et al., 2015; Morlachetti, 
2015). Host countries’ laws can also permit portability, 
for instance Australia and Malaysia refund contributions 
accrued as a lump sum when a migrant departs the 
country.
Migrants from the global South may be covered by a 
unilateral programme from their origin country. A notable 
example is the Philippines Overseas Workers Welfare 
Administration (OWWA) (see Box 1). Sri Lanka has a 
similar voluntary, contributions-based fund for overseas 
workers, with the benefits paid out to family members 
left in Sri Lanka (Taha et al., 2015), while Mexico has 
a voluntary national social insurance programme for 
emigrants to the US (ibid.). 
Finally, irregular labour migrants and those working in 
the informal economy tend not to be covered by national 
social protection systems. Asylum seekers and refugees 
outside high-income countries are also rarely covered, but 
instead may receive humanitarian support offering short-
term or ad-hoc protection (e.g. Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017).
6. EU Directive 109/2003.
7. Based on data from 2000/2001.
8. Undocumented migrants are typically excluded from social protection provision by law and are unlikely to take up any that they are entitled to for fear 
of exposure and the harassment or legal consequences that might ensue (Taha et al., 2015). The figures quoted here include estimates of undocumented 
migrants included in the data compiled by Avato et al. (2009).
2.2 Data showing migrants’ legal social protection 
coverage
While specific data is not available for most countries, 
Avato et al. (2009) have compiled a database of migrant 
stocks by destination and origin country, and paired 
this information with whether a bilateral or multilateral 
portability agreement covers each migration corridor7. 
Most agreements concern the benefits of contributory 
systems such as disability, survivors’ and old-age pensions. 
They also estimate the number of migrants who are not 
covered by portability agreements but are entitled to 
social protection access in their host country through a 
unilateral programme. This category could include access 
to non-contributory social assistance. When it comes to 
those who are not covered, official data sources only tend 
to capture those with regular status, while the stocks of 
undocumented migrants must be estimated8.
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Box 1: Migrant welfare funds
Some countries of origin such as Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
use migrant welfare funds to protect their labour 
migrants abroad. These funds are contributory 
schemes funded usually by employers, recruitment 
agencies and/or migrants, which provide a range of 
services to migrants while overseas. They commonly 
include life and medical insurance, loans and 
repatriation services (Ruiz and Agunias, 2008). They 
also provide government with funds to finance other 
migrant programmes such as pre-departure rights 
education, and can support migrants’ families at 
home (Jones, 2015).
The OWWA is the most developed of these 
funds. Managed by a government agency within 
the Department of Labor and Employment, 
OWWA is funded by a mandatory membership 
fee of US$25 paid prior to migration, either by 
the employer, recruitment agency or migrant. The 
fund pools these contributions to offer services to 
migrants including life and accident insurance, legal 
assistance and on-site help at embassies (Ruiz and 
Agunias, 2007). As of 2013, OWWA membership 
was over 1.6 million and had raised over US$300 
million (OWWA, 2013). These funds allow origin 
governments to support migrants abroad; as such 
they offer a potential solution to financing migrant 
social protection.
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Migrants therefore fall into three categories:
 • those that move between countries and are covered by a 
bilateral or multilateral agreement (23%)
 • those that move between countries without an 
agreement but are still entitled to some social protection 
(55%)
 • those that have no access to social protection (22%).
Firstly, around a quarter of all migrants move between 
countries with a bilateral or multilateral agreement in 
place, meaning that in principle some migrants are entitled 
to social protection and portability of benefits (Avato et 
al., 2009). However, as Figure 2 shows, while 90% of 
high-income to high-income movers fall into this category, 
less than 1% of migrants moving between low-income 
countries are legally covered. Overall, around 17% of 
those migrating from low- or middle-income countries 
to high-income countries are covered by a bilateral or 
multilateral social protection agreement. Some countries 
have secured bilateral agreements that result in higher 
coverage of their emigrants, notably Morocco (89% of 
emigrants), Algeria (87%) and Turkey (65%); however this 
is only for documented migrants, as we explore further in 
the next section. This is compared to a coverage rate of 
0.5% among Mexico’s 1.1 million emigrants, who migrate 
largely to the United States. 
Secondly, in the absence of formal agreements, migrants 
may still be entitled to some form of social protection in 
their host country, although these benefits are unlikely to 
be portable. In fact, most migrants fall into this category 
(55% globally). While this situation is better than having 
no access at all, it is still precarious. Some within this 
category migrate to high-income countries where they are 
 
Figure 2: Most migrants moving between high-income countries are legally covered by social protection, whereas 
coverage of migrants moving between low-income countries is low
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on data compiled by Avato et al. (2009) and hosted by the World Bank http://go.worldbank.org/
NCO9EJABP0. The figure shows the percentage of migrants (size of ‘bubble’) who are legally covered by a bilateral or multilateral social 
protection portability agreement, split by the income classification of their origin and destination country.
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generally entitled to a full range of social protection, even 
if the benefits are not portable. The majority within this 
category, however, are migrating between low- and lower-
middle-income countries where national social protection 
systems are generally weak.9
Finally, the most vulnerable group are arguably the 
remaining 22% of migrants who are neither legally covered 
by a bilateral/multilateral agreement nor entitled to social 
protection by host-country law. As Holzmann et al. (2015) 
have noted, these migrants may have access to some 
short-term provisions but are denied long-term or equal 
access as citizens. Almost all these migrants originate in 
the global South and the majority move to another low- or 
middle-income country. However, a large share (around 
42%) of those moving with no access to social protection 
are moving to high-income countries and this category 
includes large numbers of undocumented migrants. 
3 Why are migrants not covered by social 
protection? 
A range of factors affect legal and effective social 
protection coverage of labour migrants including non-
eligibility, barriers to take-up and portability constraints. 
Further, these factors often interact with others including 
gaps between policy design and implementation, practical 
barriers to participation, and political sensitivity. 
3.1 Eligibility
Labour migrants can be ineligible for social protection 
in two ways. First they may lose eligibility for social 
protection in their home country if they work in another 
country. Second, they can be legally ineligible for social 
protection in host countries. Although many countries 
have committed to equality of treatment between nationals 
and migrants10, this is not always followed in practice11. 
Some countries limit access by residency and/or nationality 
requirements (Hirose et al., 2011). For example, many 
countries in the Gulf only provide pensions to nationals 
and have no provisions for migrant workers (Avato et 
al., 2009). In addition, this can affect internal migrants. 
For instance, rural-urban migrants in China are ineligible 
for China’s biggest social assistance programme – the 
9. A more recent study by van Panhuys et al. (2017) found considerable regional variation in whether countries had laws in place granting equality of 
treatment to non-nationals for contributory social security and healthcare. It finds that Latin America had the highest proportion of countries granting 
equal legal treatment to non-nationals, although this may not reflect effective coverage.
10. A recent ILO study shows that of 120 countries, more than 70 have made provisions in the law granting equality of treatment between national and non-
nationals with regards to contributory social security (Van Panhuys et al., 2017).
11. Countries make distinctions, for example, between the rights of migrants with permanent, temporary or irregular residence status. Further distinctions 
and restrictions of rights based on the migrant‘s specific citizenship and purpose of residence (e.g. work vs. family reunion) are common (Ruhs, 2009).
12. To be eligible, workers must show their employer paid employment insurance either for 600 insurable hours in the past 52 weeks or since their last claim, 
whichever is less. This excludes many seasonal workers, as they only work for part of the year (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010).
13. One common exception to this is emergency healthcare; in many European countries hospitals are obliged to treat individuals for free even if they are 
undocumented. Some countries, such as Bulgaria, provide social benefits to irregular migrants as for natives (though this tends to be the exception rather 
than the rule), while others do not explicitly link benefits access to regularity of employment (Council of Europe, 2004).
Minimum Living Standards Guarantee Programme – and 
must meet stringent requirements to access social insurance 
programmes (Hopkins et al., 2016).
Some eligibility requirements mean access to social 
protection is cut off for certain groups of migrant workers, 
such as the self-employed or those earning too little (Taha 
et al., 2015; ISSA, 2014). For example, while Canada’s 
SAWP gives labour migrants the same social protection 
status as other groups, in practice it is difficult for seasonal 
migrant workers to meet eligibility requirements for 
unemployment benefits12 (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010 
in Taha et al., 2015). Immigration status and formality of 
employment also affects access: for example, the European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers 
excludes irregular migrants from its scope (Council of 
Europe, 2004)13. Further, informal economy employers are 
unlikely to extend social protection to their workers (van 
Ginneken, 2013). Many migrants are both undocumented 
and work in the informal economy, which can compound 
their weak legal and social position in a host country. 
Migrants can also be excluded due to political 
sensitivities. In host countries, negative public attitudes 
tend to highlight concerns about migration increasing 
job competition, placing downward pressure on wages, 
and adding pressure on public services (ISSA 2014; 
Ford and Heath, 2014; Ford and Lowles, 2016). This 
is linked to perceptions that migrant workers ‘take 
advantage’ of a country’s welfare system, even though 
the empirical evidence shows that this is mostly not 
the case (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2013).. For example, 37% of 
European citizens support migrants receiving benefits and 
services only after they have acquired citizenship of a host 
country (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013).. This climate can 
be a constraint in extending social protection to migrant 
workers, through a lack of political commitment from the 
host government. 
3.2 Legislation implementation and enforcement
Even when there are social protection arrangements 
in place for labour migrants, the implementation and 
enforcement of these can be ineffective (van Ginneken, 
2013 in Taha et al., 2015; Box 2). There is evidence 
that some national and multilateral social protection 
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instruments for migrants are not properly enforced. For 
example, implementation of relevant Indonesian legislation 
is weak due to lack of coordination between central and 
regional government. The CARICOM agreement has been 
applied infrequently, which is thought to be due to design 
inconsistencies and lack of public awareness (International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), 2010; Pasadilla and 
Abella, 2012; Fortaleza, 2010 in Holzmann and Pouget, 
2010).
Administering social protection to migrants can be 
difficult. For example, if benefits are means-tested, it 
may be necessary to obtain information on the financial 
situation of the migrant worker’s family abroad to assess 
eligibility. This can be costly or even impossible to secure 
(ISSA, 2014). Further, documentation to process claims can 
require knowledge of another country’s system (ibid.), and 
officials in countries of origins must be aware of the detail 
of agreements (Holzmann, 2016)14. 
Finally, employers of migrant workers do not always 
enforce relevant arrangements, knowingly or otherwise. 
For example, while documented Moroccan migrant 
workers can accrue portable social protection and 
retirement benefits in Spain, there is evidence that many 
of their employers do not provide migrants with relevant 
documentation for this (Arango and Martin, 2005 in Taha 
et al., 2015).
3.3 Barriers to take-up
Even if programmes are accessible and implemented 
effectively, knowledge gaps, language and financial 
barriers, time constraints and lack of representation 
can affect migrant take-up (see Box 3 for a case study). 
Furthermore, time and travel costs associated with the 
application process may prove a deterrent. For example, 
one study found that Mexican and Jamaican workers had 
difficulty accessing available health benefits in Canada 
due to lack of information on available services, language 
barriers, and long working hours limiting their access 
(McLaughlin, 2009 in Holzmann and Pouget, 2010). 
Social protection can also incur more direct financial 
costs such as monthly contributions or ad-hoc payments, 
which can be a barrier for many, particularly those in low-
skilled or low-wage labour (Hopkins et al., 2016). This 
affects labour migrants in the informal economy especially. 
As their work can involve low and irregular income, their 
capacity and willingness to contribute to social protection 
financing programmes can be limited, especially if they 
do not perceive these to meet their most important needs 
(Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003).
14. The ILO has formalised the exchange and provision of administrative assistance through international labour standards with respect to migrants and 
social protection, namely the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118), Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 
1982 (No. 157) and the Maintenance of Social Security Rights Recommendation, 1983 (No. 167).
3.4 Portability constraints
As highlighted above, the benefits received from social 
protection systems can be portable, not portable, or 
lie somewhere in between. For instance, some of the 
world’s largest migrant-sending and -receiving countries 
– Bangladesh, China, Mexico, Russia – have almost no 
arrangements in place for social protection portability (van 
Panhuys et al, 2017). Some countries limit the portability 
of pensions by applying different rates to people from 
different countries, or by banning pension payments to 
selected countries. For example, Germany and the UK 
apply reduction rates to pension payments for nationals 
of countries with which they have no social security 
agreement, and the US bans pension payment to selected 
countries (Holzmann et al., 2005). The most common 
issues are summarised in Figure 3.
Box 2: Fragmented enforcement of legislation in 
Southern Africa
Regional efforts to harmonise cross-border 
social protection, while encouraging, can have a 
limited impact due to institutional and political 
factors. The 2014 Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol on Employment and 
Labour contains provisions on the coordination of 
social security schemes and portability of benefits, 
however it has not yet been ratified by member 
states. The effects of an earlier non-binding Code 
on Social Security are also limited and social 
protection systems across SADC remain highly 
fragmented and tend to exclude migrants (Olivier, 
2009; Millard, 2008). The SADC’s institutional 
weakness and limited resources, as well as the 
absence of an accompanying policy framework on 
regional movement of labour, limit its enforcement 
capability (Dodson and Crush, 2015; Olivier, 2009). 
Therefore, migrant social protection continues to be 
decided at the national level in SADC, which can be 
problematic (Dodson and Crush, 2015). 
For example, South Africa, a primary destination 
for SADC migrants, largely excludes migrant 
workers from its national social protection system 
(Fish, 2013; Millard, 2008; Mpedi and Nyenti 
2013). Its bilateral agreements with other SADC 
states do not usually include social protection and 
where they do, for example with Mozambique, 
relevant mechanisms can be poorly enforced 
and employers’ compliance low (Mpedi and 
Nyenti, 2013; Olivier, 2009). This has been linked 
to negative anti-immigrant attitudes; 90% of 
respondents in a 2010 national survey felt there 
were too many foreigners in South Africa (Crush et 
al., 2013 in Dodson and Crush, 2015). 
5 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda
The 2030 Agenda advocates safe and orderly migration 
and the expansion of legal and effective social 
protection coverage, though it does not explicitly link 
the two. However, we argue that migration affects the 
implementation of the three main Targets on social 
protection (see Table 1), as well as several other Targets 
and Goals, and that these cannot be met effectively if these 
links are not considered.
Target 1.3 calls for the implementation of nationally 
appropriate social systems, measures, including floors, 
and for social protection systems to achieve ‘substantial 
coverage of poor and vulnerable groups’. Labour migrants 
are often a vulnerable sub-group, particularly those with 
irregular status or those in informal employment. In some 
circumstances, migrants are more likely to have physical 
(Tulloch et al., 2016) and mental health issues (Sabates-
Wheeler and Waites, 2007). Migrants can also face 
discrimination in access to labour markets and housing 
(Lucci et al., 2016), as well as stigma or harassment. 
Figure 3: The most common portability constraints
Portability constraints
Where a migrant worker is legally able to contribute to their host country’s social 
insurance system, such entitlements are not always portable or transferrable. 
The most common issues are:
Totalisation 
Migrants who contribute to systems in different 
countries in different years may not have these 
contributions added together. They may therefore 
not be entitled to a full pension.
Limited Exportability 
Some countries limit the portability of pensions: 
by applying different rates to people from different 
countries, or by banning pension payments to 
selected countries. 
Transfer cost 
Entitlements are usually paid through international 
money transfers, which are subject to fees and 
exchange rate fluctuations. These costs can be high 
in countries with less developed financial systems.
Partial Portability 
Some benefits aren’t covered under portability 
clauses; including healthcare entitlements and many 
tax-funded benefits (such as maternity allowances). 
This particularly affects retired migrant workers.
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Box 3: Bureaucratic requirements affecting take up 
of social protection in India
Programme registration requirements can prove an 
additional barrier to take-up. Such requirements 
may unintentionally make it harder for migrants to 
participate. This is the case in India where, despite 
legal access to the Public Distribution System 
(PDS), which offers access to subsidised food to 
poor households, internal migrants can be excluded 
through complicated regulations and administrative 
requirements (MacAuslan, 2009, 2011). Eligibility 
for PDS and other Indian social protection 
programmes is linked to residency and registration 
status. For example, to access PDS, residency criteria 
mean migrants must reapply with every move across 
certain boundaries. Different forms need to be 
filled out and attested to by government officials, 
and limited knowledge of local bureaucracies and 
weaker social networks leads to reluctance amongst 
migrants to apply.
Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development  95 
Therefore migrant workers may have a particularly salient 
need for social protection. Those working in dangerous 
working environments have a greater risk of work-related 
accidents or ill health and hence require sickness, disability 
or work-injury benefits. Often being in irregular and badly 
paid employment can mean migrants have a strong need 
for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, working in a new 
and foreign environment, often without family support and 
with weak social networks, migrants can lack information 
as well as informal support (ISSA, 2014). Failing to include 
labour migrants in conceptualising and implementing 
Target 1.3 will negatively affect the Target’s outcome as it 
will exclude one specific poor and vulnerable group; this 
undermines the general principle in the 2030 Agenda of 
‘leaving no-one behind’. 
One particularly vulnerable sub-group of labour 
migrants is that of domestic workers (see this series’ gender 
briefing for a detailed discussion (O’Neil et al., 2016)). As 
this group often lacks regularised status or access to social 
insurance through their employer, it is likely to have low 
effective social protection coverage – though data on this 
is lacking. This directly impacts Target 5.4, which calls for 
the recognition of domestic work through public services, 
infrastructure and social protection policies.
Many labour migrants can lose access to social 
protection when they move to another country or back 
home. This could reduce return migration and/or decrease 
payments of social security, as the incentives to stay in the 
host country and to move into the informal economy and/
or into an irregular migration status may be higher. This 
would make it harder to monitor migration flows and 
implement evidence-based policy, negatively impacting 
Target 10.7 on ‘safe and orderly migration’. The Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda also emphasises that access to and 
portability of earned benefits is part of ensuring safe, 
orderly and regular migration (UN DESA, 2015). 
If limited portability disincentivises return migration, 
this could deprive origin countries – many of them 
developing countries – of the beneficial development effects 
of migration. Migration can be an important contribution 
to economic development in origin countries, for instance 
through remittances, investment and knowledge exchange 
(see Clemens, 2011), so this could also impact the success 
of other SDGs, for instance Goal 8 on sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth.
Labour migrants can contribute to the achievement 
of Target 1.a, which calls for ‘significant mobilization 
of resources’ […] to implement programmes and 
policies to end poverty’, including social protection. 
Relevant SDG Target Link to migration
Goal 1: No poverty
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures 
for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor 
and the vulnerable.
Labour migrants can be a particularly poor and vulnerable group, especially in 
terms of work and health-related risks, but often lack eligibility for legal social 
protection and/or are not effectively covered.
Where migrants are legally covered by a social protection mechanism, benefits 
are often non-portable, further reducing coverage amongst a group that is highly 
mobile.
1.a: Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, 
including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide 
adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least 
developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in 
all its dimensions.
Labour migrants present an opportunity to increase the tax base, and a greater 
number of contributors to social insurance-type schemes leads to better risk 
pooling and financial sustainability. 
However, high immigration can at first lead to increased costs for host countries 
if immigrants are eligible for tax-funded benefits and take-up is high. Due to 
political sensitivities around migration, with many countries (especially low-
income countries) already having limited resources for social protection, it can 
be difficult to justify expansion of eligibility to labour migrants.
Goal 10: Reduced inequalities
10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and 
progressively achieve greater equality
Social protection policies often do not guarantee equal access to social 
protection, particularly for ‘non-natives’, which means that labour migrants 
have lower eligibility for, and, where eligible, lower take-up of social protection. 
If vulnerable groups (such as labour migrants) are unable to participate in social 
protection, inequalities widen.
The design of social protection policy can fail to account for mobility of 
beneficiaries, with portability being a key constraint for labour migrants in 
accessing benefits they have contributed towards.
Table 1: Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Besides their direct social security contributions, labour 
migrants generate additional resources for governments 
to deliver social protection programmes, for instance 
through personal income tax and indirect taxes such as 
consumption taxes. Research has shown that migrants 
often make net fiscal contributions to host countries 
(Dustmann and Frattini, 2013), paying more in taxes 
and social insurance contributions than they take out in 
benefits. Likewise, a study by OECD (2013) showed that 
the majority of OECD countries drew a positive balance 
from migration in their social security systems. 
However, high levels of mobility by migrant workers 
can make their contributions less predictable. Significant 
labour-market informality in many low-income economies 
acts as a constraint to increases in tax revenue through 
social security contributions. Initiatives either to formalise 
such sectors or to include informal-sector workers 
(including migrants, who are heavily represented in this 
group) in contributory social protection can expand the 
tax base (Bastagli and Hagen-Zanker, 2014). The potential 
resources to be gained from this are high: the United 
States Social Security Administration, for example, has 
acknowledged that mostly non-reimbursable contributions 
by undocumented workers represented a US$12 billion 
annual net gain to the US accounts in 2010 (Goss et al., 
2013)15. 
At the same time, if migrants are eligible for and receive 
tax-funded benefits, this could lead to increased costs 
for host countries. If needed, additional resources can be 
mobilised by designing programmes that share the costs 
of delivering social protection to migrants. For example, 
social insurance programmes tend to involve contributions 
from workers, employers and the host state. A greater 
number of contributors also leads to better risk pooling 
and financial sustainability of the system. Country-of-
origin governments can be involved, for example through 
Migrant Welfare Funds, which are funded through 
contributions by employers, recruitment agencies and/or 
labour migrants (see Box 1).
Finally Target 10.4 calls for social protection to 
‘progressively achieve greater equality’. On the one 
hand, social protection has been shown to tackle income 
inequality and unequal access to basic services (UN 
ESCAP, 2015). For example, one study found that cash 
transfers alone reduced the Gini coefficient (a measure of 
inequality) in six Latin-American countries by 1%-9% 
(Lustig et al., 2013). On the other hand, as discussed in 
Section 3, social protection policies do not guarantee equal 
access, with ‘non-natives’ having lower eligibility and 
lower take-up when eligible. This implies that if vulnerable 
groups (including labour migrants) are excluded from 
social protection coverage, inequality remains the same or 
widens. 
15. Furthermore, expansion of social security coverage is argued to be an effective tool to reduce exploitation and abuse of workers through the formalisation 
of working practices (ISSA, 2014).
Policy design can widen this inequality, in particular 
with regards to portability. As shown in Section 3, 
some labour migrants may acquire entitlement to social 
protection by fulfilling their host country’s national 
requirements, only to have these reduced or barred if they 
move back to their origin or another country. As a result, 
these migrants subsequently experience unequal access to 
social protection in both origin and host countries.
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The 2030 Agenda highlights the importance of social 
protection in reducing poverty and inequalities. It sets out 
specific targets for improving coverage amongst vulnerable 
groups and for mobilising funds to implement social 
protection programmes. International labour migrants 
are a vulnerable group, yet they often lack access to social 
protection, particularly those coming from low-income 
countries, those with irregular migration status and/or 
those working in the informal economy. 
Improving social protection for labour migrants goes 
hand in hand with better management of labour migration. 
Providing legal channels to migrants and including them 
in national social protection systems expands the base 
of potential contributors. At the same time, increasing 
social protection coverage is tightly linked with bringing 
migrant workers into the formal economy (ISSA, 2014) 
and, as such, also increases the ability of states to manage 
migration. Increased formalisation of workers also leads to 
higher tax contributions and a more productive workforce 
(ibid). Finally, guaranteeing portability of benefits removes 
some of the constraints to the mobility of labour so 
migration flows can be more closely matched to the supply 
and demand for labour. Effective coverage and portability 
are also important to ensure wellbeing and prevent 
vulnerability through the whole of a migrant’s life.
The recommendations below set out key actions for 
national governments, international institutions and 
civil-society organisations to improve social protection for 
international labour migrants. Ultimately, increasing their 
participation in social protection is not only important 
to protect migrants, but also plays an important role in 
maximising the potential benefits of labour migration for 
migrants, origin and host countries.
Conclusion 1: Legal and effective social protection 
coverage is important for labour migrants, but is 
very patchy outside high-income countries.
Most labour migrants moving to high-income countries 
are covered by a social protection agreement or provision 
giving some degree of access and portability. However, the 
proportion of those moving between low-income countries 
96 ODI Briefing
Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development  97 
that are legally covered is less than 1%. These countries 
tend to have under-developed national social protection 
systems that also leave large shares of their native 
population uncovered. Furthermore, low legal coverage is 
especially prevalent among undocumented migrants and 
those working in the informal economy.
Recommendation: increase eligibility through new 
agreements and make it more feasible for migrants to 
participants in social protection.
 • Host countries can increase labour migrants’ eligibility 
for social protection by building on existing measures 
and by concluding new agreements. Particular attention 
must be paid to improving legal coverage of migrants 
from low- and middle-income countries. 
 • Migrants in the informal economy are often in irregular 
work and unable to make regular social protection 
contributions. These factors need to be taken into 
account when designing the scope of benefits, financing 
mechanisms and administrative procedures for informal 
workers. In addition, governments, organisations and 
employers can provide effective informal protection for 
informal workers, for example by holding preventive 
health-education workshops or empowering informal 
worker alliances in certain industries (Lund, 2009).
 • Where labour migrants are not legally or effectively 
covered through other measures, country-of-origin 
governments should consider migrant welfare funds for 
emigrants. These funds provide basic protection through 
contributions from employers, recruitment agencies and 
migrants. They can be a good bridging measure, when 
integration into social protection systems in the host 
country is not yet feasible.
Conclusion 2: Some migrants are legally covered by 
social protection in the host country, but lose these 
benefits when they move again. 
Even if a labour migrant is legally eligible to contribute 
to and receive benefits from their host country’s 
social insurance system, their entitlements may not be 
transferrable when they move back home or to another 
country. This increases the migrant’s vulnerability and 
reduces their incentives to contribute to social insurance 
systems. Some benefits that are in principle portable, such 
as pensions, carry limitations such as high transfer fees or 
not being transferable to certain countries.
Recommendation: extend and improve social 
protection portability for migrants. 
 • Continue to negotiate bilateral and multilateral social 
security agreements along key migration corridors 
and within regional groupings of states, extending 
portability practices of pensions and other benefits to 
more countries. Focus on extending these to include 
low-income countries. Timely ratification of these 
agreements between states should also be encouraged to 
ensure they are operational as soon as possible. 
 • Lift any restrictions on existing portability arrangements 
by origin countries. This includes enabling the transfer 
of benefits to all countries and ending the practice of 
applying reduction rates to entitlement transfers to 
certain countries.
 • Decrease the financial burden of transferring social 
protection benefits to countries of origin. Countries can 
do this by introducing fixed transfer fees for certain 
entitlements to keep these low, requiring transfer 
operators to disclose fees, tax charges and exchange 
rates to increase transparency, and/or ending any 
exclusivity arrangements with banks or agents to 
encourage operator competition (Watkins and Quattri, 
2014).Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection 
systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 
achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.
1.a: Ensure significant mobilisation of resources from a 
variety of sources, including through enhanced development 
cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable 
means for developing countries, in particular least developed 
countries, to implement programmes and policies to end 
poverty in all its dimensions.
5.4: Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work 
through the provision of public services, infrastructure 
and social protection policies and the promotion of shared 
responsibility within the household and the family as 
nationally appropriate.
10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social 
protection policies, and progressively achieve greater 
equality.
Relevant SDG Targets
10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social 
protection policies, and progressively achieve greater 
equality.
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe and responsible migration, 
implement planned and well-managed migration policies.
10.c: Reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances. 
Conclusion 3: The implementation and enforcement 
of social protection arrangements for migrants can 
be ineffective.
Even with bilateral social protection portability agreements 
in place, many migrants continue to be left without 
effective coverage as the implementation and enforcement 
of these can be inadequate. The administration and 
financing of well-intentioned portability agreements 
can be beyond the capacity of under-funded national 
social protection departments. Further, take-up can be 
low amongst labour migrants due to burdensome and 
confusing documentation requirements, language barriers, 
and financial or time constraints. 
Recommendation: strengthen the capacities of 
national bodies to design and enforce social 
protection arrangements better.
 • Make portability agreements legally binding, ensuring 
regional and bilateral portability efforts are enacted 
at the national level. Increase the enforcement 
capabilities of national social security administrations 
and other relevant bodies to implement and enforce 
these agreements. For example, where possible ensure 
that monitoring mechanisms for social protection 
arrangements include both national agencies and non-
governmental organisations, to give a fuller picture of 
compliance.
 • Introduce compliance procedures for employers and 
appropriate oversight mechanisms. For example, 
governments can introduce mandatory social protection 
provisions in work contracts which set out entitlements 
in detail. They can also improve protection of labour 
migrants against legal reprisals from employers by 
ensuring that effective and timely complaint, appeal 
and redress mechanisms are available to migrant 
workers free of charge. Such mechanisms should also be 
available in languages spoken by migrants and through 
channels accessible to them.
 • Encourage social protection take-up by labour migrants. 
Tools for doing this include information campaigns 
that raise awareness on existing rights and entitlements 
(in different languages), greater efficiency and clarity 
in administrative procedures (including through better 
trained staff), and establishing more flexible rules and 
procedures to incentivise joining (ILO, 2014). Adopt a 
more migrant-centric approach by including migrants 
and migration organisations in the design process (Ratel 
et al., 2013). 
 • There is very little data on coverage of labour migrants, 
which exacerbates the ineffectiveness of social 
protection arrangements in place. This is partly because 
irregular migrants are usually missing from official 
population statistics, but also because even regular 
migrants are not always clearly identified in either data 
or legislation. Countries should work towards collecting 
data to help estimate effective, or de facto, social 
protection coverage of labour migrants. National data 
on social protection programmes should disaggregate 
by citizenship and residence status (a strong proxy 
for migrant status), so as to manage the financial 
implications of benefits becoming portable. 
Conclusion 4: Expanding legal social protection 
coverage can be politically and financially 
challenging.
All too often, migrants are perceived as taking advantage 
of national welfare systems (Ford and Heath, 2014), 
which makes the expansion of legal coverage to migrants 
politically challenging. The expansion of a social 
protection system does carry a cost, especially where 
benefits are funded from general taxation, yet labour 
migrants have the potential to be a financial and economic 
asset for host countries. Indeed, host countries often draw 
a positive fiscal balance from labour migration, depending 
on demographic characteristics of migrants and status of 
national labour markets (OECD, 2013).
Recommendation: recognise the economic and fiscal 
contributions of migrants and use these to expand 
social protection eligibility.
 • To fund improved legal social protection coverage, the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN DESA, 2015) proposes 
that governments broaden and diversify the tax base. By 
allowing migrants to work formally and to contribute 
towards national social insurance systems, destination 
countries can grow their tax base and spread risk across 
a larger pool.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection 
systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 
achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.
16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions at all levels. 
17.18: By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to 
developing countries, including for least developed countries 
and small island developing States, to increase significantly 
the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data 
disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
migratory status, disability, geographic location and other 
characteristics relevant in national contexts.
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 • Strengthen the political will to increase social protection 
eligibility for migrants, particularly in key destination 
countries. Policy-makers should be encouraged to use 
reliable, empirical evidence on the economic and fiscal 
contribution of migrants to host countries (Dustmann 
and Frattini, 2013; OECD, 2013) and the consequences 
of (not) granting migrants access to national social 
protection systems in order to help them make decisions 
in a polarised political context.
 • Make efforts to shift public attitudes towards favouring 
migrant access to national social protection systems, 
by targeting specific groups with information about the 
economic and fiscal benefits of migration (Dempster and 
Hargrave, 2017). 
 • Governments need to cooperate to facilitate payments 
into and out of migrant welfare funds (for example, 
overseas workers funds) based in a migrant’s origin 
country. Facilitation measures could include lowering 
transfer fees on remittances into social protection funds 
and host countries allowing administration offices for 
such funds to operate there.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection 
systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 
achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable. 
1.a: Ensure significant mobilisation of resources from a 
variety of sources, including through enhanced development 
cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable 
means for developing countries, in particular least developed 
countries, to implement programmes and policies to end 
poverty in all its dimensions.
10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social 
protection policies, and progressively achieve greater 
equality.
16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions at all levels. 
17.18: By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to 
developing countries, including for least developed countries 
and small island developing States, to increase significantly 
the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data 
disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
migratory status, disability, geographic location and other 
characteristics relevant in national contexts.
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• Climate change and disasters are, and will continue to be, major drivers of migration and 
displacement.
• The poor are the most vulnerable to climate change. They are likely to live in high-risk areas, have 
less means to prepare, and lack information to anticipate, and respond to, a disaster. Yet they are 
also the people who will find it hardest to migrate.
• National adaptation strategies must help those who are forced, or choose, to migrate as result 
of climate change. They must inform migrants of risk and build their capacity to cope in new 
locations.
•  For those who are forced to move internationally, bilateral agreements and international 
frameworks must protect their rights.
•  Migrants can put additional pressure on infrastructure and services at destination. National policies 
need to factor in the needs and impact of new climate-induced migrants.
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SDGs covered   13: Climate action
Figure 1: Migration flows from economically and environmentally vulnerable groups of countries 
Source: Authors’ calculation using WDI and Global Bilateral Migration Database (downloaded on 15/11/2016).
Note: The V20 are the 20 countries considered most ‘climate vulnerable’. The numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in 
each category.
1.1 What is climate-induced migration?
There is no universally agreed definition of climate-
induced migration. In this brief, we use the concept to 
refer to four broad categories: those displaced by climate-
related disasters, who often move temporarily; those 
forced to migrate more permanently due to recurrent 
events; those forced to migrate to avoid worsening slow-
onset deterioration of the environment; and those who 
‘choose’ to move as an adaptation strategy, in response to 
environmental pressures and other factors.
Disasters have always driven people to leave their homes 
in search of safety. Between 2008 and 2015, an average 
of 25.4 million per year were displaced by disasters 
within and across borders. The large majority (85%) of 
these were climate-related disasters (extreme weather 
and related events such as flooding). Some people moved 
across borders but the vast majority move within their own 
country (Nansen Initiative, 2015; IDMC, 2016). Those that 
are forced to move often lose property, crops and other 
resources in the disaster and during the move (Wilkinson 
and Peters, 2015). However, this kind of displacement 
tends to be temporary: for example, major floods in 
2010 in Pakistan displaced nine million people but most 
returned home within a year (Brickle and Thomas, 2014). 
For some, however, the displacement is repeated or for 
longer periods of time, particularly when flood events 
become more frequent (IDMC, 2016). 
This line is further blurred in the context of slow-onset 
environmental changes associated with climate change such 
as changes in rainfall predictability, salt water intrusion, 
desertification and sea level rise. Migration can be ‘forced’ 
when the situation is unbearable. Leaving can also be a 
survival strategy or more ‘voluntary’, where a tipping point 
1 Introduction
This briefing looks at the anticipated impacts of climate 
induced migration on efforts to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) on climate change – SDG13. 
More specifically, this brief describes the SDG targets 
relating to climate change, and the particular challenges 
to each in the context of increasing climate-induced 
migration. 
In this Introduction, we offer a definition of climate-
induced migration. Section 2 examines the migration 
trends in climate-vulnerable locations, focusing on 
least developed countries (LDCs) and the Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS). Although there are few studies 
on migration trends in response to climate risks, there is 
an observable increase in external migration flows from 
countries most vulnerable to climate change. Section 3 
explores the main international frameworks for addressing 
climate-induced migration: the Paris Agreement, Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Nansen 
Initiative and Protection Agenda. We conclude that none 
wholly captures the complex dynamics of climate-induced 
migration, and the different causes and motivations 
for leaving or staying. In Section 4, we discuss how the 
achievement of the SDGs – in particular, SDG13 – might 
face challenges due to the lack of strategies and plans 
that directly tackle climate-induced migration. None of 
the SDGs make the explicit connection between climate 
change and migration. Yet climate-induced migration must 
be included in national and international policy to ensure 
that those who are forced or choose to leave, and those 
who stay, are not left behind. Finally, Section 5 offers three 
sets of conclusions and recommendations to build climate 
resilience for all, through measures aimed at helping people 
to adapt and minimise risk, wherever they live. 
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is reached in the steadily deteriorating conditions and in 
response to opportunities elsewhere (Renaud et al., 2011). 
Across the world, sea level rise will force people from 
their homes in order to avoid severe deterioration in 
habitat and resources and even risk to lives. These people 
may be unable to return due to the physical loss of land, 
or may need to alter livelihood practices in order to return. 
This is likely to be the case in some SIDS where land will 
be lost along the coasts and costal livelihoods affected by 
salinisation and coastal erosion. 
Climate change will be a major driver of displacement 
in the future. An increasing number of people will be 
forced to move as a result of deteriorating environmental 
conditions, loss of habitat and livelihoods, and extreme 
weather events (Milan et al., 2015). While projections 
of climate-migrants are unreliable and vary between 25 
million and 300 million by 2050 (Gemenne, 2011), it is 
clear that migration and displacement in the future will be 
heavily influenced by climate change impacts.
To avoid average global temperatures increasing beyond 
1.5oC above pre-industrial levels, significant climate change 
mitigation is needed as well as measures to enhance the 
resilience and adaptive capacity of communities already 
suffering the negative impacts of climate change. Efforts 
on both fronts will be affected by the growing numbers of 
people moving and the changing patterns of migration
2 Migration trends in climate-vulnerable 
places 
The relationship between climate change and migration 
is complex and there are few reliable global studies of 
past and current migration trends in response to climate 
risks (Gemenne, 2011; Beine and Parsons, 2014; Cattaneo 
and Peri, 2015). Nonetheless, there is a marked increase 
in external migration from countries that are highly 
vulnerable to climate variability and climate extremes 
over the period 1970-2000 (the period for which we have 
data on migration flows). Over this 30 year period, flows 
of migrants doubled, with the 20 countries considered 
most ‘climate vulnerable’ (known as the ‘V20’) having 
the highest outflows (see Figure 1).1 In these countries, 
on average 10% of the population migrated in 2000. The 
trend is also increasing within LDCs. The LDC category 
of countries is highly exposed to climate hazards because 
it includes both SIDS, with high exposure to cyclones, 
storm surge and sea-level rise (Wilkinson et al., 2016a) 
and landlocked countries, many of which are semi-arid 
and exposed to desertification and drought (Simonet 2014; 
1. In 2015, the twenty member countries of the Climate Vulnerability Forum launched an official bloc for the climate change negotiations, known as the 
‘V20’. The V20 countries define themselves as countries disproportionately affected by the consequences of global warming: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Kiribati, Madagascar, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Vietnam. The V20 group refers to DARA Climate Vulnerability Monitor Data Portal and the CAIT Equity Explorer portal via the 
World Resources Institute to assess climate change vulnerability. Nonetheless this criteria doesn’t seem to be an eligibility criteria to become member of 
the group; countries considering themselves as vulnerable to climate change can apply to be member of the group.
Guillaumont and Simonet, 2011; Guillaumont et al., 2015; 
Istanbul Declaration, 2014).
In SIDS too, migration levels have been high, rising 
fivefold over the period 1960-2000. This group of 
countries has seen the highest growth in out-migration per 
capita (see Figure 2). Future climate change poses a real 
existential threat in countries like Kiribati and Tuvalu – 
reportedly 70% of households would consider migrating to 
another country (UNU-EHS, 2014).
Over the last 50 years, migration has increased in 
absolute and relative size. However, the migration patterns 
remain similar: one-third of those moving from developing 
countries have migrated to the same ten countries (i.e. 
the destination countries change very little year on year) 
and most migration is regional and south-south. The 
migration flows data (Figure 1) represents the number 
of migrants moving from one country to another each 
year. The upward trend in migration flows from V20 
countries, LDCs and SIDS (1960-2000) is also confirmed 
by the migrant stock data (the number of migrants in host 
countries, by place of origin). After 2000, the number of 
migrants from these countries rose even more sharply (see 
Figure 3).
The impacts of climate change on migration patterns 
are better understood within countries, where effects such 
as lower crop yields can be observed alongside decisions 
by families to diversify income and reduce risk through 
migration to other rural areas or often also to cities (see 
Box 1).
3 Climate-induced migration in the Paris 
Agreement and Sendai Framework  
As work begins to implement the Paris Climate Change 
Agreement and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction in national contexts, it provides an important 
opportunity to take stock of the implications of climate-
induced migration for achieving goals and targets on 
climate change adaptation, resilience and disaster risk 
reduction (DRR).
3.1 The Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement includes mention of the vulnerability 
of migrants (UNFCCC, 2015). Under the text on Loss and 
Damage (paragraph 50), there is a request to establish ‘a 
task force […] to develop recommendations for integrated 
approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement 
related to the adverse impacts of climate change’ 
(UNFCCC, 2015). However, it does not specify whether 
movement is in response to extreme events or gradual 
Figure 2: Migration flows as a share of total population from from economically and environmentally vulnerable groups 
of countries 
Source: Authors’ calculation using WDI and Global Bilateral Migration Database (downloaded on 15/11/2016).
Note: The numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in each category.
Figure 3: Migration flows from from economically and environmentally vulnerable groups of countries 
Source: Authors’ calculation using United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015). 
Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).
Note: The numbers in brackets are the number of countries considered in each category
changes; or if it is within or across national borders. 
Critically, there is also no mention of the positive effects of 
migration and therefore no recommendation to Parties on 
how to harness these.
At the national level, countries have developed Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), making 
commitments to actions they will take after 2020 (when 
the Kyoto Protocol ends) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and put CO2 back into the atmosphere through 
actions like reforestation. The collective contributions of all 
country’s INDCs make up the overall global commitment 
to climate change mitigation from 2020-2030. Post-Paris, 
these national-level commitments are now being converted 
into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), 
which include more detail on how the INDCs will be 
implemented – including the contributions of different 
sectors like transport and industry. Of the 162 INDCs that 
were submitted, only 34 referred to human mobility (see 
Figure 4). No European countries mentioned migration in 
their INDCs, suggesting that they did not think it would 
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Box 1: Climate change and rural-urban migration in Tanzania
Tanzania is a LDC exposed to extreme weather events, such as recurring droughts and flooding, as well as slow-
onset changes, such as rising temperatures and decreasing rainfall. Climate projections predict a temperature 
increase of up to 2.2oC by 2100 (Agrawala et al., 2003), a shortening of the growing season (Hulme et al., 2001), 
and altered cropping patterns (URT, 2003). Tanzania is highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture: the sector 
employs 70% of the labour force but accounts for only 23% of GDP (URT, 2016). Climate change is expected 
to decrease crop yields (Rowhani et al., 2011) and will therefore put additional pressure on the rural population. 
Given this context, climate change impacts are likely to impede poverty reduction efforts in the country (Ahmed et 
al., 2011).
To mitigate this impact, emphasis is on agricultural policies, such as increasing the use of fertiliser, irrigation 
or alternative farming systems (URT, 2007). However, progress has been slow because of a lack of funds at the 
national level (Norrington-Davies and Thornton, 2011). Opportunities for diversification into non-agricultural 
activities in rural areas are also hampered by the poor links between farm and off-farm sectors, as well as 
insufficient access to credit and infrastructure (Lanjouw, Quizon and Sparrow, 2001; Bah et al., 2003; Katega, 
2013). For many Tanzanian households affected by weather shocks, migration is therefore seen as a risk 
management or adaptation strategy to climate change. Migration enables families to spatially diversify income and 
therefore reduce the risk that the entire household income will be affected by weather events (Liwenga, Kwazi and 
Afifi, 2012; Kubik and Maurel, 2016). 
Migration in Tanzania takes place mainly within rural areas. However, climate change can alter mobility 
patterns and foster migration from rural to urban areas, especially towards big cities such as Dar es Salaam 
(Liwenga, Kwazi and Afifi, 2012; Kubik, 2016), which can offer better opportunities (See: Mbonile, 1996; Beegle, 
De Weerdt and Dercon, 2011). However, many households don’t have the funds to make such a move (Kubik and 
Maurel, 2016). In addition to acting as a push factor, weather shocks also undermine people’s ability to move by 
reducing crop yields and eroding assets (Hirvonen, 2016). Climate change can therefore intensify the poverty trap 
experienced by rural populations. 
Those who are forced into cities by adverse weather shocks may not be easily absorbed by the urban labour 
market – rural poverty can transform into urban poverty (WB, 2015; Kubik, 2016). It can also put additional 
pressure on insufficient urban infrastructure, pushing migrants into overpopulated informal settlements and 
further increasing environmental risks. Evidence of these effects can be seen in Dar es Salaam, where 70% of the 
population live in unplanned settlements, including those in low-lying areas susceptible to coastal erosion and 
regular flooding (Casimiri, 2009). The number of people directly exposed to these risks is expected to more than 
triple by 2050 (Kebede and Nicholls, 2012).
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affect their ability to meet their commitments around 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are the main 
government planning instrument for adaptation. They 
are currently being developed as a way of assessing how 
climate change will affect development progress and 
to identify adaptation opportunities within national 
development and sectoral plans. Few NAPs have been 
finalised but their predecessors, the National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action (NAPAs), which were undertaken 
by LDCs only, commonly referred to migration as an 
impact of climate change. Two-thirds of all NAPAs referred 
to migration as a negative impact, with many seeking 
to limit rural-to-urban migration and a few identifying 
planned relocation, whereby people are moved to other 
sites to avoid impacts (Warner et al., 2015).
3.2 The Sendai Framework
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-
2030 (SFDRR) (UNISDR, 2015) focuses on displacement 
in response to extreme events. It focuses less on those 
people moving due to/in anticipation of gradual changes 
in climate. Serving as a global blueprint for efforts to 
build resilience to natural hazards, SFDRR represents 
an evolution in the way human mobility is considered 
within global policy dialogues. Its predecessor, the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) (UNISDR, 2005) 
only recognised that forced migration, and efforts to 
address it, could increase exposure and vulnerability. 
In contrast to the HFA, the SFDRR addresses a 
range of topics, including climate and non-climate-
induced displacement after disasters as well as migrants’ 
contribution to resilience at their destinations, all of which 
is missing from other global dialogues. The complex 
relationship between disasters and human mobility is 
well articulated but the SFDRR too fails to highlight the 
exacerbating effect of climate change and the likelihood 
of increased forced migration in the future. Desertification 
and repetitive drought in the Sahel, glacial retreat in the 
Andes, water and soil erosion in low-lying coastal areas 
around the world are just some examples of the types of 
environmental risks that are not necessarily classified as 
disasters or extreme events. 
Box 2: The Nansen Initiative and the Platform on Disaster Displacement
Established in 2016, the Platform on Disaster Displacement addresses the protection needs of people displaced 
across borders as a result of disasters and climate change. The Platform aims to follow up on work started under 
the 2015 Nansen Initiative, which revealed a general lack of preparedness leading to ad hoc responses, and 
implement the recommendations of Protection Agenda. 
The Platform is built on three pillars: a Steering Group, an Advisory Committee, and a Coordination Unit, and 
has four Strategic Priorities:
1. Address knowledge and data gaps.
2. Enhance the use of identified effective practices and strengthen cooperation among relevant actors.
3. Promote policy coherence and mainstreaming of human mobility challenges.
4. Promote policy and normative development in gap areas.
Knowledge and data gaps persist, especially on cross-border movements, human mobility in slow-onset disaster 
contexts, disaggregated data, solutions and future risks. The Platform aims to address these gaps by mapping and 
consolidating existing data, and utilising existing data gathering mechanisms.
In most cases, people who are forced to leave due to disasters and climate change will not be considered 
refugees under current international law. Rather than calling for a new convention, the Platform supports an 
approach that focuses on the integration of effective practices into existing normative frameworks.
Finally, the enormous challenges that cross-border disaster-displacement generates are diverse. International 
cooperation as well as regional and national engagement is crucial. To this end, the Platform promotes coherence 
and enhanced cooperation across relevant global policy dialogues.
As well as being considered in climate action and DRR, 
climate-induced migration is considered a protection issue 
and is addressed in this way through the 2015 Nansen 
Initiative Protection Agenda (See Box 2).
4 Climate, migration and the SDGs: SDG13
This section explores SDG13 on climate action 
(UN, 2015). SDG13 does not mention migration or 
displacement, or recommend the inclusion of this 
important phenomenon in climate policies. Other SDGs, 
specifically SDGs 8, 10 and 17, point to the need for 
facilitated, planned and well-managed migration policies 
– but do not make the connection with climate change. 
Therefore, the ways in which migration may be altered by 
climate change and the challenges this poses for policy and 
planning are not directly addressed in the SDGs. Nor are 
the broader challenges that human mobility presents to 
meeting goals on mitigating and adapting to the impacts of 
climate change.
SDG13 is exclusively focusing on climate change, 
and requires governments to ‘Take urgent action to 
combat climate change and its impacts’. The goal is to be 
achieved through five targets. These focus heavily on the 
Figure 4: Inclusion of migration in national climate change commitments
Arab States, 2
Asia and the Pacific, 12
Africa, 15
Americas, 5
No mention, 128 34
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adaptation needed to deal with climate change impacts, 
and emphasise mainstreaming climate change in policies 
and plans, requiring capacity building, awareness raising 
and mobilising funding. SDG13 is supported by Target 1.5 
under SDG1, ‘End poverty in all its forms everywhere’, 
which relates to building resilience of the poor to climate-
related extreme events and other economic, social and 
environmental shocks and disasters.
Migration will affect progress on SDG13. However, 
given the uncertainty surrounding migration projections 
and where migrants will go in the future, it is hard to 
anticipate the precise impact of human mobility on 
achieving these targets. This section looks at some of 
the challenges for SDG13 posed by existing patterns 
of migration as well as those anticipated in the future, 
including away from coastal areas particularly in SIDS.
Target 13.1: Strengthen resilience and adaptive 
capacity to climate-related hazards and ‘natural’ 
disasters in all countries
DRR and climate change adaptation policies can build 
the resilience and adaptive capacity of individuals and 
communities and help them to prepare for and prevent 
displacement due to climate extremes. Therefore, policies 
aimed at reducing disaster risk can limit displacement. 
DRR policies commonly include structural measures to 
protect people and assets (such as dykes and sea walls) and 
land-use planning and relocation policies to limit exposure 
to hazards. People displaced by disaster often end up in 
hazardous urban areas where housing fails to comply 
with planning and building regulations, and basic services 
are lacking or provided irregularly (UN-Habitat, 2015; 
Wilkinson et al., 2016b). This increases the challenge for 
DRR. While measures to strengthen resilience and adaptive 
capacity will be confronted with further difficulties in 
assessing the level of disaster risk (vulnerability or risk 
assessments usually being the starting point for identifying 
suitable policies), and in providing effective early warnings 
of climate hazards and related health risks. 
Pushing up levels of risk
New arrivals are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change impacts for a number of reasons, including the 
fact that they are less connected to support networks and 
services than established city dwellers. In addition, the UK 
Government Foresight Report found that those migrating 
in ‘illegal, irregular, unsafe, exploited or unplanned ways’ 
are more likely to find themselves migrating to areas 
of high environmental risk, such as low-lying areas in 
mega-deltas or slums in water insecure, expanding cities 
(Government Office for Science, 2011: 104). They also 
come from other environmental, social and cultural 
settings and therefore, may be unfamiliar with how to 
respond to the unfamiliar climate extremes. For example, 
new arrivals in Indian cities were less experienced in 
responding to heatwaves and were among those most 
affected by the high temperatures of 45-48°C across cities 
and towns in the region in May 2015 (Burke, 2015). 
Similarly, those left behind in places where outgoing 
migration is high may become even more vulnerable to 
climate change. In Bangladesh, coastal farming is being 
increasingly affected by sea-level rise and storm surges 
introducing saline water. The high levels of migration 
to urban areas as a result of this, is having a negative 
economic and social impact on those left behind, 
particularly women and children who are less able to 
manage the farming activities and deal with floods and 
other extreme events (Lazar et al., 2015).
Difficulties understanding risk
Risk assessments form the basis of national-level policies 
and plans designed to manage disaster risk and adapt to 
climate change. However, these are usually a snapshot of 
circumstances at a given time to identify where people 
are living in relation to hazards and their vulnerability or 
sensitivity to these – they do not reflect the dynamic nature 
of vulnerability and exposure. 
Risk assessments rarely take into account migration 
patterns and fluctuation in demographics and any 
migration will affect the level of risk. There is some 
evidence that people who cope well with changes in 
climate are less likely to migrate (Koubi et al., 2016). Yet 
those who decide to migrate often do so because their 
livelihoods become unsustainable (Koubi et al., 2016). 
Farming practices in semi-arid areas, for example, are 
becoming less and less viable as drought periods lengthen. 
Understanding why people migrate – in any given context 
– is key to understanding the level of risk.
It is difficult to untangle the causes of migration because 
the relationship between vulnerability to climate change 
and migration is circular. People displaced by an extreme 
event will often return home (Oxfam International, 2016), 
but this may change in the future as climate extremes 
become more frequent (Field et al., 2012), while this 
movement and loss of assets will make people more 
vulnerable to future climate change impacts. 
Furthermore, like risk assessments, early warning 
systems for climate extremes are commonly based on past 
data of the types of hazards that occur and the population 
that might be affected. Migration can create new risks 
with people inhabiting hazard-prone and previously 
uninhabited areas, without drainage or sanitary services 
causing secondary health risks when there is heavy rainfall 
and drains are blocked and floodwater contaminated. 
The effectiveness of early warning systems for floods and 
related health risks will be severely affected by changes 
in population and by the likelihood of migrants not 
understanding the warnings and/or knowing how to 
respond.
Box 3: Taking account of internal climate-induced migration in Tanzania
Tanzanian authorities have not, as yet, recognised migration as an adaptation response to climate change. 
The only official document that explicitly takes into account migration in the context of climate change is the 
National Adaptation Program of Action (URT, 2007). Migration is also viewed as a vulnerability, and not a 
potential adaptation activity. The Program of Action further stipulates relocation of vulnerable communities, in 
principle from coastal areas subject to sea-level rise, emphasising again the forced and not voluntary dimension of 
migration.
Tanzanians are already migrating as a response to climate change. Policy-makers need to integrate this reality 
into official climate strategy to better facilitate the movement of people. Furthermore, climate-related strategic 
interventions, as exposed in the Climate Change Strategy (URT, 2013) should, where relevant, take into account 
the migration perspective, including the upgrading of unplanned settlements and peri-urban areas. Employment-
related solutions are also needed for integration of migrants into the local labour markets. The current Five Year 
Development Plan, which is focused on industrialisation, is a good starting point for this integration.
Despite extensive work on planning a climate strategy, the Tanzanian government has been less effective in its 
implementation (Daly, Yanda and West, 2015). These commitments need to be binding and further international 
financial assistance will be important to achieving this.
Box 4: Taking account of internal climate-induced migration in Kenya
Unlike other countries facing climate-change related risks, Kenya has recognised migration as a coping strategy. 
Several official documents, including the National Climate Change Response Strategy (Republic of Kenya, 2010), 
National Environmental Policy (Republic of Kenya, 2013a) and National Climate Change Action Plan 2013-2017 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013b), refer to rural-urban migration as a response to deterioration of rural livelihoods due 
to environmental change, emphasising the challenges this might present for those left behind.
Some policies have been put in place to address disaster-related displacement and planned relocation (Republic 
of Kenya, 2012), including a special Resettlement Policy Framework (Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Fisheries, 2016). The government considers voluntary and forced climate-induced migration as 
issues to be addressed in adaptation strategies rather than as separate problems requiring their own set of policies. 
The government acknowledges the need to understand these coping mechanisms and to identify alternatives to 
allow people to remain in their communities (Republic of Kenya, 2013b). 
Kenya now needs to make these commitments binding. The recently signed Climate Change Act (Republic of 
Kenya, 2016), the first such legal framework in East Africa, although not referring to migration directly, could be 
a first step in this direction. Kenya’s participation in the EU-funded project ‘Migration, Environment, and Climate 
Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP)’, is another encouraging sign of commitment to this issue.
Recognising migration as an adaptation strategy
Migration is not necessarily a last resort for people 
confronting environmental change and can be a powerful 
adaptation strategy (IOM, 2016). Yet facilitating migration 
when people decide to move voluntarily to seek more 
resilient livelihoods will require recognition of the 
challenges posed by migration and better infrastructure 
planning. Decision-makers will need to consider whether 
adaptation policy should help people become more 
resilient in a given location, or help people in leaving. For 
example, smallholders in fragile environments, for whom 
agriculture is already a tremendous challenge, will find it 
even more difficult to have a decent harvest in the future. 
The question is then whether investments in irrigation, 
more tolerant crop varieties and alternative crops are 
required, or whether these investments will only increase 
vulnerability over the long term. If these new crop varieties 
fail to produce or sell, people may become worse off and 
indebted if they have taken out loans to purchase new 
seeds or technologies. In these cases, support to migrate 
could be more effective.
Target 13.2: Integrate climate change measures into 
national policies, strategies and planning 
For many years, the international climate change 
community has been arguing for national development 
plans to incorporate climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. Countries can only hope to reduce the 
impact of climate change on development by considering 
climate change impacts in policies, strategies and plans. 
Development plans and investments that do not take 
into account migration as an impact of climate change 
are likely to cost more, be less effective, and potentially 
increase people’s vulnerability to climate change. Local 
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development plans, in particular, will need to take into 
account how people move in response to climate change 
– whether this is permanent, temporary or seasonal – and 
how these patterns might change in the future (see Box 3 
and 4). 
Adaptation undermined by rural abandonment
Not taking into account rural-to-urban migration 
patterns in the future could result in incomplee adaptation 
plans, which fail to protect important economic sectors 
from climate change impacts. Agricultural policies that 
incorporate projections of warmer weather in the future, 
will be ineffective if people end up moving out, resulting 
in a loss of both resources and skills. An example of this 
can be seen in Rwanda, where a team of researchers are 
working with the agricultural ministry to incorporate 
climate information into existing plans to expand the 
coffee and tea sectors (CDKN, 2014). The economic 
development of the country is linked to these exports but 
both tea and coffee will be heavily affected by climate 
change in the future. With the increase in temperatures 
projected over the next few decades, the low-lying areas 
of current production of tea (around 1700 metres) will 
become less suitable for optimal production of high quality 
tea (CDKN, 2014). Adaptation plans consider climate 
change scenarios and direct impacts on crop yields, but 
not the indirect impacts of the decisions of farmers if they 
were to relocate to urban areas. Lack of adequate drinking 
water during dry periods, flash floods and landslides will 
affect all communities living in these areas – not just those 
working in coffee and tea plantations, and many may 
choose to migrate to cities where there are more stable 
sources of income. If adaptation plans do not address the 
multi-dimensional vulnerability of those living in rural 
areas – not just those of a particular farming activity 
– investments to adapt these farming practices may be 
wasted. 
Failure to meet targets for GHG emissions
Migration, particularly large flows of migrants driven 
out of areas affected by disasters and conflict, could have 
an impact on GHG reduction targets outlined in country 
NDCs, although how significant this will be remains 
unclear. Rural-to-urban migration leads to higher incomes 
and greater CO2 emissions, as seen in China (Ru et al., 
2015). Urban low-carbon development plans will need 
to include population projections to ensure that GHG 
reduction targets can be met as the urban population 
expands. New residents will also put pressure on services, 
particularly transportation and energy: there may be a 
growth of vehicles transporting people from city centres 
to sub-urban areas, as well as greater demands for goods 
and services, all of which result in increased energy 
2. The GCF is one of several funds operated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
consumption. Planning for low-income settlements should 
include measures to increase use of LPG gas rather than 
fuelwood.
Target 13.3: Improve education, awareness-raising 
and human and institutional capacity on climate 
change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and 
early warning 
Skills and knowledge, whether traditional or learned, 
are crucial in helping people adapt to climate change 
and cope with natural hazard impacts (Agrawal, 1995). 
However, migrants arriving in a new location may not 
have appropriate skills or understand their new contexts 
sufficiently to be able to overcome unfamiliar challenges.
Education and awareness-raising must ensure that 
those new to an area gain the knowledge necessary to 
thrive. This may mean providing education in additional 
languages or with different, more culturally appropriate 
messages. This will include providing information to 
‘invisible’, undocumented people whose children may not 
be able to attend school, so that they too are aware of the 
risks to which they might be exposed, and what they can 
do to reduce their vulnerability. Spurring cultural change 
is necessary in some situations. For example, in Pakistan, 
women often cannot leave the home without a male 
relative – even in a flood (Drolet et al., 2015). In order to 
save lives, policy-makers will need to address these cultural 
barriers directly. 
Targets 13a and 13b on means of implementation 
(finance and institutional capacity)
Financial support for climate-induced migration
The direct implications of climate-induced migration for 
climate finance are unclear and identifying appropriate 
measures to be funded by the Green Climate Fund (GCF)2  
will be made more difficult by changes in population and 
energy use. Ideally, UNFCCC-related funds could be used 
to support climate-induced migration, helping people to 
move when they choose to do so, to help people adapt 
in destinations, and to ensure that costs of low-carbon 
development associated with new arrivals would be 
covered. 
Funding is a crucial trigger for action, but sometimes 
measures are taken with incomplete knowledge. It is 
important to consider whether DRR and adaptation 
investments are actually limiting mobility and promoting 
activities that prevent resilience to climate change in the 
future – something that is referred to as ‘maladaptation’. 
Capacity challenges in SIDS
In some contexts, capacities to respond to climate 
change will need to be higher – in particular, in LDCs 
and SIDS. Many factors make it difficult for people to 
migrate. However, there are also a large number of people 
considered to be ‘trapped’ – unable to migrate due to a 
lack of resources even when they would like to leave (Black 
and Collyer, 2014). In some SIDS, migration away from 
coastal areas will be essential and some islands will have to 
be abandoned entirely due to sea-level rise. This migration 
needs to be facilitated by governments in places of origin 
and destination, and will likely involve planned relocation 
(see Box 6).
Forced migration will require internationally agreed 
solutions and institutional arrangements to support those 
needing to move. The Loss and Damage Mechanism, under 
the UNFCCC, is expected to do this, potentially including 
a means to compensate countries for climate change 
impacts. Yet agreement on how this will work remains in 
the distant future. Beyond simply ensuring that people are 
free to move, action needs to be taken before we reach 
the point of no return: people should be helped before 
they have depleted all of their capital, health and mental 
wellbeing.
Box 6: Avoiding the worst impacts of climate 
change: planned resettlement in the Maldives
After the 2004 tsunami in the Maldives, a 
government programme was put in place to move 
communities from smaller islands to larger ones. 
A total of 20,000 people were evacuated to other 
islands after the tsunami, and half returned to 
their homes a few weeks later. Many remained 
displaced because of the damage to the island. 
The government designed three types of durable 
solutions for those affected:
1. Rebuilding houses and facilitating return but in 
safer locations, where possible
2. Building houses on islands where people were 
temporarily displaced, and facilitating integration
3. Where returns and resettlement were not 
possible, building new villages and infrastructure 
on uninhabited islands.
Source: Duvat and Magnan, 2014.
Box 5: Funding to support climate-induced migration
To-date, programmes financed by climate funds rarely address aspects of voluntary and forced climate-induced 
migration (IOM, 2016). The V20 Group, which brings together finance ministers to mobilise and stimulate climate 
funding, has identified migration as critical area of action. This is a promising step for allocating funds to address 
climate-induced migration in V20 countries. In addition, a number of countries – Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
the Maldives, Mali, Nepal and Peru – have applied to the IOM Development Fund (2001) to launch pilot projects 
that integrate migration and responses to climate change.
Migrants themselves offer a source of funding for adaptation activities though remittances. Asian countries have 
received high levels of remittances and in Nepal, which is particularly vulnerable to climate change, remittances 
accounted for 29% of GDP between 2013-2014. Around the world, remittances are used for basic needs, such as 
food, housing and healthcare, and are invested in assets (De Haan 2000; Banerjee, 2016). However, it is unclear 
to what extent these remittances are invested in measures that build resilience and adaptive capacity (Banerjee, 
2016). The Nepalese Government has emphasised the role that governments and local authorities should play in 
supporting these transfers and in offering options for them to be used in concrete adaptation investment (IOM, 
2016).
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5 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Building ‘resilience for all’ is akin to leaving no one behind. 
It will help to reduce the number of people displaced by 
disasters or forced to leave as a result of deteriorating 
environmental conditions and support those that do so 
in maximising opportunities and limiting the creation 
of new risks. For national policymakers, this means that 
adaptation policies should include awareness raising, 
capacity building and education on climate change to 
ensure that people understand the risks they face and 
the impacts that their behaviour might have on the 
environment, wherever they live. 
National governments will need to negotiate durable 
solutions on resettlement and local integration to 
address the needs of those permanently forced out due to 
irreversible environmental change, including from some 
SIDS (Wilkinson et al., 2016c). International agreement 
around a Loss and Damage Mechanism is making slow 
progress, but will most likely focus on forced migration 
and displacement, where the climate change drivers are 
clear. 
The following conclusions on implementing SDG13 
are drawn from the research and evidence presented in 
this brief. Based on these conclusions, we make further 
recommendations aimed at national and local governments 
in climate vulnerable countries for future policy 
consideration.
Conclusion 1: Forced climate-induced migration and 
displacement can lead to further risk accumulation 
in cities.
Investments in building resilience and adaptive capacity 
could help reduce displacement and forced migration, 
limiting the impacts of environmental change, where 
it is not an existential threat. Displaced populations in 
particular often end up living in hazardous urban areas 
and their unfamiliarity with climate risks in these places 
makes them particularly vulnerable. At the same time, 
migrants often take crucial resources, skills and knowledge 
with them, leaving communities behind with insufficient 
capacity to respond to climate change impacts in those 
places. Investment in DRR and adaptation can help to 
reduce migration and the associated ‘risks’ by tackling the 
causes.
Recommendations:
 • Diversify livelihoods in places that are likely to be most 
affected by climate change. People affected by climate 
change will seek to diversify their livelihoods and 
rely on remittances from relatives elsewhere to cope 
with seasonal variation, extreme events and longer-
term trends. Adaptation policies can ensure income 
diversification into less climate vulnerable sectors.
 • Promote livelihood options that are less risky. Measures 
to strengthen resilience need to go beyond helping 
people adapt within their current livelihood activities. 
These measures need to enable livelihood options 
that are less risky. This might include a switch to 
predominantly off-farm activities, and ensuring that 
people living in rural areas are better linked up to 
markets.
Conclusion 2: Climate policies do not take future 
migration into account because the timing of forced 
migration and displacement is unpredictable. 
In some places, solutions are needed for whole 
communities forced from their habitats. The most extreme 
example is in SIDS, where residents of some islands will 
simply no longer have any land to live on, and will be 
forced to move. Unplanned, forced migration for which 
governments and destination locations are not prepared, 
will create problems for national and local governments 
that could result in humanitarian crises. With greater 
foresight and preparedness planning, significant financial 
and human costs could be avoided.
Recommendations:
 • Ensure DRR and adaptation measures are flexible and 
take into account how movement of people – whether 
planned or voluntary – could affect these measures. 
Consider how disaster response measures and provisions 
can quickly expand in scope and reach to include 
new arrivals with different cultural backgrounds. 
Ensure adaptation and DRR strategies can incorporate 
undocumented migrants – i.e. not just those on an 
electoral or housing register.
 • Policy-makers and planners to consider projections 
of future climate conditions and migration trends. 
Projections of migration patterns and population 
changes can be generated through models by looking 
at potential climate change impacts with and without 
adaptation investments. This would provide a more 
compelling case for investing in adaptation.
 • Data gaps still exist, in particular on forced migration 
related to slow-onset changes in the environment, the 
role of remittances and the demographic dynamics 
of migrants. Data collection needs to be enhanced 
alongside improved understanding of these phenomena, 
to allow better planning for these changes.
Conclusion 3: Voluntary climate-induced migration 
can be supported and planned for as an adaption 
strategy. 
For some people, migration is an adaptation strategy, 
helping families to diversify their incomes and reduce their 
vulnerability to climate change impacts. In the context of 
some SIDS, the ability to move is existential and greater 
support to facilitate these individuals and families’ decision 
to move is important.
Recommendations:
 • Funding should aim to avoid vulnerability traps 
where climate change impacts deplete people’s assets 
to the extent that they cannot afford to move. Better 
consideration of migration as a response to climate 
change – both extreme and slow-onset changes – and 
better financial planning is required to divert funds from 
adaptation to addressing a migration crisis.
 • Consider whether development investments are making 
mobility more difficult and potentially leading to 
maladaptation. Measures specifically designed to keep 
people in place must also consider the consequences 
if they fail. For example, facilitating people’s access to 
off-farm labour opportunities now may make them less 
dependent on failing agriculture in the future.
 • Policies and funding is needed to support resettlement 
and integration of migrants into DRR systems so 
they are informed about the hazards, and can avoid 
behaviour that might even introduce new hazards or 
settling in places that actually increase their exposure.
Relevant SDG Targets
13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impacts    
13.1: Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-
related hazards and natural disasters in all countries
13.2: Integrate climate change measures into national 
policies, strategies and planning
13.3: Improve education, awareness-raising and human 
and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, 
adaptation, impact reduction and early warning
13.a: Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-
country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 
billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the 
needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful 
mitigation actions and transparency on implementation 
and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its 
capitalization as soon as possible
13.b: Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective 
climate change-related planning and management in 
least developed countries and small island developing 
States, including focusing on women, youth and local and 
marginalized communities
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•  Ensuring migrants have access to appropriate and secure legal status can help achieve 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies.
•  If granted, permanent residency and/or citizenship can help foster integration. If access is denied, 
it can lead to tensions between migrants and host communities, further marginalise migrants, and 
hinder progress towards SDG 16.7.
•  Numerous barriers prevent long-term migrants from accessing permanent residency and/or 
citizenship, including political feasibility, racial, religious and gender bars, stringent language tests, 
and high costs. These barriers should be removed, or made more flexible.
•  Second-generation migrants are particularly affected because they are often excluded from full 
membership of the communities they have lived in all their lives. States should explore granting full 
citizenship at birth, or soon after.
Key 
messages
Citizenship, migration 
and the 2030 Agenda for 
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Katy Long, Elisa Mosler Vidal, Amelia Kuch and Jessica Hagen-Zanker
SDGs covered    1: No poverty 
3: Good health and well-being 
4: Quality education 
11: Sustainable cities and communities  
16: Peace, justice and strong institutions
1 Introduction 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls on states to 
‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all, and build 
effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels’. This briefing considers how ensuring migrants have 
fair access to appropriate and secure legal status, through 
permanent residency and/or citizenship, can help achieve 
this Goal.  
Granting permanent residency and/or citizenship 
to migrants can help foster integration and promote 
‘peaceful and inclusive societies’. If such integration is not 
fostered, it can lead to tensions between migrant and host 
communities. We argue that the links between migration 
and specific Targets should be considered; specifically, 16.3 
on the rule of law and access to justice, 16.4 on organised 
crime, 16.5 on corruption and bribery, 16.7 on responsive, 
inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making, 
and 16.9 on legal identity. Ignoring these linkages will 
jeopardise the achievement of these Targets. 
This briefing begins by defining key concepts. Section 3 
outlines the evidence linking citizenship and integration. 
Section 4 shows common requirements for, and barriers to, 
accessing citizenship. Section 5 considers the implications 
of not giving migrants access to permanent residency and/
or citizenship – the potential for tensions and conflict. 
Section 6 draws out implications for the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), specifically 
the specific Targets included in Goal 16. The final section 
concludes and draws out specific policy recommendations.
2 Defining key concepts
Citizenship is broadly defined as membership of a self-
governing political community, bringing with it rights 
and obligations for both the citizen and their community 
(Stanford, 2017). Citizenship, permanent residency and 
other forms of legal status are usually considered to 
encompass a formal legal relationship with a state. Yet 
citizenship also connects to wider ideas about belonging 
to, and participating in, more local forms of community 
(see Holston and Appadurai, 1996). Importantly, although 
citizenship status is primarily acquired through birth, 
nearly all states also recognise the idea that citizenship rests 
on consent, so that it is possible for newcomers to become 
citizens in their host community by mutual agreement.1 
Citizenship is not the only form of secure legal status 
available to migrants. In many countries, migrants are 
able to apply for permanent residency (sometimes called 
1. The idea of mutual consent may also be used to justify the deprivation of citizenship by the state. Although the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness prohibits deprivation of nationality if it would lead to statelessness, in recent years countries including the United Kingdom (UK) have 
enacted and used provisions which allow them to denationalise dual nationals (mostly in terror cases) (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 1961: 
Article 8; Travis, 2017).
‘indefinite leave to remain’) without having to take on all 
the obligations – or be granted all the rights – associated 
with citizenship (for example, permanent residents may not 
be required to complete military service, and are usually 
not permitted to vote). This is often required as an interim 
stage before full citizenship, marking an incremental 
expansion of migrants’ rights over time. 
Broader than formal citizenship or other forms of 
legal status is the concept of integration. In this paper, 
integration is understood as a two-way, long-term 
incremental process that goes beyond fostering simple 
tolerance and absence of conflict (between different groups 
of people in social, economic and political spheres). It 
involves the active mixing of people who hold different 
identities, helping to foster shared collective values and 
practices of ‘belonging’ (Ager and Strang, 2008). Some 
analysts prefer to use the term ‘inclusion’ to underline 
that this idea of belonging does not rest upon ‘one-
way assimilation’ (Rudiger and Spencer, 2003). In this 
paper, the terms integration and inclusion will be used 
interchangeably. 
Host states do not expect all migrants to integrate (see 
Ruhs, 2013). Similarly, migrants’ interests in and need 
to ‘belong’ to the host community vary substantially 
depending on the purpose of their migration, which 
itself may change over time. At one end of the spectrum, 
seasonal workers are generally expected to stay in a 
fixed location and have minimal engagement with local 
community. At the other extreme, migrants who arrive 
through family channels are normally presumed to be 
settling permanently in their country of arrival. 
Most labour and student migrants can be considered 
a middle group. On the one hand, very few are admitted 
with permanent rights to stay in a country of destination, 
and many are only allowed to stay temporarily while 
they complete a course of study or work for a particular 
company.  On the other hand, many workers and students 
may find themselves settling in a destination country 
indefinitely, either by initial design, or because their plans 
change. 
Finally, there are second-generation migrants, who are 
born in a host country to immigrant parents (or arrive as 
small children), and may never have lived in their ‘home’ 
state. While a few states (the United States (US), Canada) 
still offer unconditional jus soli/ birthright citizenship to 
those born on their territory, most countries restrict access 
to citizenship based on the parent’s legal status or length of 
residency. 
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3 Links between citizenship and integration
Many argue that citizenship should not be viewed as an 
end in itself but as a crucial means to secure full inclusion 
and integration in a community (Massey and Bartley, 
2005; Portes et al., 2009). Citizenship is often presented 
as the end-point of this process, as a reward for successful 
integration and confirmation of the host community’s 
willingness to accept a new member. Those without such 
status may be prevented from accessing education and 
health services, jobs and welfare benefits (Spencer, 2006). 
These are widely recognised as critical factors for migrants’ 
inclusion (UK Home Office, 2004).
Evidence shows the positive effect naturalisation has 
on the labour market, with migrants’ gaining greater 
employability and higher wages after naturalisation 
(Peters and Vink, 2016; Bauböck et al., 2013). This 
is partly because the new status removes restrictions 
on public-sector and other jobs, and partly because a 
naturalised migrant is perceived as less risky to hire. 
In Germany, a study found that immigrant women 
experienced higher wages and improved labour-market 
outcomes after naturalisation, mainly because they were 
able to switch to jobs with permanent contracts and in 
larger firms (Gathmann and Keller, 2014). These effects 
are important for integration prospects; labour-market 
integration enables greater economic and social inclusion, 
through improved access to decent accommodation and 
healthcare (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)/European Union (EU), 2015). 
While labour-market outcomes are important markers 
of migrants’ integration, they are only one aspect of it. 
There is also evidence of a positive relationship between 
naturalisation and political integration. For example, 
a study across 19 European countries showed that 
citizenship acquisition increased political participation, 
especially for migrants who grew up in non-democratic 
settings (Just and Anderson, 2012). In Switzerland, 
naturalisation improved political integration as immigrants 
attained higher levels of political knowledge (Hainmueller 
et al., 2015). 
4 Citizenship requirements and barriers
A migrant may be able to acquire citizenship through 
registration,2 naturalisation3 or investment. There is a 
general consensus that it is reasonable a migrant should 
demonstrate a genuine connection with the community 
they hope to join when applying for permanent residency 
and/or citizenship. Most states require applicants to 
demonstrate a period of residency, basic linguistic and 
2. Citizenship by registration can be claimed if a migrant meets criteria that tend to be linked to pre-existing connections between a state and the applicant. 
It is particularly relevant when dealing with diaspora (re)migration, and migration as a result of marriage.
3. Only a very few states, including Myanmar and Lebanon, have a total or near-total bar on naturalisation. However, in practice many countries make 
naturalisation difficult for long-term migrants, through a combination of stringent criteria, high fees and arbitrary administrative procedures.
cultural knowledge, and that they are of good character. 
Many states also charge fees.  
Some states run ‘citizenship by investment’ programmes, 
which allow for citizenship (or, more often, permanent 
residency) to be fast-tracked or acquired outright in 
exchange for a financial investment. Such programmes 
– especially in less-developed countries like Antigua, the 
Comoros or the Dominican Republic – are often claimed to 
have an explicit ‘development’ objective, bringing income 
into the state.  Yet pursuing development though the sale 
of citizenship raises difficult questions about the nature of 
sustainable development, inclusion and belonging. 
Traditionally, citizenship was viewed as a unitary 
status, so that acquiring a new citizenship required the 
relinquishing of a previous one. However, as the number of 
international migrants and their descendants has increased, 
so too have the number of dual nationals, or people 
formally recognised as holding two or more citizenships. 
Some states, such as the Netherlands and India, do not 
recognise dual nationality, and require migrants who 
naturalise to give up the citizenship of their country of 
origin. Others have introduced new provisions to allow 
diaspora members to keep or reclaim citizenship. These 
policies are explicitly intended to encourage greater 
economic, cultural and social links between diaspora 
communities and origin countries by facilitating easier 
mobility and a sense of continued belonging (Faist and 
Kivisto, 2007). 
The rest of this section discusses barriers to permanent 
residency and/or citizenship faced by migrants in host 
communities, and potential policy solutions.
4.1 Political feasibility
Human-rights advocates argue that long-term migrants, 
once admitted legally, should not be denied the right to 
secure legal status and citizenship over time. However, in 
many states, granting citizenship to migrants is politically 
contentious. This is especially true if there are large 
numbers of migrants who are eligible to naturalise, as this 
may stoke fears that social identity and cohesion could 
be lost. ‘Demographic bomb’ narratives are the core of 
a number of political debates, including fears expressed 
about Palestinian Israelis, Roma in Slovakia and Latinos in 
the US.
In some cases, such concerns arise because migrants 
were not originally expected to remain permanently in 
the host country when they were admitted. It took several 
decades for Germany, for instance, to recognise that 
Turkish guest workers and their German-born children 
were not likely to return home. In the United Kingdom 
(UK), British citizenship and rights of residency were 
increasingly restricted after large numbers of migrants 
from the former British Empire arrived between the 1950s 
and the 1970s (Weil, 2001).  
This problem is compounded where a state understands 
membership in explicitly ethnic or indigenous terms. In 
these situations, such as in many Gulf States, collective 
national identity requires citizenship to be strictly 
restricted. Some states have taken involved measures to 
protect this ‘national’ ideal. For instance, in 2014 Kuwait 
attempted to buy Comoros passports for stateless Bedouin 
groups in its territory, in order to avoid having to recognise 
them as Kuwaiti citizens (Abrahamian, 2015; Mansour-Ille 
2016). 
Granting citizenship to migrants may also prove 
politically complex in cases where a migrant group is 
associated with historic oppression. Latvians’ reluctance 
to recognise Russian-speakers as citizens, for instance, 
stems from the Soviet Union’s long occupation of the 
country (Weil, 2001). In other cases, granting citizenship 
to a particular group of migrants may be feared because of 
divisions within multinational states and concerns that new 
citizens may shift political power or encourage separatism. 
Kenyan reluctance to offer Somali migrants and refugees 
citizenship can be explained in part by the state’s difficult 
relationship with the Kenyan Somali community (Manby, 
2016).
In the case of mass influx of refugees, the politics of 
granting citizenship is still more complex. Host states 
did not choose to admit these arrivals, and do so as a 
humanitarian duty. Offering hundreds of thousands of 
refugees citizenship en masse is usually politically fraught, 
especially in states like Lebanon where inter-community 
politics are already extremely fragile and demographic 
shifts could incite serious violence.  
4.2 Legal status
The ability to apply for permanent residency or citizenship 
is universally premised on having arrived as a legal migrant 
and remained in the country as such. For millions of 
migrants who do not hold, or cannot prove, legal status, 
this can create an insurmountable obstacle. 
While this group includes irregular migrants, it is not 
limited to them. Migrants who have travelled to live and 
work in countries where there are reciprocal rights of 
free movement, for instance, may not always have the 
paperwork to prove their right to residency or citizenship. 
This has recently become an issue for EU citizens in the 
UK in the wake of Brexit (Box 3), but has also caused 
difficulties in the past for citizens moving in the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region  
(Box 1).  
4.3 Racial, religious and gender bars
In some cases, constitutional bars prevent migrants who 
do not belong to a specified racial or religious group 
from becoming citizens of the country in which they have 
settled. The Liberian constitution, for instance, specifies 
that all applicants for citizenship must be ‘negro or of 
negro descent’, effectively barring non-black residents from 
acquiring citizenship. This excludes Liberia’s Lebanese 
population, who have been settled in the state since the 
1960s.
In 2003, Israel passed a Citizenship and Entry law 
that restricted access to citizenship (and residency) for 
all Palestinians with a West Bank or Gaza identity card, 
including those with an Israeli spouse. In 2007 the 
provisions were expanded to apply to non-Jewish citizens 
of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria marrying Israeli Jews 
(Amnesty International, 2017). Similarly many Gulf 
countries make it difficult for non-Muslims to acquire 
citizenship, and by law Saudi Arabia requires all citizens to 
be Muslim (US State Department, 2005).
Gender discrimination can intersect with migration 
to create barriers to citizenship, particularly for the 
children of mixed citizen-migrant marriages. In 2014, 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) launched the #IBelong campaign, advocating 
for the removal of gender discrimination in in 27 states 
where nationality laws currently prevent women married 
to foreigners from passing on their citizenship to their 
children. In 2017, Madagascar became the first country on 
the list to amend its nationality law (UNHCR, 2017). 
Box 1: Reciprocal rights in ECOWAS 
Many regional trade blocs offer citizens of member 
countries reciprocal rights to live, work and study 
across a region. Although regional or supranational 
citizenship is a relatively new concept (most fully 
developed in the setting of the EU) a number of 
emerging regional citizenship groups are emerging 
(Long, 2015). 
ECOWAS was founded in 1975. In 1979 the 
Community adopted a Free Movement Protocol 
giving all citizens of member states the right to 
enter, reside and work across the community. 
The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol still faces 
many challenges. Immigration officials in member 
states are sometimes unaware (or unwilling to 
recognise) that ECOWAS nationals holding valid 
documents can enter their country freely. And 
ECOWAS rights are not equivalent to national 
membership. For example, in 2002 questions 
regarding national citizenship (and the refusal to 
offer this to the descendent of migrants from other 
West African states) played a role in precipitating 
civil war in the Cote d’Ivoire. 
Nevertheless, ECOWAS offers a possible model 
for balancing the needs of migrants for reciprocal 
rights to foster peaceful and inclusive societies, with 
concerns about protecting national identities (see 
Manby, 2015). 
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4.4 Excessive residency requirements
Some states require migrants to prove extremely long-term 
residency in order to qualify for citizenship. In the Central 
African Republic, for instance, applicants may be required 
to show as many as 35 years (Manby, 2016). Bureaucratic 
delays and quotas can also hamper applications in 
developed states, sometimes exacerbating ethnic and racial 
disparities in access. 
Laws may explicitly seek to prevent migrants who 
arrived as refugees from naturalising, particularly in cases 
of mass influx of refugees. In Uganda, for instance, the 
government has repeatedly resisted attempts by long-
term refugees to naturalise. A 2015 High Court decision 
determined that refugees could not be barred from 
applying for naturalisation, but refugee advocate groups 
complain that in practice, administrators refuse to provide 
refugees with the necessary forms (International Refugee 
Rights Initiative (IRRI), 2016). Tanzania, on the other 
hand, is an example of a country that has given citizenship 
for long-term refugees on a large scale (Box 2). 
4.5 Stringent language and citizenship tests
Many locals feel permanent residents and new citizens 
should speak some form of lingua franca. However, 
some states insist that migrants applying for citizenship 
must pass complex language exams that go beyond the 
skills needed for everyday communication. For instance, 
Botswana requires knowledge of Setswana or another 
language spoken by a ‘tribal’ community (Manby, 2016). 
A number of countries – mostly developed states – also 
require applicants to pass a citizenship exam. Some of 
these exams have been deliberately designed to be difficult 
for immigrants to pass, with questions on trivia that are 
irrelevant to migrants’ everyday inclusion. The Danish 
citizenship test, for instance, was revised in 2016, as part 
of a raft of measures intended to cut immigration after 
a surge of support for anti-immigrant political parties 
(Delman, 2016). It includes questions such as ‘Which 
Danish restaurant gained a third Michelin star in February 
2016?’. 
4.6 High costs
The monetary cost of applying for citizenship varies 
considerably. In Japan, although cultural requirements 
are strictly enforced, the naturalisation process is free. 
However, Kenya levies a fee of KSHS500,000 (US$4,800), 
3.5 times Kenya’s per-capita gross domestic product (GDP). 
The UK has also been criticised for disproportionately 
high citizenship fees (Economist 2017). One consequence 
of such high costs is that permanent residency and 
citizenship become unaffordable ‘luxuries’ for less wealthy 
migrants; the high cost of US naturalisation (US$680), for 
example, is one reason a number of migrants chose not 
4. This is not to suggest that citizenship is the only factor in fostering integration and inclusion. As a counter-example, despite French citizenship being 
relative easy for immigrants to acquire, and French identity being understood in non-ethnic terms, France has struggled with the marginalisation and 
segregation of migrant and second-generation citizens.
to apply for citizenship even when they can meet other 
criteria (Gonzales-Barera et al., 2013). Unable to afford 
naturalisation, poorer migrants remain on temporary 
visas, without protection against deportation (Taylor et al., 
2012).   
5 Tensions arising from lack of citizenship
When immigration policy changes, prior acquisition of 
permanent residency or citizenship (and even migrant 
parents’ and grandparents’ citizenship) can become an 
essential protection against deportation and discrimination. 
The surge in EU nationals applying for UK citizenship 
post-2015 (see Box 3) and in naturalisation rates in the 
US among eligible Green Card holders since the 2016 
Presidential election, reflect these concerns (Tolan, 2017).
The inability of long-term migrants, including second-
generation ‘migrants’ born in their host country, to acquire 
citizenship in their host community can result in exclusion 
and deprive migrants of fundamental rights, as well as 
contribute to inter-community tensions and conflict. 
The case of Turkish migrants and their descendants in 
Germany, who until the 1990s were unable to become 
citizens under German law and who as a result struggled 
to integrate into German communities, is one well-
known example of barriers to citizenship preventing full 
inclusion.4 
Box 2: Tanzanian citizenship for Burundian 
refugees
In 1972, Tanzania received tens of thousands of 
refugees from Burundi and settled them in three 
rural settlements. Over the years, refugees integrated 
with the host communities and began to contribute 
significantly to the local economy. Today, over 
85% of the inhabitants in these settlements were 
born in Tanzania. Nonetheless, the second and 
third generation of Burundian refugees continue 
to live with refugee status and no prospects for 
naturalisation. 
In 2007, the government of Tanzania, in 
partnership with the government of Burundi and 
UNHCR, designed the Tanzania Comprehensive 
Solutions Strategy. This comprised three key 
elements: voluntary repatriation, application 
for naturalisation, and final local integration 
in Tanzania. To date, 151,019 certificates have 
been distributed to individuals who opted for 
naturalisation, and over 53,000 refugees have 
returned to Burundi (UNHCR, 2014).
In the most extreme cases, violence follows government 
decisions to strip citizenship from the descendants of 
migrants. In 2013, for example, the Dominican Republic’s 
Constitutional Court revoked citizenship for children 
born to foreign parents as far back as 1929, as part of a 
long-running ‘anti-Haitianismo’ political movement in the 
country inspired by racial, linguistic and socio-economic 
prejudice (Hindin and Ariza, 2016). This affected a large 
proportion of the 240,000 Dominicans of Haitian descent 
in the country5 who were left without the right to work, 
services and more. It provoked huge social and political 
disquiet, with large-scale protests in Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic and across the US (Constable, 2015; Semple, 
2013). 
5.1 Political exclusion 
Many migrants have limited political rights in their host 
country: the ability to vote (especially at the national level) 
and to run for office is usually limited to citizens alone. 
One consequence is that migrants – including long-term 
migrants with permanent residency and their families – 
have no right of political participation and very little direct 
political power to influence community decision-making. 
Policies excluding migrants may prove popular with a non-
migrant electorate or avoid close scrutiny, because migrants 
must rely upon proxy representation (for instance, family 
who do hold citizenship) in order to influence the outcome 
of political debate. The relatively progressive nature of 
the US debate on immigration regularisation – where a 
majority of those surveyed continue to favour a pathway 
to citizenship for irregular migrants who meet certain 
criteria – can be partly attributed to the irregular migrants 
who have close friends and family with citizenship, and 
who are an increasingly important political bloc (Branton, 
2007). 
More serious tensions can arise when governments deny 
political rights to individuals who have a long-standing 
claim to that country and/or previously enjoyed these 
rights. This is the case for the long-established Nepali 
community in Bhutan (Box 4), and for approximately 
300,000 ethnic Russians in Latvia, who, despite having 
been born or lived in the country for decades, remain 
non-citizens without political rights. Debate over their 
status is heated. In 2012, 75% of the electorate rejected 
a proposal to recognise Russian as a national language in 
the constitution, even though a third of Latvia’s population 
speak it as their mother tongue (Cianetti, 2014; Schmid, 
2008).
5. Their situation was further complicated as they could not resettle in Haiti; foreign-born individuals are only eligible for Haitian citizenship if one parent is 
a natural-born Haitian citizen.
5.2 Access to justice
Non-citizens can struggle to secure access to justice. 
Although citizens are normally guaranteed legal counsel 
if they are arrested, this right often does not extend to 
non-citizens, particularly those whose status is irregular. 
Australia, for instance, does not guarantee legal counsel 
for anyone detained under the Migration Act (Congress, 
2017). 
Tensions around legal access and due process for non-
citizens are amplified for low-skilled workers. Given that 
many migrants are in low-skilled employment, it makes 
this group particularly vulnerable. This double bar has 
affected low-skilled migrants in some Middle Eastern and 
Asian countries, where alleged violations have led to local 
and national tensions. 
Migrants have also protested against seasonal and 
temporary workers’ programmes that offer no opportunity 
to accumulate a more permanent residency status and that 
can leave workers open to abuse. In 2010, hundreds of 
Guatemalans gathered to protest against abusive working 
conditions of Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker system 
(Market Wire, 2010).   
Box 3: EU citizens in the UK after Brexit
In June 2016 the UK decided to leave the EU, 
resulting in uncertainty for millions of EU citizens 
living in the UK. Key issues at stake include their 
continued right to work, families potentially being 
split up, and access to pensions and healthcare 
(House of Commons, 2017). There are also 1.2 
million UK citizens living in EU countries with 
similar concerns (ibid). 
After Brexit, EU citizens rushed to secure 
their status in the UK; over 90,000 applied for 
a ‘permanent residence’ card in 2016 (Ryan, 
2017) and capacity to handle these was low. It 
was estimated it would take 140 years to process 
applications (Migration Observatory, 2016). At the 
end of 2016, 29% of claims were rejected (Elgot, 
2017). The process was eventually declared ‘not fit 
for purpose’ by a parliamentary committee (House 
of Commons, 2017). 
For many EU citizens who have established their 
lives – legally studying, working, paying taxes and 
starting families – the continued uncertainty is 
disruptive. Many have voiced anger at being used 
for political bargaining in Brexit negotiations, while 
others have reported anxiety and feeling unwelcome 
in the UK (House of Commons, 2017; O’Carroll, 
2016). 
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5.3 Access to education, healthcare and other 
services6 
Decisions by states to limit entitlements to permanent 
residents and citizens are, in the first instance, relatively 
uncontroversial. However, second-generation migrants 
unable to claim citizenship can be particularly affected 
by limited access to subsidised education or healthcare 
programmes. This issue has been especially prominent 
in the US, where 20 states now allow undocumented 
immigrant students who have graduated from high school 
to benefit from in-state tuition rates (National Conference 
of State Legislatures (NCSL), 2015).
Another group whose exclusion from services can 
be problematic are refugees, and those who arrived 
involuntarily in a state. In developed regions, recognised 
refugees (though not asylum-seekers) are usually provided 
with immediate access to most state services. In contrast, in 
many developing regions states have pursued deliberately 
hostile policies aimed at the long-term exclusion of 
refugees. For instance, Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan 
6. For more information on migration and access to services, see the other briefings in this series: education (Nicolai et al., 2017); health (Tulloch et al., 
2016); and social protection (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017a).
face a number of prohibitions that contribute to economic 
isolation, including no or limited access to the formal 
labour market (Domat, 2016). Support to refugees in 
these contexts is mostly provided through humanitarian 
agencies. Covering vulnerable citizens and non-citizens in 
parallel systems diminishes any social-cohesion effects to 
be gained from joint access (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017b). 
5.4 Lack of integration prospects
A lack of permanent status and/or citizenship can lead 
to general unrest in local communities, and the further 
marginalisation of migrants. In these cases, lack of 
citizenship is rarely an explicit cause of unrest, but rather a 
contributor to migrant-local tensions and failed inclusion. 
Such protests can be migrant-led, such as the violent 
riots in Paris in 2005 (Schneider, 2008). Most common, 
however, are anti-migrant and/or anti-multiculturalist 
protests that are in part motivated by a sense that migrants 
are living separately from local citizens, such as the 
xenophobic riots and attacks in South Africa in 2008 (and 
again in 2015 and 2017) (Mosselson, 2010). 
It is ironic that in some cases the expansion of migrants’ 
rights and/or of host-country citizenship could help address 
local anger at migrants’ perceived segregation. Partly in 
response to such concerns, some local authorities have 
developed local forms of citizenship based on residency 
(see Box 5).
6 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda
SDG 16 promotes ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development’. Migration has played a role in 
making societies more diverse and inclusive, by creating 
opportunities for new social and cultural exchanges 
(Moran, 2011). This in turn can help increase innovation 
and fuel economic growth (Bove and Elia, 2017). However, 
a lack of permanent residency and/or citizenship can 
prevent migrants from becoming full members of society, 
for instance by limiting access to justice and services, and 
can create tension and conflict between migrant groups 
and host communities. Thus, if migration is not framed by 
inclusive citizenship policies, progress towards ‘peaceful 
and inclusive societies’ can be hindered. 
In direct contradiction to SDG 16.3, which calls 
for equal access to justice for all, non-citizens may 
struggle to be accorded equal treatment within the 
justice system, or may be unable to access legal aid to 
assist with representation. Similarly, long-term and/or 
second-generation migrants can be barred from political 
participation, which means decision-making is not 
fully representative at all levels, directly affecting the 
implementation of SDG 16.7 on responsive, inclusive, 
participatory and representative decision-making. Again, 
Box 4: Discriminatory citizenship laws in Bhutan
The experience of ethnic Nepalis in Bhutan shows 
how regressive and discriminatory citizenship laws 
can be used as a pretext to deny human rights, and 
to marginalise and impoverish ethnic minorities, 
decades after any initial migration.  
In 1985, the Bhutanese Citizenship Act created 
an extremely narrow definition of citizenship that 
was deliberately used to exclude ethnic Nepalis 
(some 43% of the population). Authorities went 
even further than the Act stipulated, requiring 
Nepalis to prove residency in 1958 to qualify, 
even when they were already in possession of a 
citizenship card. Any Nepalis who could not do this 
were reclassified as ‘illegal immigrants’ and non-
nationals. 
These revisions led to growing unrest in southern 
Bhutan. By the mid-1990s, at least 106,000 refugees 
had fled to camps in Nepal, where they would spend 
the next 15 years. The ethnic Nepalis who remained 
in Bhutan were subject to frequent harassment, 
discrimination and marginalisation (Hutt, 2003).
In 2007, the US government announced its 
willingness to resettle Bhutanese refugees, with eight 
other resettlement countries joining them. By late 
2015, 100,000 had been resettled (Van Selm, 2013; 
Shrestha, 2015). There are still 10,000-12,000 
refugees in Nepal’s camps hoping for repatriation. 
While mass resettlement has helped the exiled 
Bhutanese, it has done so arguably at the expense of 
their claims to Bhutanese citizenship.
this can lead to disillusionment, frustration and tension 
amongst migrants, with implications for Goal 16 more 
generally.
Permanent residency and naturalisation processes 
are often opaque, bureaucratic and inefficient, making 
it harder for migrants to apply. This gives officials, who 
hold considerable administrative power to approve or 
deny applications, the opportunity to engage in corrupt 
behaviour. It can lead to frustration and disillusionment 
amongst applicants and potential tensions. As such, it 
affects the implementation of SDG 16.5 on reducing 
corruption and bribery, and that of SDG 16.6 on 
developing effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions, as well as the broader goal of ‘peaceful 
societies’.
Ensuring universal coverage of birth registration and 
legal identity in origin and host countries (SDG 16.9) is 
a vital first step in enabling migrants to access services 
and apply for citizenship or residency. Yet, globally only 
two-thirds of births are registered (Mikkelsen et al., 
2015). When migrants lack documentation or are unable 
to access citizenship, residency or legal status more 
generally (e.g. a work permit), they may resort to obtaining 
documents from informal markets (Vasta, 2011). This 
can jeopardise efforts to tackle organised crime, as set out 
in SDG 16.4. In fact, when pathways for legal migration 
become more restrictive, it can deflect migrants towards 
irregularity (Czaika and Hobolth, 2014), which hinders 
their integration into the host country, impeding progress 
towards SDG 16 more generally. Ensuring all migrants 
have access to legal identity documents issued by origin or 
host countries is key to combating trafficking by reducing 
migrants’ vulnerability (SDG 16.2). More broadly, when 
migrants, including second-generation migrants, cannot 
obtain citizenship or residency status, they are more 
vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers.
Citizenship and residency issues affect the 
implementation of a number of other SDG Targets. 
Eligibility to basic services (including health and education) 
and social protection is often tied to citizenship/residency, 
with undocumented migrants rarely eligible. This is often 
an issue for second-generation migrants who, despite 
being born in the country, are unable to gain citizenship 
or a more secure status. This means that progress towards 
the Goals on health, education and social protection 
(Targets 4.1, 4.3, 3.8, 1.3) is hampered. Furthermore, 
when migrants are excluded from accessing fundamental 
services such as health and education, they are prevented 
from becoming full members of society, hindering their 
integration. 
Box 5: Local citizenship initiatives
While most migration policies are set at the 
national level, it is increasingly common for cities 
at the frontline of migration to develop their own 
approaches to integrating people, including through 
processes that draw on the idea of citizenship as jus 
domicil, or ‘citizenship by residency’. In the US, for 
instance, both San Francisco and New York offer 
identity cards to all residents, regardless of legal 
status. Such inclusive practices are closely linked 
to the ‘sanctuary cities’ movement, in which local 
authorities limit their cooperation with federal 
immigration orders (Lee et al., 2017).
In Europe, since 1997 the city of Barcelona has 
been explicit about its ambition to grant equal 
citizenship to all persons based on ‘the acquisition 
of rights instead of the concept of nationality’ 
(Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1997), granting ‘the 
same citizen rights and duties to all persons living in 
Barcelona’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2012). 
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Table 1: Citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels 
Migration can contribute to making host countries more diverse and inclusive 
(Bove and Elia, 2017). 
Lack of citizenship/residency can prevent migrants from being full members of 
society, including access to services, and can lead to tensions and conflict. 
16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and 
torture of children
When migrants, including second-generation migrants, cannot obtain citizenship 
or residency status, they are more vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers.
16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure 
equal access to justice for all 
Non-citizens may struggle to be accorded equal treatment within the justice 
system, or may be unable to access legal aid.
16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen 
the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized 
crime
When permanent residency and/or citizenship cannot be obtained legally, 
migrants may resort to obtaining documents on the black market. There are 
well-recognised links between passport markets and organised crime.
16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms Permanent residency and naturalisation processes are often opaque, 
bureaucratic and inefficient, providing considerable opportunity for officials to 
engage in corrupt behaviour.
16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels As permanent residency and naturalisation processes can be difficult to 
navigate (see SDG 16.5), it is harder for migrants to apply and become full 
members of society.
16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-
making at all levels
When long-term migrants, and subsequent generations, settle permanently 
in large numbers and are barred from political participation as non-citizens, 
decision-making is not fully representative.
16.9: By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration Universal birth registration is a vital first step in ensuring that all children, 
including migrants’ children, are able to lay claim to the citizenships to which 
they are entitled. 
Proof of legal identity is vital to being able to apply for residency/citizenship.
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures 
for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor 
and the vulnerable
Migrants lacking permanent residency and/or citizenship status may not be 
able to access social protection (see Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017a). Furthermore, 
they can be prevented from accessing contributions made due to portability 
constraints (ibid). Tying eligibility for social protection to citizenship/residency 
hampers progress towards this target.
3.8: Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, 
access to quality essential healthcare services and access to safe, effective, 
quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all
Eligibility for health access is often tied to citizenship/residency status, with 
only some countries opening up (emergency) healthcare to all, regardless of 
status (see Tulloch et al., 2016). These eligibility requirements impede progress 
towards this target and full integration of migrants more generally.
4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality 
primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning 
outcomes
Education for migrant children is essential to meet SDG 4.1. Yet, eligibility for 
primary- and secondary-school education can be tied to citizenship/residency 
status, which means that migrant children can be prevented from accessing 
education, particularly those who are undocumented (see Nicolai et al., 2017). 
This often includes second-generation migrants.
Access to education is critical, because it plays an important role in social 
integration and economic mobility (ibid). Participation in education is also key 
to migrant children becoming fluent in the national language – an important 
enabling factor to ensure their integration.
4.3: By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and 
quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university
Access to vocational and tertiary education is often linked to citizenship/
residency status and  fees are sometimes higher for non-nationals. This can be 
especially critical for second-generation migrants. 
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of 
people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed 
migration policies
Planned and well-managed migration must consider pathways to residency and 
citizenship.
7 Conclusions and policy recommendations
This briefing illustrates the numerous ways in which 
migrants’ access to permanent residency and/or citizenship 
can play a vital role in fostering peaceful and inclusive 
societies, as called for in SDG 16.  Migrants who lack 
secure permanent legal status may suffer a deprivation 
of other essential rights including access to justice, basic 
services and work. Opaque and arbitrary naturalisation 
processes – sometimes deliberately intended to exclude 
migrants – may contribute to official corruption and 
bribery.  Migrants’ lack of access to permanent residency 
and/or citizenship status can cement their political 
exclusion, resulting in their marginalisation. In the long 
term, discriminatory policies can foster civil unrest 
and even contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict, 
especially when they exclude second and subsequent 
generations of settled migrants.
In light of these findings, this briefing makes the 
following recommendations for national and local 
governments in host and origin countries, international 
institutions and civil-society organisations in order to make 
progress towards SDG 16.
Conclusion 1a: Giving migrants access to permanent 
residency and/or citizenship can foster peacefulness, 
inclusion and cohesion in host societies.
Conclusion 1b: Numerous barriers prevent long-term 
and second-generation migrants from accessing 
permanent residency and/or citizenship.  
Recommendation: Make pathways to permanent 
residency available to all long-term migrants.
 • Grant, presumptively, permanent residency status to 
all applicants who meet basic criteria (e.g. length of 
residency, proof of good conduct) so that long-term 
migrants are not required to keep renewing short-term 
visas.
 • This should not be contingent on meeting any ethnic, 
religious or other ascripitive criteria.
 • The international community should help countries 
with the highest ratios of migrants to locals –  especially 
forced migrants and refugees –  to find solutions that 
help address the particular burden these influxes can 
pose to social cohesion.
Recommendation: Make pathways to citizenship 
accessible to all long-term migrants who meet certain 
conditions.
 • Host governments, particularly those that require an 
excessively long period, should reduce the number of 
years’ residency required before an application for 
citizenship can be lodged.
 • Remove all categorical bars on citizenship acquisition, 
as these can foster tensions and conflict. Furthermore, 
make language requirements more flexible, particularly 
for older migrants. Remove citizenship tests for migrants 
with limited education, or offer them alternative, non-
written, means of demonstrating membership (e.g. 
community engagement).
 • Acquiring citizenship should not be contingent on the 
ability to pay. Host governments should lower fees for 
citizenship or introduce fee waivers for poor migrants. 
The US, for instance, extended a fee-waiver programme 
for naturalisation in 2016 (United States Citizen and 
Immigration Service (USCIS), 2017).  
 • Where the costs of processing citizenship applications 
present a significant burden for a host state (for 
example, mass refugee integration in a developing 
country), multilateral funding should be made available, 
to ensure timely and fair processing.
 • Naturalisation policies should include education 
and development components that also target local 
populations, to lessen prospective tensions. 
Recommendation: State and non-state actors should 
collaborate in creating programmes to provide 
migrants with the skills necessary to qualify both 
for formal citizenship and everyday practice of 
membership.
 • Such measures can include holding information sessions 
on adjusting to life in the host country, language lessons, 
facilitating entry to professional networks, setting up 
cultural mentorship programmes, and expanding access 
to microfinance programmes (Vieru, 2017). Portugal’s 
National Plan for the Integration of Migrants, for 
example, includes a holistic set of measures to help 
integration across language, employment, vocational 
training and housing (Juzwiak et al., 2014).
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Conclusion 2: Second-generation migrants are 
particularly affected by citizenship policies, which 
may exclude them from full membership of the 
communities in which they have lived all their lives.  
Recommendation: Second and subsequent 
generations of migrants should have automatic access 
to citizenship in their host communities.
 • Second-generation migrants should have an opportunity 
to register as permanent residents and/or citizens at 
birth. 
 • When it is not politically feasible to grant full citizenship 
at birth, states should provide second-generation 
migrants with opportunities to register for citizenship at 
an early date (e.g. as they enter school).
 • States should not ask second-generation migrants 
to complete a naturalisation process, which is often 
bureaucratic and prohibitively costly.
Recommendation: Host and origin country 
governments should remove any gender bars on 
citizenship that prevent women from passing on their 
citizenship to their children, and allow and facilitate 
the holding of multiple citizenships. 
 • Remove barriers that prevent emigrant citizens – 
particularly women married to non-citizens – from 
passing on their citizenship to their children. 
 • Lift legal and policy bars on holding multiple 
citizenships. This can help integration, as it means 
migrants do not have to choose one citizenship over 
others, and can foster business development and trade 
networks with origin countries.
Recommendation: Host and origin country 
governments should not deprive naturalised citizens 
or their descendants of their status arbitrarily, 
especially in cases where it would render them 
stateless.
 • Host and origin country governments that are not 
already signatories to the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (and the 1954 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons) should 
accede to these conventions.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection 
systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 
achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable. 
3.8: Achieve universal health coverage, including financial 
risk protection, access to quality essential health-care 
services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable 
essential medicines and vaccines for all. 
16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and 
international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all. 
16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms 
flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets 
and combat all forms of organized crime.
16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their 
forms.
16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions at all levels.
Relevant SDG Targets
4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, 
equitable and quality primary and secondary education 
leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes. 
4.3: By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men 
to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary 
education, including university.
16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of 
violence against and torture of children. 
16.9: By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth 
registration.
Conclusion 3: A lack of access to citizenship/
residency can limit representative decision-
making, both increasing migrant communities’ 
marginalisation and hindering progress towards SDG 
16.7. 
Recommendation: Support local and regional 
identities and statuses as alternative and interim 
means of framing inclusion and providing important 
legal rights.
 • Governments, local authorities and private 
organisations should consider extending some rights 
normally reserved for citizens, in order to foster 
inclusion. With the consent of the local community, such 
measures could include voting in local or community 
elections. In particular, migrant parents of children who 
are permanent residents and/or citizens should be able 
to participate fully in decisions relating to education.
 • Work together to build reciprocal citizenship rights 
that allow migrants to travel, work and live long-term 
across broad regional blocs as regional citizens. The 
international community should seek to support these 
processes of inclusion and regional integration.
 • Cities should work on building local forms of 
membership (e.g. by providing citywide identity cards) 
that help strengthen everyday inclusion in communities 
and provide access to important services (e.g. access to 
banking facilities) for all residents, without reference to 
national legal status.
Many thanks to Pietro Mona (SDC), Nando Sigona (University of Birmingham), Alina Rocha Menocal and Helen Dempster (ODI) for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to Sophy Kershaw for editing.
Relevant SDG Targets
11.3: By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable 
urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and 
sustainable human settlement planning and management in 
all countries.
16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and 
representative decision-making at all levels.
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